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IN THE SUPREME COURT
o~F THE STATE OF UTAH
KIMBALL ELEVATOR
COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case
No. 8066

-vs.ELEVATOR SUPPLIES
COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Appella;n.t.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
(a) Preliminary Statement

Defendant and appellant, Elevator Supplies Company, Inc., has appealed from the judgment on a verdict
of $17,085 entered March 17, 1953, in favor of plaintiff
and respondent, Kimball Elevator Company, in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R. 194,
212).
Plaintiff, the unsuccessful bidder on the Hotel Utah
passenger elevator modernization project, sued defend-

1
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ant, the successful bidder. Plaintiff alleged an express
oral agreement whereby defendant was to submit to
Utah Hotel Company a ''supporting bid'' in an amount
of $18,000 or $19,000 in excess of plaintiff's bid, and
that in "violation" of the "agreement" defendant made
a firm bid and accepted an award of the contract in its
own name. (R. 34-41). The "theory" was changed at
the trial to ''an implied agreement not to compete'' with
plaintiff, although the subject of competition 'vas never
specifically discussed. (R. 632, 651). The trial court
rejected the contentions of defendant that there 'vas no
consideration for any such purported "agreement", and
also held that federal and state statutes interdicting
agreements in restraint of trade and competition, are
''inapplicable.''
Utah Hotel Company on September 27,1950, awarded
to defendant two contracts. One 'vas for modernization
of the passenger elevators, in the sum of $78,774, Exhibit
'' J''; and the other was for installation of t"ro electric
dumb-waiter elevators, Exhibit 4. (R. 243-244, 770-771,
779-782). When plaintiff learned that defendant had
been awarded the contracts, plaintiff (whose bids on
both projects had been rejected by Utah Hotel Company), demanded that defendant (the successful bidder)
pay plaintiff a ''commission''. (R. 590-591). At the trial,
plaintiff's manager admitted that defendant never told
plaintiff at any time that defendant would give plaintiff
a "cut out of the job" if Utah Hotel Company awarded
the contracts to defendant; that defendant's manager
did not promise anything; and that there were no
2
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promises. (R. 589-590). Defendant flatly refused to pay
anything to plaintiff. (R. 893-895).
Plaintiff then asked Utah Hotel Company, owner
of the building, for a ''commission'', which was refused.
(R. 238, 240, 250-251). Plaintiff finally attempted to induce the hotel company to cancel its contract with defendant on the passenger elevators and to issue a contract
in the name of plaintiff, which the hotel management
refused to do. ( R. 239-240).
Of the total verdict, $8,555 was awarded by the jury
for" Plaintiff's loss of profit in n.ot getting contract with
Hotel Utah," (R. 194). Plaintiff's only bid on the modernization of the passenger elevators, dated August 16,
1950, Exhibit ''I'', was incomplete, vague, and said bid
was unsatisfactory to Utah Hotel Company. (R. 246-247,
263-264, 787-788, 813-817, 822, 831-832). Plaintiff's bid
on two electric dumb-waiters, was also unsatisfactory to
the hotel management, Exhibit 20. (R. 792-793). Utah
Hotel Company did not see fit to ask plaintiff if it cared
to submit another bid. (R. 264). Nor was the hotel company anxious to do business with plaintiff nor to invite
plaintiff to submit another bid, as plaintiff had not submitted a satisfactory bid to begin with. (R. 263-264).
Defendant did not solicit this particular business
f'rom the hotel company. (R. 242). Plaintiff's bid was
never discussed with defendant by the hotel company.
(R. 237). Defendant did not do nor say anything to discourage the hotel management from dealing with plain-

3
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tiff. (R. 248). Utah Hotel Company had been a customer
of defendant since 1948, Exhibit 3. (R. 243-244, 770-771,
779-782). On August 17, 1950, the management of the
hotel expressly requested defendant to submit a firm bid
on the over-all modernization project; and such request
was repeated on August 30, 1950. Such a bid was submitted about September 11, 1950, Exhibit "J". (R. 241242, 788-792). Said bid was the only one the hotel management ever obtained for doing the job as- the hotel
wanted it done. (R. 264). The hotel management also
requested defendant to submit a firm bid on the dumbwaiter elevators. Exhibit 4 is defendant's bid with the
acceptance by Utah Hotel Company. (R. 244).
The balance of the verdict, $8,530, was awarded for
"Plaintiff's loss of advertisement value", because plaintiff's name-plates were not installed in the thresholds of
the new passenger elevator cabs. (R. 194). There was
no evidence that plaintiff could possibly have been
awarded a contract, as its bid was unsatisfactory to the
offeree; the hotel management refused to entertain it,
and did not see fit to invite plaintiff to submit any further
bid. (R. 264). Plaintiff was not the manufacturer of any
of the equipment involved in the modernization. The
subject of name-plates had never been discussed by
plaintiff with the hotel management. (R. 586-587, 650),
nor was anything mentioned about it in the only bid
plaintiff ever submitted on the elevator modernization
(Exhibit "I"). Utah Hotel Company as owner of the
building refused to allow any name-plates in the elevator
cabs, except the name of the cab manufacturer, ''Tyler",
4
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in small letters on the capacity plate 1n each elevator
cab. (R. 249, 259-260, 834~835).
(b) Pleadings, motions and orders.

Kimball Elevator Company filed suit against defendant October 22, 1951 (R. 1-7). By its amended complaint, plaintiff demanded 10% of the contract price of
the passenger elevator modernization contract awarded
to defendant by Utah Hotel Company (10% of $78,774),
plus $50,000 ''damages'' for ''breach'' of an alleged
express oral agreement. Plaintiff alleged that it procured from defendant a written proposal on a portion
of the elevator modernization project in June 1950; that
plaintiff then submitted a firm bid to Utah Hotel Company in the sum of $59,600 on the entire project on
August 16, 1950; that plaintiff then obtained a quotation
on two electric dumb-waiters, and plaintiff in tum quoted
Utah Hotel Company; that defendant then "agreed"
with plaintiff to submit to Utah Hotel Company a ''supporting bid'' on the elevator modernization project in
the amount of $78,000 or $79,000 (which would be $18,400
or $19,400 in excess of the bid presented by the plaintiff) ; that "in violation of the trust and confidence between the parties and the agreement with plaintiff",
instead of a ''supporting bid'' the defendant made a
firm bid to Utah Hotel Company and accepted an award
of the contract in its own name. (R. 34-41).
Defendant challenged the validity of the complaint
and the amended complaint, by motion to dismiss. (R.
42-43). The district court denied defendant's motion to
5
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dismiss, also its alternative motion for a more definite
statement, and motions to strike. (R. 44).
By answer defendant expressly denied there was
any such agreement or any other agreement between
the parties. Defendant alleged there was no consideration for any such agreement, and also that if such an
agreement had been made the same would have been
illegal and void; that such an agreement would have
been designed to stifle competition and to aid plaintiff
to monopolize the bidding to the injury and detriment
of Utah Hotel Company as owner of the property, and
any such agreement would have b~en against public
policy and void. Defendant further alleged that plaintiff knew that Utah Hotel Company desired a bid from
defendant; that said hotel company expressly requested
defendant to submit a bid on the over-all project; that
defendant thereupon submitted to Utah Hotel Company
a bona fide bid and defendant was awarded the contract.
(R. 45-53).
On motions to strike, the district court struck out
the affirmative defense of illegality of the alleged agreement, lack of authority of any agents of defendant to
make any such agreement, and also the allegation that
Utah Hotel Company as owner of the building did not
allow name-plates in the elevator cabs. (R. 54-59).
At pre-trial conferences November 21 and December
2, 1952, there was advanced on behalf of plaintiff the
novel "theory" that an unaccepted offer may give rise
to an "impl~ed agreement not to compete" with the
6
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offeree; and that the claimed "issue" was "that when
the plaintiff requested a bid from the defendant, that
the defendant agreed to refrain from competitive competition with the plaintiff for the work on which the bid
was made, and for the work of the customer for whom
the work was to be done." (R. 62). Defendant thereupon
again moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the
ground that the pre-trial hearing disclosed that plaintiff has no cause of action, and that plaintiff cannot show
any legal consideration. ( R. 62-63).
The defendant contended that if there had been such
an agreement as alleged in the amended complaint, the
same would have been illegal and void, as an unlawful
agreement in restraint of competition in violation of
federal and state criminal statutes. The trial judge ruled
that defendant's claim that the alleged agreement would
be illegal and void, does not constitute a defense, to which
defendant excepted. (R. 62-63).
The various defenses allowed by the pre-trial order
as amended, included: (a) Denial that any contract was
ever made, inasmuch as the unaccepted offer had expired; (b) that such an agreement would have been
collusive and void; (c) that the bid on a portion of the
proposed job was obtained by plaintiff from defendant
on the false representation that plaintiff would be
awarded the contract by Utah Hotel Company; (d) that
plaintiff never entered into any agreement with Utah
Hotel Company, and that the only bid submitted was
incomplete, indefinite and unsatisfactory; (e) that there

7
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was no consideration for any agreement not to compete;
and (f) that if the plaintiff's name-plates had been placed
in the elevator cabs, the same would have constituted a
mislabeling and an unfair trade-practice, since plaintiff
was not the manufacturer of any of the equipment. (R.
62-67).
The trial court on January 19, 1953, denied defendant's motion for a summary judgment. (R. 71-79).
On March 2, 1953, following plaintiff's opening
statement, the defendant moved to dismiss the case with
prejudice. (R. 96). At the conclusion of plaintiff's case
in chief, defendant orally moved for a verdict in favor
of defendant. (R. 756-757). The trial judge deferred
ruling on such motion. (R. 764). At the close of all of
the evidence, defendant presented and filed its written
motion for a directed verdict against plaintiff, no cause
of action. (R. 106-109). Ruling on said motion was .deferred until after the verdict. (R. 963).
The court submitted the case to the JUry on the
theory that there were ''exclusive dealings'' between
the plaintiff and defendant, which the jury might consider in determining whether there was an ''implied
agreement . . . that the defendant would not compete
against the plaintiff." (R. 121). During the trial, however, the court sustained an objection to questions designed to draw admissions from plaintiff that plaintiff
did not purchase exclusively from the defendant. The
court ruled that whether .or not the dealings were exclu8
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sive, wa.s wholly immaterial. (R. 501). It was expressly
stipulated that defendant did not quote exclusively to
plaintiff, and that defendant uniformly allowed a discount of 10% from list price to all elevator companies
which purchased from defendant. (R. 858-859). Plaintiff
admitted that it purchased from other elevator companies, the same type of materials which defendant
manufactures and sells. (R. 505). Plaintiff also admitted
that notwithstanding numerous requests from plaintiff
for bids on dumb-waiters, plaintiff never at any time
purchased any dumb-waiter from defendant, but plaintiff always purchased such equipment from other companies. (R. 503, 874, 948-949, Exhibit 14). Plaintiff's
manager also admitted that l(imball Elevator Company
at no time issued any purchase order to defendant for
synchron control, signal control, nor any other modern
elevator controls manufactured by defendant, on which
plaintiff had requested bids. (R. 480-482).
Mr. Connole, plaintiff's manager, admitted that defendant never at any time told plaintiff in writing that
defendant would give plaintiff an exclusive bid; and
when asked whether defendant ever told him orally that
defendant would give an exclusive bid, Mr. Connole
answered, "Not specifically." (R. 651). He also admitted
that defendant did not at any time promise that it would
refrain from submitting a bid to any competitor, and
that such matter was never discussed. (R. 632).
When the court asked counsel for plaintiff if ''part
of your implied agreement is based on any theory that
9
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the defendant had an agreement that they would deal
exclusively 'vith you'', counsel said: ''We do not claim
that, your Honor. We do make the claim they never informed the Kimball Elevator Company they were ever
bidding or making quotations to competitors of Kimball
Elevator Company." (R. 846). Mr. Connole, however,
admitted that it is not the practice in the elevator field
for one elevator company to disclose to another company,
to whom it is bidding. (R. 520-521).
The court refused defendant's requests for instructions whereby the court would construe the written instruments, and the court declined to instruct the jury
that there can be no finding of an ''implied agreement
not to compete with plaintiff" from unaccepted offers
and from other past negotiations.
Numerous exceptions to the charge to the jury were
taken, and exceptions were also taken to the refusal of
the court to instruct as requested. (R. 963-971).
Following entry of verdict and judgment on the
verdict (R. 193-194), defendant served and filed its
motion to set aside the verdict and to vacate the judgment, and to enter judgment in favor of defendant in
accordance with the motion of defendant for a directed
verdict of no cause of action, and also a motion for new
trial in the alternative, March 24, 1953. (R. 195-200). On
June 4, 1953, both motions were denied (R. 202). Notice
of appeal was filed on July 2, 1953. (R. 212).

10
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(c) The evidence.
Plaintiff, Kimball Elevator Company, is an elevator
contractor. It does not manufacture the type of elevator
equipment involved in the modernization of the passenger elevators at Hotel Utah. Daniel W. Connole is the
manager of plaintiff corporation. Plaintiff has been
agent for Kimball Brothers Company, of Council Bluffs,
Iowa. (R. 460). About 1945, plaintiff became agent for
Murphy Elevator Company, of Louisville, Ky. (R. 301302, 460). In 1949 plaintiff also became territorial representative of Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company,
of San Francisco. (R. 328-329, 460, 688, 701).
Defendant, Elevator Supplies Company, Inc., is an
elevator equipment manufacturer. It manufactures elevator controls, signal systems, electric door operators,
relay panels, hangers, various elevator accessories, and
electric dumb-waiters. Defendant's manufacturing plant
is in New Jersey. Roy C. Smith, with office in San Francisco, has been district manager since 1924. (R. 842-843).
Defendant has issued catalogs, from which its materials can be ordered by catalog number. Plaintiff has
ordered some repair parts from defendant by catalog
number. (R. 415, 461). On jobs of any size, plaintiff has
asked for bids. (R. 461). Defendant not only sells elevator
equipment on an F.O.B. basis, but throughout the years
it has sold materials on contracts to install the equipment. It has been the practice of defendant, which has
always been engaged in interstate commerce, to submit
bids to everyone who has asked for quotations. (R. 84911
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850). As illustrated by Exhibits 34, 36, 39 and 42, when
two or more elevator companies requested defendant to
give quotations on identical equipment and installation,
the bids have been identical. It was admitted by plaintiff that defendant did not quote and sell exclusively to
plaintiff. (R. 846, 856-858).
A trade discount of 10% from list price, has always
· been allowed by defendant on all purchases by elevator
companies, whether the sale has been on an F.O.B. basis
or on an installed basis. (R. 459, 849-850). The only
way such discount can be obtained is to make the purchase. (R. 519). Defendant has sold not only to plaintiff
on that basis (R. 438, 459, 519, 743, 850), but defendant
has sold on the same discount basis to Murphy Elevator
Company, Otis Elevator Company, Montgomery Elevator
Company, Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company,
Elevator Maintenance Co., Ltd., Elevator Service and
Supply Company, and others, as illustrated by Exhibits
5, 6, 8, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, 43. Although the pla.intiff has
made numerous requests for bids, in more than 20 years,
the plaintiff has actually awarded to defendant only 7
contracts, and one of them was canceled. Most of defendant's business has come from other corporations. See
Exhibit 46. As to the numerous exhibits offered in. evidence over objections of defendant, referred to by Mr.
Connole as ''business deals'' and ''contracts,'' he admitted that the bids were never accepted, no purchase
orders ever issued and no contracts materialized. (R.
500).

12
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Prior to February 1948, Hotel Utah had purchased
various elevator repair parts from Kimball Elevator
Company, but the management became dissatisfied with
the service. Commencing February 1948, Utah Hotel
Company (owner of Hotel Utah) began to purchase
replacement parts and equipment from defendant for
rebuilding the existing equipment. Exhibit 3 consists of
a number of invoices from defendant to Hotel Utah, with
attached letter. The hotel company went directly to
defendant to expedite the repair of the equipment. (R.
770-771). Most of the elevator parts deal with door
operating equipment. The hotel rebuilt the door closing
mechanisms, prior to the time when the Utah Hotel
Company decided to undertake the modernization program. The repair of the passenger elevators was carried
on in 1948 and 1949. Some of the repair parts were
ordered by the hotel by catalog number. (R. 779-782).
At the request of Utah Hotel Company, Mr. Roy C. Smith
made an investigation of the passenger elevators and
reported to Mr. Charles W. Lerch and Associates, elevator consultants employed by the hotel, under date of
December 28, 1948, Exhibit 26. (R. 770-777). Roy C.
Smith assisted the hotel in the repair program. (R. 877787).
After Utah Hotel Company began to order equipment from defendant for the repair of the elevators,
Mr. Connole of plaintiff corporation, asked Mr. Roy C.
Smith for a "commission". Payment was refused. Mr.·
Connole was told that defendant did not pay commissions ; that it sold at a discount, and that if plaintiff had
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ordered such materials it would have purchased at a
discount. (R. 878). Defendant has never paid any commissions.
Otis Elevator Company wrote a letter to Utah Hotel
Company on December 1, 1947, Exhibit 25, stating that
the existing equipment could not successfully be adapted
to modernization. (R. 772). Some months later, in 1948,
Mr. Jerry Smith, building superintendent at Hotel Utah,
began a series of conferences with Roy C. Smith of
defendant corporation, with respect to the kind of modernization program which would be most economical to
the hotel. Jerry Smith had been instructed by management to investigate the possibility of bringing up to
date all of the passenger elevator equipment. H~ had
been dealing with Roy C. Smith on the repair program
and he had confidence in the ability of Roy C. Smith.
The hotel had used Elevator Supplies Company equipment satisfactorily for some years. Roy C. Smith pointed
out how Elevator Supplies equipment could be used in
connection with some existing elevator equipment. Jerry
Smith ultimately made recommendations to the hotel
management for use of Elevator Supplies equipment in
modernization. (R. 782-784).
Jerry Smith discussed modernization of existing
equipment with Otis Elevator Company, Elevator Service
and Supply Company, Westinghouse, and Kimball Elevator Company. He also asked for recommendations and
bids. (R. 784). On May·ll, 1950, after Kimball Elevator
Company was advised by Jerry Smith that the hotel was
14
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interested in recommendations and bids with respect to
modernization, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant, Exhibit HHH: "Please figure out the necessary Elevator
Supplies equipment to revamp the three passenger elevators in the Hotel Utah. We would like these figures
on an installed basis.''
Before submitting any quotation to plaintiff, Roy C.
Smith asked Mr. Connole of plaintiff corporation what
the bidding procedure would be on the project. Mr.
Connole admitted that he told Roy C. Smith that Kimball Elevator Company was going to do the job at Hotel
Utah; that he understood that there would be no other
bidder on this job, and that he told Roy C. Smith that
Jerry Smith stated he would not let Otis Elevator Company bid. (R. 523-524; 883). Defendant, through Roy C.
Smith, then submitted to plaintiff a bid on a portion of
the modernization of the passenger elevators, on an
installed basis, Exhibit KKK, dated June 14, 1950, delivered June 30, 1950. (R. 524, 883).
Jerry Smith never told Mr. Connole that Kimball
would be awarded the job, nor did he say that Otis would
not be allowed to bid. (R. 785). Mr. Max C. Carpenter,
manager of Hotel Utah, called to testify by plaintiff,
also said that he did not tell Mr. Connole that the Kimball bid would be accepted. (R. 242). Nor did Mr. Carpenter authorize anybody to make such a statement. (R.
242).
Plaintiff obtained a quotation dated July 13, 1950,
from Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company, Exhibit
15
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JJJ, covering a portion of the items not included in the
bid of defendant to plaintiff. Under date of August 16,
1950, the plaintiff submitted the only bid it ever presented to Utah Hotel Company on the passenger elevator
modernization, Exhibit "l". Said bid was made up by
copying the proposal obtained from defendant, except
for the price; and by including the following items without any specifications whatsoever: "Main generator and
drive control panels. Leveling units, vanes and brackets.
Three new cahs at a value of $1800 each." (R. 524-526).
The 15 repair items mentioned in the bid from Pacific
were entirely omitted.
Mr. Connole had a conversation with Jerry Smith
at the time the bid was presented to Utah Hotel Company,
Exhibit "I". (R. 533). Over the objections of defendant
that such was hearsay, and not the best evidence, the
court permitted Mr. Connole to testify as to what Jerry
Smith allegedly said. (R. 369-370). Mr. Connole said
that conversation was following August 16, 1950; that
Jerry Smith said he did not know whether the hotel
would change the outside lanterns, push buttons and
things of that type for the present; and that he wanted
to know what reduction could be obtained if the old ones
were used; and that Mr. Connole said that as soon as
they made up their minds "we could give him a firm
proposal." (R. 371-372). Mr. Connole also said that
Jerry Smith wanted to know ''if I had any suggestions
as to who they could get another bid from. I suggested
the Westinghouse Elevator Co.'' Mr. Connole further testified that Jerry Smith asked him ''if Elevator Supplies
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would give a bid on the total job, and I told him that I
did not know; that I would telephone San Francisco and
ask them if they would bid on the total job, as an estimate." (R. 371-373). He further testified: "I told him
that the bid would be by identically the same people;
ana I could not see what justification there would be for
having two people bid on identically the same equipment." (R. 575).
Jerry Smith denied that there was any discussion
about re-using the lanterns, push buttons or other equipment, after the Kimball bid was presented. (R. 788).
He testified that in the conversation with Mr. Connole
about getting other bids, ''I told him it was necessary
to get additional bids, and that I was going to ask Elevator Supplies for a bid. ... He told me that he did not
feel it would be of any value, because it would be the
same bid that he had received from them or would get
from them; it would be identical." (R. 786-787).
Jerry Smith further testified that when plaintiff's
bid dated August 16, 1950, Exhibit "I", was presented,
Mr. Connole told him that the bid covered a portion of
the necessary work; and that there was some additional
work not included in the bid which would be discussed
later; and that Mr. Connole said "we could come to
some kind of an understanding as to how it was to be
executed, whether we would do it at the hotel, which was
his recommendation, or just how the balance of the work
would be done." (R. 787, 815). Upon examination of
said bid, Jerry Smith determined that it was not a sa tis17
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factory bid; that the bid was not complete; that it did
not cover the entire scope of the work that was necessary
to have the job done as the hotel wanted it; and that
he recommended to the management of the hotel that
said bid be rejected. (R. 787 -788).
When Max C. Carpenter, manager of Hotel Utah,
examined the bid, Exhibit "I", he did not regard the
bid as satisfactory. (R. 246). He testified that he could
not tell from reading it, just what ""\\ ork would actually
be done. It was too vague. (R. 247). As to certain items
there were no specifications nor detail. (R. 235-236).
Mr. Carpenter did not discuss the matter with Mr. Connole. ( R. 236). There was a small service elevator ·installed by Kimball Elevator Company which did not
work satisfactorily, and the job of repairs by Kimball
had also been unsatisfactory, and the elevator had to
be replaced. (R. 258). Mr. Carpenter did not even submit
the l{imball bid to the executive committee. (R. 264).
The hotel management was not very anxious to do business, or invite l{imball to come back and submit another
bid, as Kimball had not submitted a satisfactory bid to
begin with. (R. 263). Mr. Connole was never asked if
l{imball cared to submit a new bid, after the hotel was
informed by him that there ""\\ras going to be a price increase. ( R. 264).
7

After examining the Kimball bid, l\fr. Carpenter
instructed Jerry Smith, building superintendent, to call
Elevator Supplies Company, Inc., at San Francisco, California, and ask defendant to submit a bid on the over
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all job. (R. 241). There were Elevator Supplies equipment in the passenger elevators, and parts had been
replaced by defendant from time to time. The hotel had
been dealing directly with defendant, and had a course
of business dealings with defendant for a period of time.
(R. 243-244). Exhibit 3 consists of a number of invoices
representing purchases by the hotel from defendant after
February 1948. (R. 242-243). When Roy C. Smith of
defendant company came to the hotel, Mr. Carpenter
told him he wanted him to present a straight-forward
bid to the hotel, which could be accepted by the hotel.
(R. 248). Defendant did not solicit this business. (R.
242).
On August 17, 1950, Jerry Smith of Hotel Utah
called Roy C. Smith of defendant corporation, at San
Francisco. Exhibit 28 is the record of the teleph<>ne call
to defendant's telephone number on that date. (R. 788790). Jerry Smith asked Roy C. Smith if Elevator Supplies Company would be interested in submitting a quotation with recommendations to the Hotel Utah covering
the modernization and general rebuilding of the elevators.
He did not ask for anything other than a firm bid. (R.
788-790). Roy C. Smith said it would be necessary for
him to give it some consideration, and to contact his
home office. (R. 789-790). About three days later, when
Roy C. Smith was in Seattle, he called and said he felt
his company would be interested, and that he would be
in Salt Lake City about the latter part of the month and
would go into detail. (R. 790-791).
19
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On ..~..L\.ugust 18, 1950, Mr. Daniel W. Connole of plaintiff corporation called Roy C. Smith, by telephone. There
is a conflict in the evidence as to what was said in such
conversation. Roy C. Smith testified that Mr. Connole
called for a quotation on two dumb-waiters, which defendant furnished by telegram dated August 22, 1950,
Exhibit 19, both on an F.O.B. basis and on an installed
basis. ( R. 885). Plaintiff offered no evidence that the
request for bids on the dumb-waiters was made in writing.
Mr. Connole testified : ''I told him that the Hotel
Utah would like to have a proposal on the .over-all job
to verify our bid and justification of the amount quoted
in our proposal and asked him if he could prepare the
same and he said he would ... he said he would have to
get in touch with the Pacific people." (R. 374). On crossexamination, when asked to state what was said by Roy
C. Smith, he testified: ''I don't remember just what he
said.'' (R. 578).
Mrs. Alice Connole, mother of Daniel W. Connole,
and secretary of Kimball Elevator Company, testified
that she listened in on the conversation her son had with
Roy C. Smith .over the telephone on August 18, 1950:
''That was when he asked for a bid, another estimate ...
He called them and told them that the hotel company
wanted a supporting bid; that Otis was not going to bid,
and that Westinghouse had too much on the coast, they
would not come into the Salt Lake territory with the
elevator business .... He said he would look it up and
let us know.'' She could not remember if there was
20
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anything else discussed. (R. 940). On cross-examination
she admitted that her son had called up Roy C. Smith
for a quotation on dumb-waiters, and it may have been
in the telephone conversation of August 18, 1950. (R.
942).
Both Roy C. Smith and Jerry Smith denied that
Mr. Connole ever said anything about a ''supporting
bid'', and denied that such a term was ever used. (R.
786, 885). Roy C. Smith never heard of that term prior
to this lawsuit, and he would not know what was meant.
(R. 884-885).
By letter dated August 28, 1950, Exhibit 20, plaintiff submitted a proposal on two electric dumb-waiters
to Utah Hotel Company, on a non-installed basis. Such
bid was unsatisfactory to Utah Hotel Company as it
'vas only interested in bids on an installed basis. (R.
249}. Furthermore, the bid was incomplete, and it contained no specifications whatsoever. (R. 793).
Mr. Roy C. Smith and Mr. Charles Maynard Henker
came to Salt Lake City on August 29, 1950. Mr. Henker
was one of the partners in Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company. (R. 695-696). Prior to coming, Roy C.
Smith asked Mr. Henker if Pacific would submit a bid
to defendant on a portion of the project on an installed
basis (R. 673). At that time defendant was not manufacturing the power controls. Mr. Henker said it would
be all right if ''it is all right with Kimball Elevator Company'', as Pacific had already submitted a bid to Kim21
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ball. (R. 673-674). Kimball was then representative of
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company in Utah. (R.
688). Mr. Henker said he would not make a bid to defendant without clearance from Kimball. (R. 674). He
also told Mr. Roy C. Smith that he thought it would be
absolutely necessary to make a complete survey of the
job at the job site. (R. 716). There had been business
dealings for many years between defendant and Pacific,
always on the basis of a request for bid, submission of
a quotation or bid, and a purchase order. That had been
true both ways. (R. 725). Contracts have always been
in writing. (R. 727).
There was a conference on August 30, 1950, between
Max C. Carpenter, manager of Hotel Utah, Jerry Smith,
building superintendent, and Roy C. Smith of defendant
corporation. Mr. Carpenter testified that he had asked
Jerry Smith to call Roy C. Smith for a bid from defendant on the over-all elevator modernization. On this
occasion Mr. Carpenter asked Roy C. Smith to submit
a bid to the hotel on modernization of the three passenger elevators. Defendant did not solicit the business.
(R. 242). Mr. Carpenter told Roy C. Smith that he expected Roy C. Smith to present a straight-forward bid
to the hotel-one that could be accepted by the hotel.
(R. 248). There was no discussion about the Kimball
bid. Roy C. Smith did not say or do anything to discourage Mr. Carpenter from dealing with Kimball. (R.
248). Mr. Carpenter at that time also asked Roy C. Smith
to submit a bid on two electric dumb-waiters. (R. 244).
They went over the elevator openings and made a
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thorough inspection and examination, and Mr. Carpenter
told Roy C. Smith the things he wanted done. (R. 250).
Mr. Henker testified that after he and Roy C. Smith
arrived in Salt Lake City, they talked to some of the
hotel people, ''Then we made a very thorough survey
of the equipment down to the last detail, preparatory
to making up a firm bid to Elevator Supplies Company.''
(R. 676). Nir. Jerry Smith told Mr. Henker that the
management had invited Elevator Supplies Company
to submit a bid on the over-all job, and that the hotel
wanted Elevator Supplies equipment used as far as
possible. (R. 716-717). Mr. Henker spent whatever time
he thought was necessary to determine just how much
this job should cost for Pacific equipment and supplies,
plus installation charges, before submitting a bid to
defendant. The purpose of his visit to Salt Lake City
was to determine what to bid to defendant. (R. 717-718).
There was a conversation that day between Roy C.
Smith, Daniel W. Connole and Charles Maynard Henker,
on the way to the Park Building at the University. Roy
C. Smith testified that he told Mr. Connole that he
wanted him to know that Hotel Utah had asked defendant
for a bid on the entire job, and that defendant was going
to submit a bid; and that Mr. Henker came here to make
a survey of the job to quote on an installed basis. Mr.
Henker asked Nlr. Connole if it was all right to give
defendant a bid, and Mr. Connole told Mr. Henker, yes,
as long as they were bidding list price. (R. 886-887).
23
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Mr. Henker testified that he told M1'. Connole that
he had been requested by defendant to bid on the Hotel
Utah job on an installed basis, and he wanted to be sure
that Mr. Connole had no objections to subxnitting a bid
to Elevator Supplies Company. Mr. Connole made some
\
statement to the effect that he knew that the hotel management had requested additional bids on the over-all
job. (R. 718). Mr. Henker said that he had already bid
to Kimball so he asked Mr. Smith and Mr. Connole
whether they were in agreement, as he wanted to clear
himself of any wrongdoing as far as Kimball Elevator
Company was concerned. (R. 676-677). He said they
indicated they were in agreement, but that was all that
was said. (R. 677).
On direct examination Mr. Connole testified that
Mr. Henker said: "While I have the two of you together,
you understand Mr. Smith is going to place a proposal
to the Utah Hotel. Am I to give him your figures~'' Mr.
Connole told him "Yes." He did not recall whether anything else was said. (R. 37 4-375). On cross-examination
Mr. Connole admitted that he told Mr. Henker it was all
right to submit a bid to Roy C. Smith, but he did not
know if that was the exact language. (R. 572). He admitted that on deposition he testified: ''The Elevator
Supplies Company requested the information from Mr.
Henker, and Mr. Henker refused to give it to them, until
he had my permission and that it was finally understood
that I knew they were bidding it." (R. 572). "He told
me that he could not give them a quotation, because we
were figuring the job and representing them-unless it
24
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was with our permission.... I told him it was all right.''
(R. 573).
Eight days later, Pacific presented a firm bid to
defendant dated September 7, 1950, Exhibit 18. (R. 717).
The bid was on an installed basis. By letter dated September 15, 1950, addressed to plaintiff, Exhibit '' F' ',
Pacific increased its original bid of July 13, 1950, from
$3050 per car to $3715 per car (R. 714), or nearly 22%.
There was a 30% increase in price of electrical equipment alone that year. (R. 734-735). In the letter of
Pacific to plaintiff, Pacific advised of the price increase
and stated: "l\1r. Henker made an extensive survey of
the present installation and we wish to add the following
items of repair work which you would have to figure
locally:'' ( 8 items including new hoist cables, governor
cables, etc.). Mr. Henker said that Pacific called attention to those additional items so that if Kimball had an
opportunity to revise its bid, it could take those items
into consideration. (R. 714-715). Pacific intended that
Kimball should rely on its new quotation. (R. 736). A
quotation from Pacific is only good for 30 days. (R. 734735).
As of September 11, 1950, defendant submitted two
bids to Utah Hotel Company, Exhibit "J" on the overall passenger elevator modernization, and Exhibit 4 on
two electric dumb-waiter elevators on an installed basis.
On the same day, defendant also submitted to plaintiff
two new bids, both dated September 11, 1950, Exhibit
LLL. One was a new proposal on the passenger elevators
25
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with the elimination of the provision for night attendant
in one elevator, and a price increase from $30,126 quoted
as of June 14, 1950, Exhibit KKK, to $32,020. A new
proposal was also made on the dumb-waiters. Defendant
quoted plaintiff, list price less 10%, but quoted Utah
Hotel Company list price.
Plaintiff admitted that after rece1v1ng new quotations from both defendant and Pacific, plaintiff did not
present any new bid to the Utah Hotel Company. (R.
542). There was a discussion between plaintiff and Utah
Hotel Company about price increase, but there is a
dispute as to what was said. (R. 534-535, 794-796, 816817).
On September 2·7, 1950, Utah Hotel Company accepted both proposals of defendant, and signed the contracts, Exhibit "J" and Exhibit 4.
Mr. Connole was asked if he was trying to keep Hotel
Utah from getting a bid on the over-all job from Elevator
Supplies Company. He testified: ''I wasn't trying to
keep them from it.'' (R. 579). He further testified that
prior to the award of the contract he did not tell anyone
at the hotel not to award the contract to defendant. Then
he added, "I never knew they would consider it." (R.
596). Mr. Connole also testified that Roy C. Smith did
not say that he would not submit a firm bid to Utah Hotel
Company. (R. 589). Also, Roy C. Smith did not at any
time tell Mr. Connole that if the Hotel Utah awarded
the contract to defendant, defendant would give plaintiff
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any cut out of the job. Mr. Connole admitted there was
no cu.t, and there were no promises. (R. 589-590).
When Mr. Connole learned that the contract had
been awarded to defendant, he said he told Roy C. Smith,
''I expected my regular commission on this job, as I had
estimated in my figure." (R. 590). Defendant never at
any time paid any commissions. It merely sold to elevator companies at a discount of 10% from list price.
( R. 895). When 1\tlr. Connole demanded a ''commission'',
Roy C. Smith told him defendant absolutely would not
pay any commission; and that defendant merely allowed
a discount to elevator companies on the materials which
they purchased from defendant. (R. 893-895).
Mr. Connole then went to Hotel Utah and asked Mr.
Carpenter for a "commission" on the job awarded to
defendant. (R. 238, 240). Mr. Carpenter said he would
not pay any commission because there was no commission
to pay; that Hotef Utah was dealing with Elevator Supplies Company; that Hotel Utah had put the job out on
bid, and Kimball had not been the successful bidder. (R.
250). Ivir. Connole then attempted to induce Utah Hotel
Company to change the contract from defendant to Kimball, on the assurance that it would not cost any more.
Mr. Carpenter refused to do anything to change the
contract in any way, shape or form. (R. 239-240).
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company received
a purchase order from defendant, October 4, 1950, Exhibit 2. After the job got under way, Pacific employed
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defendant's men to do its part of the work. (R. 722-723).
The two jobs, on elevator modernization, and on the
dumb-waiter elevators, were successfully and satisfactorily performed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON WHICH APPELLANT
RELIES FOR REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT
1. The motions to dismiss should have been granted
for the reason plaintiff's pleadings show that plaintiff
was not entitled to any judicial relief.
2. The pre-trial order recites as the "issue" a purported ''agreement not to compete'' which would be
utterly void if proved: (a) For want of consideration,
(b) as a restraint of trade illegal at common law, and
(c) as a violation of federal and state criminal statutes.
3. No agreement to refrain from competing with
plaintiff could be implied from numerous unaccepted
written offers nor from other negotiations which had
terminated.
4. Defendant 'vas entitled to a directed verdict, for
the evidence not only fails to show any agreement to
refrain from competition, but the evidence requires a
finding that plaintiff recognized the right of defendant
to submit bona fide bids to Utah Hotel Company as well
as the right of the hotel company to obtain firm bids
from defendant.
5. Plaintiff was the only wrongdoer, (a) by practice of deceit in an effort to prevent competition, and
28
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(b) by attempting to exact a spurious "commission"
from defendant as successful bidder, and by wrongfully
attempting to deprive defendant of its contract.
6. There was no competent evidence that plaintiff
would have obtained the modernization contract, and no
competent proof of any damages.
7. There was no proof of legal consideration.
8. The trial court deprived defendant of basic
rights, by injecting fictitious issues into the case, by
prejudicial comments on evidence, by receiving inadmissible evidence of plaintiff, by excluding competent evidence of defendant, and by rejecting a number of
defenses.
9. The court misdirected the jury prejudicially both
as to the law and as to the evidence, and the court also
withheld from the jury various theories of defense by
refusing to give appropriate instructions.
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ARGUMENT
PoiNT

1.

THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASON PLAINTIFF'S PLEADINGS SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY JUDICIAL RELIEF.
The complaint and the amended complaint both
show on their face that plaintiff as unsuccessful bidder
on the Hotel Utah elevator modernization projects,
sought to exact ''damages'' from defendant, the successful bidder. Claim was not made that defendant
unlawfully interfered with presentation of a proper bid
by plaintiff. Plaintiff sued because of frustration of its
scheme to deprive Utah Hotel Company of its right to
obtain a firm bid from dependant. Plaintiff alleged an
express collusive agreement.
Stripped of its verbiage and diversionary allegations, the amended complaint, like the original complaint
in substance states: That plaintiff is a Utah corporation
engaged in general elevator construction, repair and
supply business; that defendant is a New Jersey corporation; that under date of June 14, 1950, plaintiff
procured from defendant a written proposal to furnish
the plaintiff on an jnstalled basis in connection with
modernization of the passenger elevators at Hotel Utah,
the signal control system, and other equipment at a
price of $30,126 ; that prices were list and subject to
discount of 10%; that on August 16, 1950, plaintiff made
30
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a written offer to Utah Hotel Company to perform the
passenger elevator modernization at a firm price of
$59,600; that on August 22, 1950, plaintiff obtained from
defendant a proposal to furnish and install two dumb
waiters at Hotel Utah, and on August 28, 1950, plaintiff
made a written offer to furnish such dumb waiters to
the hotel; that it was "then agreed between the plaintiff
and the defendant companies that a supporting bid
would be made by the defendant company to the Hotel
Utah Company on the over-all job", and after a conference between officers of the two companies, "it was
thereafter agreed that a bid would be made by the defendant company to the Hotel Utah Company on the
same modernization job in the amount of $78,000.00 or
$79,000.00''; that thereafter a representative of defendant conferred with a representative of Utah Hotel Company and agreed upon new and additional specifications;
that ''in violation of the trust and confidence between
the parties and the agreement with the plaintiff company to merely submit a supporting bid, the defendant
company ... made a ne,v, separate and firm bid upon
the changed and altered project''; and that defendant
''made its independent bid and accepted a contract to
perform and complete the entire and altered project in
its own name and right." The plaintiff demanded 10%
of the contract price and $50,000 ''damages''. (R. 34-41).

..

: !':

By answer to interrogatory No. 8 plaintiff stated
under oath: "It is a fact that the Utah Hotel Company
stated it wanted more than one firm to bid on the job."
(R. 23). Any bid which the defendant submitted to Utah
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Hotel Company was expected by the hotel company to
be a genuine bid, or in other words, a bona fide offer to
perform. The dictionary definition of "bid" is "an act
of one who bids something; an offer, as of a price at an
auction; a statement of what one will give or do for
something to be received, or will take for something to
be done, or furnished; also that which is offered."

The pleadings of plaintiff state a collusive agreement, but fail to state any consideration whatsoever.
There is no allegation that plaintiff agreed to give defendant anything. No valid agreement is alleged. Any
agreement of such a character would have been void,
with or without consideration. If there had been consiaeration, it would have been clearly a conspiracy to
commit a fraud on Utah Hotel Company. Plaintiff could
not possibly be entitled to any judicial relief, for plaintiff shows that it was frustrated from doing that which
it never had a legal right to do, either at common law
or under statute.
In Pittsburgh Dredging &; Construction Co. v. Mo·nongahela &; Western Dredging Co., 139 F. 780, both
plaintiff and defendant were bidders for removal of slag
from the bed of a stream, for a private steel company.
Defendant in that case agreed to bid $1.60 per yard and
plaintiff agreed to bid $1.70 per yard, with the understanding that whichever party was awarded the contract, the other was to be given half the work. After a
change in requirements, both bids were rejected; and
defendant put in a bid for $1.25. Plaintiff tendered half
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of the work of performance, which defendant refused.
Plaintiff sued for breach of the agreement. It was held
that such an agreement constituted a conspiracy to
defraud the owner awarding the contract, and that such
agreement was void as against public policy, so that
recovery was precluded. The court further held that
the rule which is applicable to bids on public works is
also applicable to private contracts. The court said that
a party calling for bids is entitled to have bona fide
bids based upon actual competitive bidding, not collusive
bids designed to make it appear that one party has submitted a good faith bid when in fact he has not.
The court said: ''In all cases where contracts are
claimed to be void as against public policy, it matters
not that any particular contract is free from any taint
of actual fraud, oppression, or corruption. The law
looks to the general tendency of such contracts. The
vice is in the very nature of the contract, and it is condemned as belonging to a class which the law will not
tolerate." Richardson v. Crandall, 48 N. Y. 348, cited
with approval in McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 654,
19 S. Ct. 845, 43 L. Ed. 1117. Finally, the court stated:
''. . . Viewed from the standpoint of morals,
square dealing, and commercial integrity, combinations for collusive, misleading biddings, wherever made, cannot be approved; yet to enforce
rights based on an agreement to make such bids
is to make the law an active agent to accomplish
such deceptive purposes. In view of this result,
we think the law should adjudge such agreements
void on the broad ground of public policy ... ''
33
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In Daily v. Hollis,. 27 Tex. Civ. App. 570, 66 S. W~
586, a private corporation called for bids for the erection
of a gas plant. One .of the bidders agreed with the other
that one of them should make a higher bid, and upon
the award of the contract, there should be a sharing of
profits. The court held that such an agreement was void
as against public policy, and denied recovery. To the
same effect is Ray v. lf!l ackin, 100 Ill. 246.
The allegations of plaintiff's pleadings sho'v au
intent on the part of plaintiff to prevent Utah Hotel
Company from obtaining from defendant a bona fide
firm bid, and that the design of plaintiff was to prevent
competition. The owner of real estate who calls for bids
is entitled to obtain bona fide bids. Any scheme to
circumvent the efforts of Utah Hotel Company to obtain
firm bids, by having defendant submit a bid which would
not be intended as a firm bid, would have been fraudulent, not merely on the part of defendant, but on the
part of plaintiff. The rule is well-stated in Corbin on
Contracts, (1951), Sec. 1468:
agreement for the suppression of competition is a matter of restraint of trade and commerce, and if the bidding relates to the making
of a contract with a private individual it is a
fraud upon such person and is unenforceable, for
it is in the public interest to prevent a fraud upon
such person. ' '
'' A11

It is true that the plaintiff did not allege any consideration for such an agreement; but that merely shows
that the agreement, if made, would be unenforceable for
34
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want of consideration if it had been legal; but the lack
of consideration could not make it any less fraudulent
as to Utah Hotel Company, as the intended victim of
such collusive agreement. Not having a right to make
such an agreement, the plaintiff could not have been
damaged by the breach of it; and it could not be damaged when it gave no legal consideration anyway.
PoiNT

2.

THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER RECITES AS THE
"ISSUE" A PURPORTED "AGREEMENT NOT TO
COMPETE'' WHICH WOULD BE UTTERLY VOID
IF PROVED: (A) FOR WANT OF CONSIDERATION, (B) AS A RESTRAINT OF TRADE ILLEGAL
AT COMMON LAW, AND (C) AS A VIOLATION OF
FEDERAL AND STATE CRIMINAL STATUTES.
The defendant renewed its motion to dismiss at the
pre-trial conference. It was improper for the court to
allow plaintiff to go to trial on some nebulous claim of
an "implied agreement not to compete with plaintiff"
when such claim is in defiance of law just as much as
an express agreement to that effect. The law cannot
be circumvented by doing indirectly, that which a person cannot do directly.
The following statement was made as the "issue"
at the pre-trial conference, whereupon the defendant
again moved to dismiss the case :
"The court finds that plaintiff's cause of
action is based on an alleged contract between the
35
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plaintiff and the defendant that when the plain
tiff requested a bid from the defendant, that the
defendant agreed to refrain from competitive
competition with the plaintiff for the work on
which the bid was made, and for the work of the
customer for whom the work was to be done.''
(R. 62).
(A) Any "agreement" of such a character would
have been void for want of consideration.

Both the plaintiff and the trial judge refused to
make any statement as to what consideration there would
be for such purported "agreement". The recital of an
agreement not to compete, does not show any consideration, legal or illegal. The statement of the "issue" sugg~sts that a separate agreement arose each time the
plaintiff procured a bid from defendant. .l\. request for
a bid does not constitute consideration, and it is not
even an offer.
An analysis of the ''issue'' shows that there is no
consideration. An offeree is under no duty to accept a
bid, even if the offeree solicits the bid. By failure of
plaintiff as offeree to accept any bid of defendant, under
such a theory as stated in the pre-trial order, defendant
could be prevented from getting any business, whether
plaintiff's failure to accept were due to acceptance of
the bid of defendant's competitor or due to plaintiff's
inability to obtain the award of a. contract.
In 1 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 31, page.74, it is
pointed out that a request for bids is not an offer : ''That
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is, an ordinary advertisement for bids or tenders is not
itself an offer, but the bid or tender is an offer which
creates no right until accepted."
Inasmuch as an offer creates no right until accepted,
it is palpably absurd to say that while failure to accept
an offer cannot give rise to an express contract, it will
nevertheless give rise to an implied contract to refrain
from competing with the offeree. Until there is accept_ance of an offer,. there is no contract, and that means
there is no consideration.
Consideration has been defined as a benefit to the
promisor or a loss or detriment to the promisee. 17 C. J.
S., s~c. 70, page 420. The statement of ''issue'' does not
suggest that plaintiff promised to accept the offer of
defendant which plaintiff procured, so there could be
no consideration and no contract, express or implied.
A contract must be supported by consideration to be
valid and legally enforceable. 17 C. J. S., sec. 71, page
421. Plaintiff· did not claim at the pre-trial conference
that it suffered any detriment or gave any promise in
return for the pretended implied promise of defendant
to refrain from competing. The pre-trial order shows a
scheme to get something for nothing, since plaintiff
promised nothing nor suffered any detriment for the
''implied promise'' not to compete.

lt ~

:~~

The so-called ''agreement'' is fictitious on its face,
involving a naked promise on the part of defendant to
refrain from doing that which defendant had a right
37
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to do, without any obligation on the part of plaintiff to
do anything or to give anything.
As will be illustrated later, the rule is that agreements in restraint of trade are illegal and void. Among
the few exceptions to the rule are agreements involving
the sale of an established business with the good will of
the business, by the terms of which sale the seller may
agree to refrain from competing with the buyer within
a limited area or territory for a specified period of time.
Such agreements are permitted as exceptions to the
general rule on the theory that refraining from competition with the vendee is incident to sale of the business.
Failure to enforce the express agreement to refrain
from competing 'vith the vendee might operate to deprive
the purchaser of his newly acquired business.
Inasmuch as the law discourages restraints of trade,
even agreements for the sale of a business with a covenant to refrain from competition, will be strictly construed, and will not be extended beyond the express
terms by implication. Rapalee v. John Malmquist & Son,
165 Iowa 249, 145 N. W. 279.

Such. a restrictive coven.an.t must be ancillary to a
lawful agreement, and such restrictive covenant must
be supported by. a valuable consi(leration". As pointed
out in 5 Williston on C ontra.cts, Sec. 1636, page 4580 :
' ' . . . A rule of the early decisions, still operative, that consideration must be given for a restrictive promise, even though it is under seal
accords with the broader principle that the re:
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ui:

strictive promise must be ancillary to some permissible transaction.''
Inasmuch as the purported ''agreement not to compete'' could not be ancillary to a valid contract, inasmuch
as the procurement of an unaccepted bid does not constitute a contract, there could be no valid basis for an
agreement not to compete. Furthermore, there is :q.othing which even resembles consideration.
The pre-trial order stated no cause of action, but
a scheme to get something without consideration, which
the law cannot condone.
(B) Such a purported "agreement not to compete''

would have been illegal and void a.t common law.
The pre-trial order clearly shows that the purpose
of the plaintiff was to prevent a prospective customer
or owner of property from obtaining a competitive bid
from defendant. Such purpose would have been illegal
because it would operate to deprive the prospective customer or the owner of property of his legal right to
obtain competitive bids. Such agreements have never
been countenanced in America. As codified in The Restatement of the Law, Contracts, Sections 513, 516, 517,
577, inter alia, specify:
''Sec. 513 : A bargain is in restraint of trade
when its performance would limit competition in
any business or restrict a promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation.''
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"Sec. 516: Comment on Clause (e).
''g. An agreement providing for exclusive
dealing between the parties, while not in itself
necessarily illegal is not unlikely to involve an
attempt to obtain a monopoly. In such a case the
agreement is illegal ... ''
''Sec. 517: A bargain not to bid at an auction,
or any public competition for a sale or contract,
having as its primary object to stifle competition,
is illegal.
"Comment:
''a. The common case of the application of
the rule stated in the Section is in bargains not
to bid at auction sales or at other competitive
sales. Competition may also be stifled, however,
by an agreement so to bid as to affect injuriously
the final result of the competition even though the
number of bidders is not diminished. (See illustration 6).
.* *
*
'' 4. A, advertises for bids for the construction of a building. B, a contractor, promises
$1,000 each to C and D if they will refrain from
bidding. They do so. The bargains are illegal.
:1(:.

* * * *
"6. A, B, C and D, building contractors
agree with one another to form the X association
and that in future bids for the award of building
contracts the successful bidder shall pay the X
association 2 percent of the gross amount of the
price fixed in the contract awarded. The agreement between A, B, C and D is illegal.''
''Sec. 577. A bargain, performance of which
would tend to harm third parties by deceiving
the~ as to ~at.erial.facts, or by defrauding them,
or Without Justrficat1on by other means, is illegal.''
40
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As previously pointed out, an agreement for the
suppression of competition whereby a person agrees to
refrain from bidding to a private person, it is a. fraud
upon such person and such agreement is unenforceable.
In each of the situations where the plaintiff would have
had defendant refrain from submitting a bid to the
prospective customer or owner of property, the prospective customer or owner would have been the victim.
The plaintiff had no right to make any agreement to
defraud Hotel Utah or anyone else. Yet, such was the
purpose of the purported agreement not to compete.
Such a scheme was especially reprehensible in this type
of case where Hotel Utah had been a customer of defendant for over two years.
In 5 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1663, page 4691,
under "Bargains to stifle competitive bidding", the rule
is stated:
''A bargain not to bid at an auction or other
competitive sale, or on the competitive award of
a contract, is illegal a.nd unenforceable by either
party if the primary purpose was to stifle competition and secure an unfair advantage over the
vendor or the person awarding the contract. Bargains directly tending ·to chill competition, such
as one that the successful bidder shall pay a percentage to his competitors, or employ a possible
competitor to perform the c·ontract at a pre-agreed
price, constitute illegal stifling of competition.
Competition may also be stifled by a bargain so
to bid as to affect injuriously the :final result of
the competition though the number of bidders is
not lessened. . . . It may probably be assumed
that if the contract is against public policy, so
41
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far as the parties to it are concerned, it is also
fraudulent as regards the seller or one awarding
the contract, and the converse of this proposition
is undoubtedly true. ' '
Obviously, under the amended complaint the theory
of plaintiff was that defendant agreed to submit a ''supporting bid'' to Utah Hotel Company in an amount of
$18,000 or $19,000 in excess of the bid presented by
plaintiff. In view of the written answer to interrogatory
that Utah Hotel Company "stated that it wanted more
th ...n one firm to bid on the job", (R. 23), the plaintiff
alJ~ged an illegal agreement, one which would have been
a rjalpable fraud on Hotel Utah. The pre-trial order
chEtaged the theory to allege an agreement not to compete with plaintiff, equally reprehensible and fraudulent,
whether the design was to prevent defendant from submitting a firm bid to Utah Hotel Company or any other
person desiring to obtain from defendant a bona fide bid.
(

In the cases above cited, where a party to an illegal
agreement promised to pay the other party a sum of
money or give part of the profit for not submitting a
bid or for making a higher bid, the agreement was pronounced illegal and void. Even if no promise had been
made to give consideration for such an illegal agreement, the agreement of such character would not be
valid or enforceable, for either illegal consideration or
lack of any consideration would render the agreement
void. Furthermore, it is the nature of the agreement,
the purpose of which is _to deprive an owner of property
of his right to obtain fair and honest bids and thereby
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circumvent his freedom of contract, which makes the
agreement fraudulent and void.
The purported ''implied agreement not to compete
with plaintiff", could not possibly come within the exception to the rule prohibiting agreements in restraint
of competition, since the so-called ''agreement'' could
not be arncillary to some lawful agreement. An unaccepted offer is not a contract, so it would be utterly
impossible for such pretended agreement to be ancillary
to a lawful agreement. The pre-trial order utterly f?1ils
to state a valid contract to which an agreement not to
compete with plaintiff, could possibly be ancillary, Zor
the order fails to show anything other than an unaccetted
bid, which cannot be a contract. There is nothing·· to
exempt the ''agreement'' from obvious illegality.
(C) Any such ''agreement''

~vould

have violated
federal and state criminal statutes, and would have
been void.
The trial court entertained the idea that the plaintiff could avoid the inexorable prohibitions of the federal
and state statutes, by abandoning the idea. of an express
agreement such as alleged in the amended complaint,
and by adopting a theory of an ''implied agreement not
to compete''. Neither the federal nor state statutes
exempt ''implied agreements in restraint of competition.''
Even if such an agreement to refrain from bidding
did not affect the movement of goods in interstate com43
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merce, the "agreement" recited in the pre-trial order,
even if it were not void for "~ant of consideration, would
be void as a violation of the statutes of this state. Section 50-1-3, U. C. A. 1953, declares:
"It shall not be lawful for any corporation
. . ., or an agent, officer, employee, director or
stockholder of any corporation, to enter into any
combination, contract or agreement with any person or persons, the purpose or effect of which
shall be . . . to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce within this state."
Section 50-1-6, U. C. A. 1953, d.eclares that "Any
contract or agreement in violation of any provision of
this chapter shall be absolutely void.'' In Endicott v.
Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 16 P. 2d 673, under similar California statutes, it was held that contracts entered into
for the purpose of preventing competition are void as
in restraint of trade and as tending to,vard monopoly.
Such contracts need not actually result in monopoly to
be void. The criminal penalties provided by our statutes
are severe, to say the least.
Inasmuch as plaintiff pleaded by amended complaint
that defendant expressly agreed to submit a bid to Utah
Hotel Company in an amount $18,000 or $19,000 in excess
of the bid submitted by plaintiff, it is well to point out
that the Legislature in enacting the Unfair Practices
Act, Sec. 13-5-3, U. C. A. 1953, did not distinguish between activities done either directly or indirectly:
''That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com44
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merce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality, ... or to injure, destroy
or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of
them; ... "
Section 13-5-13, U. C. A. 1953, makes ''Any contract
express or implied ... in violation of any of the provisions of this act ... an illegal contract and no recovery
thereon shall be had. ' '
Our state statutes are patterned after the federal
statutes, and the federal courts have left no room for
doubt that contracts of the character stated in the pretrial order would be criminal and void.
The pleadings show that defendant Is engaged in
interstate commerce. As indicated by 15 ·U. S. C. A.,
sec. 1:
''Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states, ...
is declared to be illegal. . . . ''
Inasmuch ·as the defendant was and is engaged in
interstate commerce, defendant could not have done any
differently than it did throughout the years, which was
to quote and offer to sell to all persons who sought to
purchase, without discriminating against any person. As
stated in 15 U. S. C. A., sec. 13 :
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
In commerce, in the course of such commerce,
45
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either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality, where either or any of
the purchases involved in such discrimination are
in commerce, where such commodities are sold for
use, consumption, or resale within the United
States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination,
or with customers of either of them; ... ''
The federal statutes interdict monopolies and restraints of trade. Criminal penalties are imposed, but
in addition to criminal penalties for entering into agreements in restraint of trade or to create a monopoly in
interstate commerce, Congress provided that the injured
party may recover treble damages, 15 U. S. C. A., sec.
15. Thus, Utah Hotel Company would have had a cause
of action for treble damages against plaintiff and defendant if any such agreement had been entered into
as contended by plaintiff. The United States Supreme
Court in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 500,
60 S. Ct. 982, 996, 84 L. Ed. 1311, 128 A. L·. R. 1044, said
that ''this court has not departed from the conception
of the Sherman Act as affording a remedy, public and
private, for the public wrongs which flow from restraints
of trade in the common law sense of restriction or suppression of commercial competition.''

In Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc.,. 263 U. S. 291,
311, 312, 44 S. Ct. 96, 100, 68 L. Ed. 308, the Supreme
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Court declared illegal under the Sherman Act any agree·ment to refrain from selling to a particttlar person or
class of persons:
''The alleged purpose and direct effect of the
combination and conspiracy was to put an end to
these contracts and future business of the same
character and 'restricts, in that regard, the liberty
of a trader to engage in business' (Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 27 4, 293, 28 S. Ct. 301, 303, 52 L. Ed.
488, 13 Ann. Cas. 815) and, as a necessary corollary, to restrain interstate trade and commerce
in violation of the Anti-Trust Act."
As stated in United States v. Southern Wholesale
Grocers' Ass'n., 207 Fed. 434, at 439, on the subject of
monopolies interdicted by the Sherman Act:
''It may be conceded, as contended by the
plaintiff, that a contract between many engaged
in the same business to refrain from selling to
an individual, or a class would be an illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, unenforceable at law and subjecting the participants
to a criminal prosecution thereunder. Such a contract might be express or implied, or consist of a
mere combination or conspiracy to accomplish
that end. No definite form of agreement is required.... " (Italics added.)
The foregoing case disposes of the contention that
the plaintiff could get around the statute by an implied
agreement instead of an express agreement. In United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 174, 31 S.
Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663, the court pointed out that the
term "restraint of trade" used in the statute is the
common law definition; that the statute was designed to
47
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protect the individual right to contract, and to preserve
the fundamental right of freedom of trade. It is obvious
that the "agreement not to compete with plaintiff" was
designed to circumvent the fundamental right of Utah
Hotel Company to make a contract with defendant, and
to interfere with the individual right to contract.
In United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100, 68 S. Ct.
941, it was held that it is not always necessary to find a
specific intent to restrain trade or to create a monopoly.
Furthermore, that
''It is indeed 'unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market.'
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S.
392, 396, 68 S. Ct. 12. The anti-trust laws are as
much violated by the prevention of competition
as by its destruction. * * * ''
In a footnote to United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60S. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed. 1129, it is stated
that ''the amount of interstate or foreign trade involved
is not material (Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38,
24 S. Ct. 307, 48 L. Ed~ 608), since §1 of the Act brands
as illegal the character of the restraint, not the amount
of commerce affected. Steers v. United States, 6 Cir.,
192 F. 1, 5; Patterson v. United States, 6 Cir., 222 F.
599, 618, 619. '' Furthermore in the main opinion in
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra, the
court held that pretended good intentions on the part
of the person who seeks to prevent competition on the
ground that ''competition is ruinous to the industry'',
cannot be used as a defense to either criminal prosecution or injunction proceedings :
48
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'' * * * Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing
schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry of
ruinous competition and competitive evils to be
a defense to price-fixing agreements. It has no
more allowed genuine or fancied competitive
abuses as a legal justification for such schemes
than it has the good intentions of the members
of the combination. If such a shift is to be made,
it must be done by the Congress. Certainly Congress has not left us with any such choice.''

It 'vas not within the discretion of the trial court to
say that the purported ''agreement not to compete 'vith
plaintiff", whereby defendant would be required to
abstain from bidding, should be sanctioned when the law
prohibits the purpose and the effect of such an agreement as well a.s the agreement itself, whether with or
'vithout consideration.
Even agreements to divide territory, whereby one
party promises not to compete within the area, are also
void. Pennsylvania W. & P. Co. v. Consolida.ted G., E.
L. & P. Co., 184 F. 2d 552. (Certiorari denied).
In 5 Williston on Con tracts, Sec. 1658, page 4664, in
referring to the Sherman Act, it is stated that "Agreements to fix prices, . . . to refrain from selling to an
individual or a class, are all within the statute.''
If the plaintiff could have proved the agreement
stated in the pre-trial order, (assuming that consideration could have been established), plaintiff would have
49
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proved only a criminal offense, and a fraud on Utah
Hotel Company 'vith a right of the hotel to recover
treble damages.
The court erred in denying each of the motions to
dismiss the action.

PoiNT

3.

NO AGREEl\fENT TO REFRAIN FROl\f COMPETING WITH PLAINTIFF COULD BE IMPLIED
FROM NUMEROUS UNACCEPTED WRITTEN
OFFERS NOR FROM OTHER NEGOTIATIONS
WHICH HAD TERMINATED.·
Plaintiff was only an occasional purchaser of some
of defendant's equipment. Notwithstanding numerous
requests for bids, and the submission of numerous
written bids to plaintiff, in more than 20 years the plaintiff awarded defendant only 6 contracts (except for one
other which was later cancelled). On ·some types of
equipment, such as dumb-waiters, plaintiff requested
bids from defendant on numerous occasions, but invariably purchased from competitors of defendant. Plaintiff
ordered some replacement parts from defendant by
catalog number, on occasions. It is undisputed that defendant did not sell nor offer to sell to plaintiff on terms
more favorable than terms granted by defendant to other
elevator companies. Defendant sold its equipment to
all elevator companies at a discount of 10% from list
price, whether F. 0. B. or on an installed basis. Most
50
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of defendant's business in Utah came from elevator
companies other than plaintiff.
By Instruction No. 6 in the charge to the jury, the
court authorized the jury to find in favor of plaintiff
either on the basis of "an implied agreement not to
compete'' generally, or ''an implied agreement not to
compete for the Hotel Utah job." (R. 124). There was
no competent evidence of any ''implied agreement'' in
either category, and the admissions of the plaintiff negatived the possibility of any agreement. No express agreement was claimed, and no written agreement was claimed.
There "\Vas no competent evidence offered from which
reasonable minds could find any ''implied agreement.''
The court should have granted the motion for directed
verdict in favor of defendant (R. 106-109), for the evidence manifested a wrongful attempt of plaintiff as the
unsuccessful bidder to get something for nothing by a
resort to fictitious claims.
Over the objections of defendant (R. 268, 276), the
trial court permitted plaintiff to introduce ''as evidence
of the past dealings which show the close relationship
of the parties", negotiations relating to numerous proposed elevator projects during a period of more than
20 years. (R. 229-231, 267 -357). Those negotiations involved: (a) Requests for defendant to submit bids,
either to plaintiff or to Murphy Elevator Company (of
which plaintiff became territorial representative in 1945),
such requests being in writing with few exceptions. (b)
Submission of bids by defendant in specific detail, either
51
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to plaintiff, or to Murphy Elevator Company, the bids
invariably being in writing. (c) Written notice of acceptance and issuance of purchase order, in the few cases
where the bids were accepted. (d) Oral discussions and
written communications with respect to how defendant's
eqUipment would be co-ordinated with other materials
and equipment.
During a period of 5 years, of the various bids submitted by defendant. to Murphy Elevator Company, only
one contract 'vas awarded, which was for installation of
synchron control and electric door operators by contract
dated November 20, 1947, in the Medical Arts Building,
Exhibits "T", 8, 46. During a period of more than 20
years in which plaintiff made numerous requests for
bids, plaintiff awarded the defendant only 7 contracts,
and the one on the W a.lker Bank Building in 1948 was
subsequently canceled. See Exhibit 46. The 6 instances
where plaintiff accepted bids procured from defendant,
and the contracts were performed, with the date of the
contract and the equipment involved, are as follows:
February 1, 1930, Hotel Utah, flashlight annunciator, waiting passenger lanterns, electric door
operators, ground floor position indicators.
September 22, 1931, Kiesel Building, Ogden, door
closers, interlocks, and hangers.
December 5, 1945, Hotel Utah, electric door operator and hangers.
January 26, 1950, Logan Temple, door operator
and hangers.
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June 3, 1950, John R. Park Building, electric door
operator, hangers, position indicators.
August 8, 1950, Z. C. M. I., electric door operator
and hangers.
Each of the six contracts was fully performed. Each
of them will be searched in vain for any suggestion that
defendant will refrain from competing with plaintiff.
Plaintiff had every opportunity in its requests for bids
to make any statement it saw fit to make, but it did not
ask nor even hint that defendant should refrain from
competing with plaintiff. It is true that in addition to
the 6 contracts in 20 years, plaintiff ordered repair parts
from defendant by catalog number, as indicated by a
group of invoices, Exhibit "L". However, neither plaintiff nor defendant could have stayed in business on the
amount of business which they transacted between them
in 20 years.
Plaintiff exhausted the alphabet nearly 3% times
with exhibits which were supposed to show a course of
"past dealings" from which an "implied agreement not
to compete'' allegedly arose. With the few exceptions
noted, those exhibits consisted only of negotiations which
had terminated long prior to the Hotel Utah modernization project. The evidence pertaining thereto was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, unless to demonstrate that the claims of plaintiff were outrageous. Mr.
Connole, manager for plaintiff, repeatedly referred to
such exhibits as ''business deals'' and as ''contracts'',
notwithstanding they were unaccepted proposals which
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had expired. The court finally directed him to use the
word "proposal" instead of "contract". (R. 370-371).
In each instance, if the bid procured from defendant had
been accepted, a. separate and distinct contract would
have come into being, unrelated to any other bid on some
other project. Mr. Connole admitted that the prospective jobs did not materialize. (R. 500). When defendant
sought to bring out admissions from Mr. Connole that
those negotiations did not result in any contract, and
that the instruments were requests for bids and unaccepted oIf ers which had expired, the trial judge inter-jected (R. 503) :
''THE COURT: It doesn't make any difference. The complaint is, the contract breached was
not a contract to install, but a preliminary contract
of negotiations." (Italics added.)
The "preliminary contract of negotiations" concept,
is alien to American jurisprudence. Negotiations do not
constitute a contract. Liability cannot be fastened upon
a person by mere negotiations, where the essential elements of a valid contract are lacking, such as a meeting
of the minds, a good and valuable consideration, and
agreed terms. With respect to the numerous exhibits
involving negotiations short of acceptance of bid, no
contract came into being. Nevertheless, the trial court
permitted evidence of negotiations which came to naught,
as proof of an "implied contract not to compete with
plaintiff.''
In each instance, the written proposal submitted by
defendant, whether to plaintiff Kimball Elevator Com54
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pa.ny or to Murphy Elevator Company, contemplated a
written contract, which could come into being only by
acceptance of the proposal. Failure to accept such offer
precluded the creation of the particular contract proposed; but the effect of the court's ruling amounts to
saying that although plaintiff's failure to accept such
proposal prevented the creation of an express written
contract, such failure on the part of plaintiff (or Murphy) to do the very thing essential to bring into existence a valid written contract could give rise to an
implied-in-fact contract not to compete with the offeree.
The idea that failure of the offeree to accept, would
merely defeat the creation of an express written contract,
but might bring about an "implied contract of negotiations" on matters not even discussed, is patently absurd.
The attempt to read into those simple requests for bids
and into the detailed and explicit proposals in response
thereto, some undiscussed and unmentioned ''promise
not to compete'', amounts to an effort to force down the
throat of defendant a fictitious contract to which defendant never assented, in derrogation of fundamental
constitutional rights.
T'here can never be an implied agreement a.rtstng
out of an. unaccepted offer or a group of unaccepted
offers, for there is no contract without acceptance. Nor
could there be any consideration for ''an implied agreement" when there is no acceptance to create a contract.

The court not only overruled objections of defendant
to such incompetent evidence of negotiations which had
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faded into oblivion, but the trial judge refused to construe those written instruments in accordance with their
tenor as negotiations involving requests for bids and
unaccepted offers. The court delegated to the jury the
judicial function of interpreting written instruments,
a.nd allowed the jurors to find from negotiations which
had terminated and from expired unaccepted written
offers, an implied agreement not to compete with platinti jj'. ( R. 120-122, 124, 157, 159-160).
The trial court had the duty to construe the written
instruments; but in construing written instruments the
court is limited by principles which govern construction
of written instruments. Courts cannot manufacture contracts out of unaccepted offers, nor can courts read
implied terms into written instruments which are not
reasonably required by the provisions of such instruments. As to the vast majority of the exhibits which
involved unaccepted offers, there was no contract and
hence no contractual terms either express or implied.
The written instruments in each exhibit are clear and
explicit, and there is no room for implication. There is
no hint of refraining from competition. This is true
both as to proposals which were neyer accepted and also
to the few which resulted in written contracts. As to the
few ~nstruments which did result in contracts, the rule
is well-stated in 17 C. J. S., Contracts, Implied Terms,
pages 779-780, which rule is approved by this Court in
Donovan v. McGurrin, 69 Utah 1, 251 P. 1067:
''However, in order that an unexpressed term
may be implied, the implication must arise from
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the language employed in the instrument or be
indispensible to effectuate the intention of the
parties. So there can be no implication as against
the express terms of the con tract, and the courts
will be careful not to imply a term, where the
subject thereof is completely covered by the contract, or as to which the contract is intentionally
silent, or which is against the intention of the
parties as gathered from the whole of the instrument. Also, a term which the parties have not expressed is not to be implied merely because the
court thinks it is a reasonable term, or because the
contract is advantageous to one party, and. a person may not be required to do what he did not
promise merely because what he did promise was
not sufficient to meet the requirements of some
real or supposed public policy. Terms of another
agreement cannot become a part of the contract
except by express stipulation or necessary implication that the parties contract with reference
to it." (Italics added.)
As to the numerous instances where there was no
acceptance of offer, there could have been no contract,
and hence no room for any implication of some undisclosed promise. To read into any of the written instruments an implied promise not to compete 'vith plaintiff
on some other project would do violence to the instruments. As to the six isolated cases where plaintiff
awarded contracts, four of them had been fully performed before the Utah Hotel Company announced any
intention to proceed with a modernization program. The
consideration in each of the six contracts is limited to
the particular job expressly mentioned. There is ·no
reference to any other project. There is nothing in any
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of the instruments \Yhich could possibly be construed to
restrict or limit the conduct of defendant in the future,
nor \Yith respect to some other job. There is a total
absence of language from which the court could imply
any agreement to refrain from competing with plaintiff.
There is no promise, express or implied, that either
party would do business with the other in the future.
Inasmuch as the court could not imply a promise from
any one of them, it could not imply a promise from the
'vhole group of them collectively. The "issue" of an
''implied contract not to compete with plaintiff'' was
utterly fictitious.
Inasmuch as the court cannot make a ne\v agreement for the parties, the court cannot imply some
promise which would give the other party something
more than he bargained for, nor read into the instrument some implied covenant not essential to make the
agreement effective. As illustrated in Johnson v. Iglehart Bros., 95 F. 2d 4, "\vhere .it was contended that an
agreement to refund the processing tax should be implied, although the written agreement was silent as to
refund:
"It is urged upon us, however, that notwithstanding the want of express language to cover
the situation presented, the court should construe
the contracts as containing an implied promise
to refund to the plaintiff that part of the purchase price which went to make up the processing
tax. In other words, we are asked, by construction, to afford the plaintiff protection against a
contingency other than that \vhich the parties
themselves provided.''
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After citing a number of cases, the court said:
'' ... It seems clear to us that the law is well
settled that \Yhere parties expressly contract,
under \vhat circumstances an obligation may arise
"rith reference to a certain subject-matter, "\\ here
the same is entered into without fraud or mutual
mistake, it excludes the possibility of an implied
covenant of a contradictory or different nature.
In the instant case, the alleged implied covenant,
of course, is not contradictory to those expressly
made, but it certainly is different and in addition
thereto ... ''
7

The la~v will never permit an implied contract where
from the nature of the case the parties could not legally
make an express contract. Simpson v. Bowden, 33 Maine
549. ''An implied contract is one which the law infers
from the facts and circumstances of a case, but it will
not be inferred in any case where an express contract
'vould for any reason be invalid." Case v. Second .Ave.
R. Co., 97 N. Y. 384, 388, 49 Am. Rep. 531. Inasmuch as
an express agreement not to compete would have been
illegal, it would have been impossible to have implied
an agreement not to compete \vhich could have been
lawful.
The subject of competition was never disc~tssed.
Apart from the fact that the comments and conclusions
of Mr. Connole concerning the written instruments were
contradictions of their express contents, any oral testimony at variance with those instruments was incompetent under the parol evidence rule anyway, and the
objections to such conversations should have been sus59
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tained. On cross-examination, Mr. Connole admitted
that defendant never at any time told plaintiff in writing
that defendant 'vould give plaintiff an exclusive bid. (R.
651). Nor did he even testify as to any conversation in
which defendant promised to give an exclusive bid or
to refrain from competition. Mr. Connole was evasive,
to say the least. When forced to answer the question
''whether the defendant ever told Kimball Elevator
Company the defendant was giving l(imball Elevator Co.
an exclusive bid", he said, "Not specifically." (R. 651}.
There was no competent evidence that 0/Yirything was
ever said from which a reasonable 1nind cou.ld arrive
at the conclusion that defendant impliedly promised to
refrain from competition. The subject was never discussed. Although Mr. Connole made a number of gratuitous remarks to the effect that he never knew that defendant "'as dealing with any competitors of plaintiff,
he admitted that he testified on deposition (R. 631-632):
'' Q. But there was no agreement entered into
between your company and the Elevator Supplies
Company whereby the Elevator Supplies Company stated that it would not submit a bid to any
competitor~

"A. No."

"Q. But you have admitted, have you not,
that at no time did the defendant corporation ever
promise that it 'vould refrain from submitting a
bid to any competitor' .

''A. That was never discussed.
''Q. Never discussed?
"A. No."
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There wa.s no evidence whatsoever, that defendant
ever dealt ~vith plaintiff on any basis different from any
other elevator cornpany. By Request for Admission No.
5 the plaintiff was asked to admit (R. 10):

'' 5. All negotiations between plaintiff and
defendant have been on the basis of requesting
defendant to submit bids, and defendant has submitted quotations and proposals to sell or contract on the basis of list price less a discount,
said discount being made available to plaintiff if
plaintiff would accept such proposal and pay the
quoted price.''
By answer, plaintiff stated under oath (R. 18) :
''Plaintiff admits No. 5, except that from time
to time plaintiff has purchased materials from
defendant at ·a certain price less plaintiff's discount.''
Plaintiff has always been allowed a discount of 10%
from list price on its purchases from defendant. (R. 438,
459, 519, 743, 850). Such trade discount has been allowed
to all elevator companies making purchases from the defendant either on an F. 0. B. basis or on an installed
basis. (R. 459, 849-850). As shown by Exhibits 34, 36,
39 and 42, when two or more elevator companies requested defendant to give quotations on identical equipment and installation, the bids were identical. Defendant
has always been in interstate commerce, and its practice
has always been to submit bids to everyone who has
asked for quotations. (R. 849-850). However, as shown
by stipulation, when quotations were requested by own-
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ers, defendant did not quote subject to the 10% trade
discount allowed to elevator companies. (R. 858).
As indicated by Exhibits 5, 6, 8, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40
and 43, the defendant has contracted to sell at list price
less the trade discount of 10%, to Otis Elevator Company, JYiurphy Elevator Company, Montgomery Elevator
Company, Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company,
Elevator Maintenance Co., Ltd., Elevator Service and
Supply Company, and others. The only way the trade
discount of 10% can be obtained is by making the purchase. (R. 519).
It costs money for defendant to prepare a proposal
on any project. (R. 462). If any job did not materialize
on which plaintiff asked defendant for a bid, plaintiff
did not reimburse defendant for making such quotation.
(R. 519). Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company, of
which plaintiff became territorial agent in 1949, has had
business dealings 'vith defendant over the years, on the
basis of a request for bid, submission of a firm bid, and
issuance of purchase order if the bid was accepted. Such
practice has been true both ways. (R. 725).
Defendant's equipment has been quoted on various
jobs by Murphy Elevator Company. (R. 464). Whenever
·Murphy bid on defendant's equipment in connection with
its bids on elevator modernization, it obtained bids from
defendant with respect to equipment manufactured by
defendant. (R. 280, 310, 316-317). Exhibit "GG" con·
tains illustrative material issued by J\1urphy which
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features certain equipment manufactured by defendant
corporation. ( R. 312).
Defendant has issued catalogs, from which its materials can be ordered by number. Plaintiff has ordered
repair parts from defendant by catalog number (R. 415,
461), although on jobs of any size, plaintiff has asked
for bids. (R. 461). Hotel Utah in 1948 and 1949 also
ordered repair parts from defendant by catalog. (R. 779782).
11:r. Connole admitted that Montgomery Elevator
Company is an elevator manufacturer, and that on the
original bidding on the Park Building job, Montgomery
bid on defendant's controls. (R. 520). Such admission
further proved that defendant did not deal exclusively
with plaintiff. Finally, counsel for plaintiff admitted,
"We do not claim we had exclusive dealings." (R. 847).
In disregard of the stipulation of counsel showing
that defendant dealt with other elevator companies on
the same basis as plain tiff ( R. 858-859), and the admissions of plaintiff that there were no exclusive dealings,
the trial judge submitted the case to the jury on the
false theory that there was evidence of a course of ex·clusive dealings between plaintiff and defendant which
the jury might ''consider'' ''in determining whether or
not there was an implied agreement to the effect that
the defendant would not compete against the plaintiff.''
Instruction No. 5-a. (R. 121).
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First· of all, there was no competent evidence that
defendant either sold exclusively to plaintiff nor contracted exclusively with plaintiff. The evidence required
a finding that defendant dealt with other elevator companies on the same basis as def~ndant dealt with plaintiff. When the court finally asked counsel for plaintiff
if "part of your implied agreement is based on any
theory that the defendant had an agreement that they
would deal exclusively with you'', counsel answered:
"ff'e do not claim that, yo~tr Honor. We do make the
claim they never informed the Kimball Elevator· Company they were ever bidding or making quotations to
competitors of the J(imball Elevator Company.'' (R.
846). Obviously, defendant had no duty whatsoever to
disclose to plaintiff that defendant had negotiations with
or submitted bids to other persons. That was none of
plaintiff's business anyway. Ho,vever, Mr. Connole ex.pressly admitted that it is not the practice in the elevator
field for one elevator company to disclose to another company, t.o whom it is bidding. (R. 520-5.21).

"Q. As a matter of fact, it is not the practice
in the elevator field for one elevator company to
disclose to another company, to whom it is bidding, is it~

''A. Why no.
It is significant that most of defendant's business
in the State of Utah was awarded by corporations other
than plaintiff. Of the six contracts awarded to defendant
by plaintiff in 20 years, (exclusive of the one on the
Walker Bank Building which was canceled in 1948}, the
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largest of all was on the Hotel Utah job in 1930. Three
of the contracts were awarded in 1950, all of which were
very small jobs as far as the purchase orders to defendant were concerned. The largest was the one on the
Park Building job, a'varded June 3, 1950, in the amount
of only $1,502.10. See Exhibit 17. The other two were
even smaller. Three jobs of comparable size were
awarded to defendant in 1950 by Elevator Service and
Supply Company of Salt Lake City, as shown by Exhibit
46. The one large contract, in the sum of $36,000, was
on the new Veterans Administration Hospital, Exhibit
39, June 9, 1950, awarded by Elevator Maintenance Co.,
Ltd.
Nor was there any competent evidence that plaintiff
purcha.sed exclusively from defendant, the type of equipment defendant was manufacturing. If defendant had
been compelled to rely on the business it was awarded
by the plaintiff, it 'vould have gone bankrupt. Notwithstanding the trial court's charge to the jury that there
was evidence of exclusive dealings, such instruction was
contrary to the written evidence and the admissions of
plaintiff. There 'vere statements in the testimony of
Mr. Connole to the effect that plaintiff had always bid
on defendant's equipment, the evidence requires a finding that such testimony is utterly false, for it contradicts
the written exhibits introduced by plaintiff and such
pretenses were destroyed by admissions made on crossexamination. Although Mr. Connole testified several
times that plaintiff had "exclusive dealings" with defendant, the court sustained an objection to questions
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designed to draw admissions from him that plaintiff
did not purchase exclusiYelv.., from defendant (R. 501):
"THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
Members of the jury, in this case the plaintiff
through ~Ir. Connole has made two or three statements that they purchased exclusively from the
defendant, and because that statement has been
made the defense is trying to rebut it, and that
was not a proper statement in the first place. They
had a right to deal 'vith them exclusively or the
right to deal 'vith a number of people. It does not
make any difference. The court admonishes the
jury not to give weight to that statement because
it is immaterial and with that admonition the
court restrains eross-examination on that sub. t .... "
JeC
Defendant agrees with the statement that plaintiff
had a right to deal 'vith any number of people; but so
did the defendant have such right too. And the evidence
conclusively shows that plaintiff did deal with others,
for plaintiff expressly admitted at the trial that it purchased from others, the type of materials which defendant manufactures and sells. (R. 505). It was admitted
by Mr. Connole that on numerous occasions plaintiff
requested defendant to furnish quotations on dumbwaiters, but that at no time did plaintiff ever purchase
a dumb-waiter from defendant. Such equipment was
invariably purchased from other companies. (R. 503,
87 4, 948-949). Other elevator companies, however,
awarded contracts to defendant on dumb-waiters, as
evidenced by Exhibits 32, 39, 41 and 46. Exhibit 14, a
letter from plaintiff to defendant dated June 14 1950

'
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'

states that plaintiff awarded the contract to another
company:
"We wish to inform you that you were high
on the above job, hence we have awarded this to
another company.... ''
Contrary to the testimony of Mr. Connole that l{imball ''bid on'' and ''purchased their controls'' (referring
to controls manufactured by· defendant), the fact is that
plaintiff did not at any time ever award to defendant a
contract nor issue a purchase order for synchron control,
signal control, directional collective control, or any other
modern controls of defendant's. Mr. Connole so admitted
on cross-examination. ( R. 480-482). He tried to claim
credit on behalf of Kimball for the purchase of synchron
control in connection with the Medical Arts Building job
in 1947, because Kimball was the agent of Murphy.
Plaintiff \vould put in reverse the elementary rule that
the act of the agent is the act of the principal, by contending that the act of Murphy, the principal, was the
act of l{imball, the agent.
The fact is that plaintiff did not even ask defendant
to bid on a number of jobs in 1950 which would involve
controls of the type manufactured by defendant. In 1949
plaintiff became the territorial representative of Pacific
Elevator and Equipment Company. It was admitted that
Pacific has manufactured control equipment which performs the same functions as equipment manufactured
by defendant. (R. 486).
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On the Park Building job, defendant originally bid
to M·urphy Elevator Company and Montgomery Elevator
Company. Montgomery was the low bidder, but the job
\Yas refigured. On 1\tlarch 21, 1950, Kimball obtained
from defendant a quotation on directional collective control, and on various other items, Exhibit 16. l{imball
then obtained a quotation on the controls from Pacific
Elevator and Equipment Company, and asked defendant
to furnish a new quotation which would exclude the controls. Such new proposal was presented by defendant
May 25, 1950. The purchase order of June 3, 1950, from
plaintiff to defendant (which 'vas the sixth one in 20
years), did not cover any of the control equipment for
the job, but covered only signals, door hangers, electric
door operators, as shown in Exhibits 16 and 17. The
gross amount was only $1,502.10, subject to the trade
discount of 10% allo,ved to elevator companies. Mr.
Connole, plaintiff's manager, admitted that plaintiff
purchased the controls from Pacific. (R. 510-518).
When it came to bidding on the Charleston Apartments, by letter dated April 3, 1950, from plaintiff to
defendant, Exhibit 12, plaintiff restricted its request for
a bid to one only on signals, hangers, and door operators.
In that letter plaintiff said to defendant: "We believe
it would be well to get in touch with the Pacific Elevator
Company to find out if they want to use your directional
collective or their own type control." (Italics added).
Plaintiff obtained a quotation from its principal, Pacific
Elevator and Equipment. Company on the entire control
system, and in submission of bid to general contractors,
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the plaintiff based its bid on the quotation from Pacific
for controls manufactured by Pacific, Exhibit 11, dated
I\Iay 1, 1950. (R. 486). It would have been strange indeed, when plaintiff gave Pacific the option of quoting
on its own controls or on defendant's controls, if Pacific
had not quoted on controls manufactured by Pacific.
It was finally stipulated that prior to September 11,
1950, "With regard to quotations on signal control, collective and duplex collective control, it is further stipulated that the defendant Elevator Supplies Corporation
(Company) did not quote exclusively to the plaintiff,
Kimball Elevator Company, but that all. quotations on
such equipment by defendant Elevator Supplies Company, were made exclusively to original elevator contractors." (R. 858-859). It was finally admitted that
neither party dealt exclusively with the other. In fact,
the evidence demonstrated that the dealings were few
indeed, and that the only relationship consisted of vendor
and purchaser with respect to items purchased by catalog
number, and as subcontractor under an express written
contract where defendant "\vas awarded contracts by acceptance of specific proposals, which happened in only
7 instances in 20 years.
In the few instances where plaintiff did accept defendant's proposals, and defendant became a subcontractor on those specific projects, that relationship ended
upon completion of defendant's contract. None of those
written contracts related to any other project. Owing
to the fact that the plaintiff awarded defendant a con-
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tract on a small portion of the Park Building elevator
job on June 3, 1950, which ,vas prior to the time when
defendant submitted a bid on the Hotel Utah elevator
modernization, an attempt was made at the trial to infer
that some agreement not to compete on the Hotel Utah
projects arose by virtue of the contract on the Park
Building job, although there was no connection whatsoever between the two projects. The trial judge attempted
to generalize on the subcontractor relationship, and injected a false issue into the case during the cross-exami-·
nation of plaintiff's manager (R. 506):
"THE COURT: I am going to limit you, the
same as I said at noon, to the issue of whether
the defendant was a subcontractor for the plaintiff.''
The defendant could not possibly have been a subcontractor for plaintiff on the Hotel Utah projects in
1950, for plaintiff had no contract whatsoever. The sub.
contract on the Park Building job had nothing to do
with Hotel Utah. The court nevertheless made a further
prejudicial comment on the evidence by saying, ''Most
of the evidence was, they were the original contractor
and subcontractor." (R. 506). The comment was contrary to the undisputed evidence, for there had been no
acceptance of the bids to which reference was made. The
jury 'vas told that a contractual relationship existed
when none had come into being because the offeree had
failed to accept the offers. Inasmuch as plaintiff did not
submit bids to the owner in most instances, the plaintiff
could not have been an original contractor even if there
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had been a contract awarded to plaintiff by a general
contractor.
There was absolutely no competent evidence of any
''prior dealings'' from which there could have been any
''implied agreement not to compete.'' The contract
awarded to defendant June 3, 1950, on the Park Building
job, could not possibly be construed to imply any promise
that either of the parties would contract with the other
in the future. As far as the "course of business dealings"
were concerned, an examination of the negotiations on
the Park Building job negative any idea that one party
intended to deal exclusively with the other i?- any category. Plaintiff admitted kno,ving that on the original
bidding on the job back in 1949, nlontgomery Elevator
Company had quoted on defendant's control equipment,
and Montgomery 'vas the lo\v bidder, Exhibit 15. (R. 520).
Defendant originally had bid to Murphy on the control
equipment, then on rebidding in 1950, plaintiff obtained
a bid from defendant on the controls as well as other
items, but purchased the major items including the controls, from Pacific, and a\varded a contract to defendant
on only a relatively small portion of the work on which
defendant originally had been requested to bid. Obviously, in lVlay and June 1950, it would have been impossible to have had any ''implied agreement not to
compete with plaintiff'' even if there had been no question of illegality.
Plaintiff's own witness, Allen E. Mecham, general
counsel for the Associated General Contractors, testified
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on written stipulation that in "the construction industry
there is free competitive bidding." (R. 667). Free
competitive bidding precludes any ''implied agreement
to refrain from competing with the offeree.'' Charles
Maynard Henker, of Pacific Elevator and Equipment
Company, when asked by counsel for plaintiff whether
in the elevator industry there is a trade practice not to
bid directly to a customer, testified that he had ''seen
it 'both 'vays, three "rays against the middle. . . . Well,
in some of these places .they will bid to suppliers, and
bid to the customer, and with different figures, and ·
everything else.'' (R. 77 4-7 45).

PoiNT

4.

DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED VERDICT, FOR THE EVIDENCE NOT ONLY
FAILS TO SHOW ANY AGREEMENT TO REFRAIN
FROM COMPETITION, BUT THE EVIDENCE REQUIRES A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF RECOGNIZED THE RIGHT OF DEFENDANT TO SUBMIT
BONA FIDE BIDS TO UTAH HOTEL COMPANY
AS WELL AS THE RIGHT OF THE HOTEL COMPANY TO OBTAIN FIRM BIDS FROM DEFENDANT.
The trial court erred prejudicially in failing to grant
the motion of defendant for a directed verdict, and by
submitting the case to the jury with a charge ·that the
jury might "find" either "an implied agreement not to
compete with plaintiff'' generally, or ''an implied agree72
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ment not to compete with plaintiff for the Hotel Utah"
jobs. (R. 124). Plaintiff proved no agreement whatsoever with defendant concerning Hotel Utah elevator
modernization. All that plaintiff could show, was an
unaccepted offer which plaintiff had obtained by deceit.
The trial court disregarded the elementary rule of law
that an ~ttnaccepted written offer creates no rights in the
offeree, and that an unaccepted offer could not give
birth to either an express or an implied contract of any
kind. The court was also inexorably wrong in charging
the jury that an implied agreement not to compete with
plaintiff would be legal and valid, in view of both federal and state statutes to the contrary.
The federal courts have declared criminal and void
under the Sherman Act, every contract or agreement,
express or implied, to refrain from selling to a person
or to a class of persons. Binderup v. Pathe Exchange,
Inc., 263 U. S. 291, 311, 312, 44 S. Ct. 96, 100, 68 L. Ed.
308, and United States v. Southern Wholesale Grocers'
Ass'n., 207 Fed. 434, 439 (certiorari denied). In United
States v. Grijj'ith, 334 U. S. 100, 68 S. Ct. 941, it was declared that "It is indeed 'unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market.' ... The
anti-trust laws are as much violated by the prevention
of competition as by its destruction."
It is true that the federal cases do not say that a
person who is in a position to compete, must give a
competitive bid, but the cases hold that if a person agrees
with someone that he will not give a competitive bid or
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not sell to a particular person or to a class of persons,
such agreement is a criminal offense and renders all
parties liable to the victim for treble damages. The court
should have dismissed the action '"ith prejudice, for each
of the alternates of "implied agreement", general or
specific, submitted to the jury would constitute a criminal
offense. The plaintiff was not entitled to have the case
submitted to the jury anyway, since it had not proved
any kind of an agreement, for an implied agreement
cannot be created from an unaccepted offer. There was
a failure to prove any of the essential elements of a valid
contract.
Plaintiff's own witnesses produced evidence which
required findings against the plaintiff, including the following facts heretofore or hereinafter detailed, which
precluded any recovery by plaintiff: ( 1) Defendant did
not transact business with plaintiff on any basis more
favorable than defendant transacted business with other
elevator companies, which was on the basis of selling at
list price less a discount of 10%. (2) In more than 20
years, of the vast number of bids obtained by plaintiff
from defendant, only 7 \Yere accepted and resulted in
contracts, and offers and acceptances in each instance
were in writing, and there \vas not the slightest intimation that defendant would surrender its right to compete
with plaintiff. (3) The subject of competition was never
discussed, and defendant never gave plaintiff any
promise either orally or in writing. ( 4) Since February
1948, Utah Hotel Company had been the customer of
defendant, and the hotel company was well-satisfied with
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its business dealings with defendant. ( 5) Plaintiff procured a bid from defendant dated June 14, 1950, on a
portion of 'the proposed elevator modernization at Hotel
Utah. Said bid was obtained by deceit, for plaintiff
falsely represented to defendant that plaintiff was going
to be awarded the contract. (6) Plaintiff obtained a
quotation from Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company on some equipment, dated July 13, 1950. (7) On
August 16, 1950, plaintiff submitted to Utah Hotel Company an incomplete bid, which was unsatisfactory and
unacceptable to the hotel company. (8) Plaintiff knew
that Utah Hotel Company not only wanted more than
one firm bid on the over-all project, but plaintiff knew
that the hotel wanted a firm bid from defendant. (9) On
August 17 and 30, 1950, the Utah Hotel Company requested defendant to submit a firm bid on the elevator
modernization. (10) Defendant requested Pacific to give
a bid on a portion of the job on an installed basis, but
Pacific refused to give defendant any bid without clearance from plaintiff, inasmuch as plaintiff then was territorial representative of Pacific. (11) On August 30, 1950,
Mr. Connole, manager of plaintiff corporation, told Mr.
Henker of Pacific, that it was all right for Pacific to submit a bid to defendant. (12) Pacific submitted a firm bid
to defendant on September 7, 1950. (13) On September
15, 1950, Pacific submitted to plaintiff a new bid, raising
the price quoted in its letter of July 13, 1950, and also
calling attention of plaintiff to 8 items of necessary
repair, in addition to 15 items mentioned in the letter
of July 13, 1950. All of said items had been omitted from
75

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff's bid to Utah Hotel Company dated August 16,
1950. (14) On September 11, 1950, defendant submitted
. two firm bids to Utah Hotel Company in accordance with
the request of the hotel company, one on the passenger
elevator modernization, and one on the two electric
dumb-waiter elevators. (15) On the same day, defendant
withdrew its original bid to plaintiff, and submitted two
new bids in the light of information defendant had
acquired from Utah Hotel Company, defendant quoting
to plaintiff list price less a discount of 10%. (16) Although plaintiff had definite information from both
defendant and Pacific as to what Utah Hotel Company
wanted and what it did not want, which would disclose
to plaintiff that plaintiff's original bid was abortive,
plaintiff neither attempted to revise its bid nor to submit
a new bid. (17) Utah Hotel Company awarded the two
contracts to defendant on September 27, 1950, the defendant having submitted the only bids for doing the
work as the hotel 'vanted it done. (18) Defendant never
paid a commission to plaintiff nor to anyone else, and
defendant did not at any time promise plaintiff a commission nor any other kind of a ''cut out of the job.''
(19) When plaintiff learned that defendant had been
awarded the contracts, plaintiff demanded a ''commission" which defendant refused to pay, and plaintiff then
asked Utah Hotel Company for a ''commission'' which
was likewise refused. ( 20) Plaintiff then unsuccessfully
attempted to induce Utah Hotel Company to cancel its
contract with defendant on elevator modernization, and
issue a new contract to plaintiff.
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The first three factual propositions have already
been discussed. The others likewise demonstrate that
plaintiff's claims are spurious. Although plaintiff made
numerous insinuations to the effect that defendant "tried
to steal plaintiff's prospect", the undisputed fact is that
plaintiff knew that Utah Hotel Company had been a
satisfied customer of defendant for over two years, and
that plaintiff sought to monopolize the bidding on the
modernization job by the practice of deceit.
Max C. Carpenter, manager of Hotel Utah, testified
that there had been satisfactory business relations between the hotel and defendant since February 1948. Mr.
Carpenter testified that there were Elevator Supplies
Company equipment in the passenger elevators prior to
the time he became manager. Such equipment had operated satisfactorily. Utah Hotel Company became a customer of defendant in February 1948, and began to make
purchases of repair parts and replacement parts, as
indicated by Exhibit 3, invoices from 1948 to 1950. (R.
243-244).
Jerry Smith, building superintendent of Hotel Utah,
testified that prior to 1948, various eleva tor replacement
parts had been purchased from plaintiff, but the service
had not always been satisfactory. Consequently, the
hotel began to purchase elevator parts directly from
defendant in order to expedite the repair of the equipment. (R. 770-771). Mr. Roy C. Smith testified without
contradiction that after defendant sold materials directly
to Utah Hotel Company in 1948, Mr. Connole asked for
77
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a ''commission'', which was refused. He was told by
defendant that defendant did not pay any commissions,
but sold to elevator companies at a discount, and if plaintiff had obtained the order for the materials it could
have purchased them at a discount. (R. 878). Mr. Connole merely said he could not remember the conversation. (R. 638). Mr. Roy C. Smith assisted the hotel in
the repair program. (R. 877 -878). Some of the repair
parts were ordered by the hotel by catalog number. (R.
779-782). Defendant issued catalogs, and made the same
available to all who were interested in them. One of such
catalogs "\Vas given to Utah Hotel Company. (R. 908909). The repair program at the hotel "\vas carried on
principally in 1948 and 1949. The hotel rebuilt the door
closing mechanisms. ( R. 779-782).
In 1947 the hotel asked Otis Elevator Company to
make recommendations with respect to modernization.
By letter dated December 1, 1947, Exhibit 25, Otis represented to the hotel that "The present equipment does
not lend itself to conversion to automatic control of any
kind,'' and Otis recommended that the hotel discard the
existing equipment and start all over with "new Otis
signal control equipment.'' Inasmuch as defendant's
equipment had operated satisfactorily in the elevators
for years, Mr. Jerry Smith started to consult with Mr.
Roy Smith of defendant corporation, not only with respect to necessary repairs, but also in regard to how
modernization could be accomplished most economically.
At the request of the Hotel Utah, Roy C. Smith made
an investigation of the condition of the passenger eleva78
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tors and reported to Mr. Charles W. Lerch and Associates, elevator consultants, under date of December 28,
1948, Exhibit 26. (R. 770-777).
Jerry Smith had been dealing with Roy C. Smith
in the repair of the elevators, and he had confidence in
the ability of Roy C. Smith, who pointed out how Elevator Supplies Company equipment could be used in
connection with some existing equipment in the modernization program. Jerry Smith ultimately made recommendations for use of Elevator Supplies equipment
in the modernization. (R. 782-784).
In 1950, Jerry Smith had discussions as to modernization, not only with defendant, but also with Otis Elevator Company, Elevator Service and Supply Company of
Salt Lake City, Kimball Elevator Company, and Westinghouse. Jerry Smith asked for recommendations and
also for bids. (R. 784). After Kimball was advised that
the hotel was interested in recommendations and bids,
plaintiff addressed to defendant a letter dated May 11,
1950, Exhibit HHH: ''Please figure out the necessary
Elevator Supplies equipment to revamp the three passenger elevators in the Hotel Utah. We would like these
figures on an installed basis.'' Plaintiff furnished no
specifications whatsoever.
Before submitting any bid to plaintiff, Roy C. Smith
asked Mr. Connole, plaintiff's manager, what the bidding procedure would be on the project. Mr. Connole
said that he (Mr. Connole) would be the only bidder. (R.
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883). Mr. Connole admitted that he told Roy C. Smith
that Kimball Elevator Company was going to do the
job at Hotel Utah; that he understood there would be
no other bidder on this job, and that Jerry Smith had
told him Otis Elevator Company would not be permitted
to bid. (R. 523-524). The representation was false, and
without excuse. Hotel Utah had never even intimated
that Kimball would be awarded the contract. Mr. Connole did not offer any testimony that anyone at the hotel
told him that Kimball would get the job. On the contrary, Mr. Carpenter testified that he did not tell Mr.
Connole nor anyone else that Kimball's bid would be
accepted, nor was anyone authorized to make such a
statement. (R. 242). Jerry Smith testified that he did
not tell Mr. Connole that Kimball would be awarded the
job, nor that Otis would not be allowed to bid. (R. 785).
The only purpose of the false pretense that Kimball
was going to be awarded the job, was to discourage
competition, by making it appear useless for defendant
to present a bid either to the hotel (defendant's customer) or to anyone else. The claim that by submitting
a bid to plaintiff (which was never accepted and which
could not possibly result in any contract), defendant
impliedly ''agreed'' to refrain from submitting a bid
to Utah Hotel Company, the customer of defendant, is
patently absurd and fictitious on its face. The claim
of "implied agreement not to compete", wears the
badge of fraud-fraud on the defendant and fraud on
Utah Hotel Company, for plaintiff knew that the hotel
company wanted more than one firm bid on the over-all
80

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

job: and the hotel had not promised Kimball anything.
Furthermore, Mr. Connole knew that there had been
strained relations between Kimball and Hotel Utah for
several years over the small service elevator which
l(imball had installed, which never operated satisfactorily, and ultimately had to be removed. (R. 258). In
the light of the hotel's unsatisfactory experiences with
Kimball, the hotel would scrutinize any proposal from
Kimball.
The claim of ''an implied agreement not to compete
with plaintiff for the Hotel Utah" jobs, amounts to saying that when plaintiff procured a. written offer from
defendant by false representations, defendant thereby
impliedly agreed with plaintiff that it would not submit
a bona fide bid directly to defendant's own customer,
although Utah Hotel Company requested defendant to
do so. The claim of plaintiff is utter sham, for there
could not be any agreement when there was only an
unaccepted offer-an offer procured by deceit. No rights
could arise from an unaccepted offer. There was no
consideration, no meeting of the minds, nor any other
essentials of a contract. There was not even a discussion
suggesting that defendant refrain from dealing with its
own customer.
After plaintiff obtained the written bid on a portion
of the passenger elevator modernization, dated June 14,
1950, Exhibit III (R. 524, 883), plaintiff obtained from
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company a quotation
dated July 13, 1950, Exhibit JJJ, covering the power

81

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

controls and some other equipment. Plaintiff waiteu
over a month longer before getting around to submitting
a bid to Utah Hotel Company. The only bid plaintiff
ever submitted to the hotel was dated August 16, 1950,
Exhibit "I". That bid \Vas made up by copying the
proposal obtained by plaintiff from defendant, except for
the price; and by listing the following, without any specifications whatsoever: ''Main generator and drive control
panels. Leveling units, vanes and brackets. Three new
cabs at a value of $1800 each." (R. 524-526). The 15
items of necessary repair, mentioned in the letter of
July 13, 1950, from Pacific to plaintiff (which had to be
done in connection with the job), were entirely omitted
from plaintiff's bid. One glance at the bid ought to be
enough to understand why Mr. Carpenter, manager of
Hotel Utah, would not even present it to the executive
committee of Hotel Utah, and \vhy he would not consider
it any further, but rejected it. (R. 235-236, 246-247, 258,
263-264).
Mr. Connole testified, over the objections of defendant that it \Vas hearsay and not the best evidence,
that at or about the time he presented Exhibit "I" to
Utah Hotel Company, "Mr. Jerry Smith told me that
Otis Elevator Company was not going to be invited to
bid on the job, and wanted to know if I had any suggestions as to who they could get another bid from. I
suggested the Westinghouse Elevator Company ... At
the hotel he asked me . . . if Elevator Supplies would
give a bid on the total job, and I told him that I did not
know, that I would telephone San Francisco and ask
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them if they 'vould bid on the total job, as an estimate.''
(R. 369-370, 372-373, 533). Plaintiff showed that Utah
Hotel Company not only "\\ a.nted another bid on the total
job, but it wanted a "bid on the total job" from defendant. By anS"\\ er to interrogatory No. 8, plaintiff stated
under oath: "It is a fact that the Utah Hotel Company
stated that it ""'anted more than one firm to bid on the
job." (R. 23).
7

7

The term ''bid'' means a proposal or offer to perform. There can be no dispute about the fact that Utah
Hotel Company wanted defendant to submit a bona fide
offer to perform, which, if accepted, would become a
contract. The remark of Mr. Connole that he would ask
defendant to "bid on the total job, as an estimate," is
presumptuous, to say the least. It suggests an attitude
of dictating to defendant and to Utah Hotel Company.
No sane person could expect defendant to go to the
expense of figuring out how the job should be bid, and
then turn the figure in to the hotel as an ''estimate.''
Plaintiff could not foreclose the hotel of its right to have
a bona fide bid, nor could plaintiff dictate to defendant
that defendant restrict its figure to a mere "estimate".
At that time, Mr. Connole made no pretense that there
'vas any agreement, express or implied, to prevent defendant from giving the hotel company as its customer,
a firm bid.
Mr. Jerry Smith testified concerning the conversation with Mr. Connole: "I told him it was necessary to
get additional bids, and that I ~vas going to ask Elevator
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Supplies for a bid ... He told me that he did not feel it
\vould be of any value, because it would be the same bid
that he had received from them or \vould get from them;
it would be identical." Jerry Smith categorically denied
that the term "estimate" was mentioned, or that Mr.
Connole was to contact the defendant. (R. 786-787). On
cross-examination, Jerry Smith. testified that he told Mr.
Connole that he (Jerry Smith) was going to get a bid
from Elevator Supplies Company. "I insisted on a bid
on Elevator Supplies equipment. That was our decision.
We wanted to go along with the same equipment we had
been, in using Elevator Supplies equipment.'' He said
that :hfr. Connole told him it would do no good to get
such a bid; that the "bid \vould be identical." (R. 818).
Thus, .Hotel Utah had specified defendant's equipment.
The hotel had been a customer since 1948, and the hotel
was satisfied with defendant's equipment. The hotel had
a right to obtain a firm bid, not a fictitious bid from defendant. Inasmuch as defendant was engaged in interstate commerce, it would have been a criminal offense
for defendant to have agreed with plaintiff or any one
else, either expressly or impliedly, that it would refrain
from selling to Utah Hotel Company or to any group of
persons.

On cross-examination, Mr. Connole admitted that
''I told him that the bid would be by identically the same
people; and I could not see what justification there would
be for having two people bid on identically the same
equipment." (R. 575). Plaintiff made no claim to Utah
Hotel Company that defendant was precluded from
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giving the hotel a bona :fide bid, although plaintiff had
every opportunity to do so, and it had a duty to say so
if it so claimed. Plaintiff merely used the selfish argument that it could not see the "justification" for "having
two people bid on identically the same equipment.'' In
the :field of trade and commerce, that is the very purpose
of getting bids, to get the best price on the same kind
of equipment and materials.
That was the second occasion when Mr. Connole
made false representations. He knew that Elevator
Supplies Company at that time was not manufacturing
power control equipment (R. 576), so he knew that the
bid from defendant on the over-all job "\Vould not be an
identical bid. He also knew that a bid· from Kimball and
another bid from defendant would not be bids from the
same people. There was no other purpose for his misrepresentations than to discourage the hotel company
from getting a bid from defendant. The very argument
used to attempt to talk Jerry Smith out of getting a bid
from defendant, constituted a recognition of the right
of the defendant to submit a bid to the hotel company,
and it amounted to an acknowledgment of the right of
the hotel to receive a firm bid. No one had any right to
interfere with the attempts of the hotel company as
owner, to obtain :firm bids from defendant.
An examination of Exhibit "I", dated August 16,
1950, exclusive of the notations placed thereon by Jerry
Smith, discloses that said bid was an incomplete and
abortive bid. Utah Hotel Company did not have to have
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any reason for rejecting it, and it had no duty to explain
why it did not accept it. There were substantial reasons
for rejecting it. The bid states:
''We propose to modernize the three passenger
elevators from the present car-s"\\ritch control to
push button signal control \Yith automatic leveling.
''The new equipment would consist of the following:
Relay panel.
Selectors.
Door operators, interlocks and hangers.
Car operators fixture including annunciator.
Position indicator and hall lanterns.
Hall buttons.
Main generator and drive co'ntrol panels.
Leveling units, vanes and brackets.
Three n.e~w cabs at a value of $1800 each.
"In accordance with the follo,ving specifications''.
The only specifications which follow the quoted
words, are the specifications contained in the proposal
from dependant to plaintiff. Utah Hotel Company had
a very definite reason for pronouncing the bid unsatisfactory, since the plaintiff only actually offered to do
the work contained in defendant's proposal, inasmuch
as there were no other specifications. The italicized items
are those which were not embodied in the proposal from
defendant dated June 14, 1950, Exhibit l{KK. As to the
items emphasized with italics, there were no specifications whatsoever to suggest type of manufacture or
method of installation. The bid of plaintiff omitted all
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of the 15 items mentioned in the letter from Pacific
dated July 13, 1950, as "items you will have to estimate
locally'', \V hich were necessary repair i terns. Plaintiff
did not offer to furnish that equipment nor to do the
necessary work. The proposal of plaintiff was therefore
incomplete and unsatisfactory on its face, and Utah
Hotel Company had every reason to reject it, as such
bid did not show where plaintiff's work \vould end and
the hotel's would begin or vice versa.
At the time the bid was presented by plaintiff, according to the uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Jerry
Smith: "Mr. Connole told me that this was a bid on a
portion of the work that would be involved, and that the
work that was not included in this bid would be discussed
between us at a later date, and that we could come to
some kind of an understanding as to how it was to be
executed, whether we would do it at the hotel, which was
his recommendation, or just how the balance of the work
would be done . . . . I did not have to ask him in that
conversation what work was omitted, because we had
discussed this job previously, and I was as well aware
of it as he was.'' (R. 815). As to omitted items, there
was electrical work, new feeders, new end feeders to the
penthouse, new hoisting hinges on the hoisting sheaves;
cable rings on the hoisting sheaves, and a number of
other items. Furthermore, ''There is no mention here
of who is to do the actual installation of a great portion
of the work necessary, that had been discussed between
Mr. Connole and myself." (R. 815). Other than by
omission of a number of items from the bid, there was
87
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nothing in the bid from plaintiff to indicate what work
was to be done by the hotel.
When he examined the bid, Exhibit "I", dated August 16, 1950, Mr. Jerry Smith testified that he did not
regard it as a satisfactory bid: "It was not a satisfactory bid because it was not complete. It had not covered
the entire scope of the work that was necessary, and the
work that had been discussed previously. Therefore, I
could not term it a 'satisfactory bid'." (R. 787-788).
After he examined the bid he took it up with management: ''I told them it was not complete; and that ... my
recommendation would be that it be rejected on that
basis." (R. 788).
Plaintiff's own witness, Mr. Max C. Carpenter,
manager of Hotel Utah, testified that when he examined
the bid, Exhibit "I", he did not regard it as a satisfactory bid. (R. 246). He was not able to tell from reading
the bid, what work would actually be done; that the bid
"was too vague." (R. 247). At that time, the relationship of Utah Hotel Company with Kimball Elevator
Company was unsatisfactory to some degree, because
Kimball had installed a small service elevator which did
not operate satisfactorily, and it had to be removed. (R.
246-247). Mr. Carpenter said he never submitted the
Kimball bid to the executive committee, and he never
asked Kimball if it cared to make another bid. He said
the only bid which Utah Hotel Company ever obtained
as it wanted the job done was the bid later submitted by
defendant Elevator Supplies Co. (R. 264).
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Mr. Carpenter testifi~d that any contract of any size
had to be approved by him. He instructed Jerry Smith
to call Mr. Roy C. Smith and ask Elevator Supplies Company to submit a bid to the hotel on the modernization
of the three passenger eleva tors. ( R. 242). The hotel
had a course of business dealings with defendant since
February 1948. (R. 243-244).
On August 17, 1950, Mr. Jerry Smith called defendant Elevator Supplies Company, Inc., San Francisco,
and talked to Roy C. Smith: "I asked him if Elevator
Supplies Company would be interested in submitting a
quotation, with recommendations, to the Hotel Utah,
covering the modernization, and the general rebuilding
of our equipment, and assuming the full responsibility
for that work." (R. 788-789). Mr. Jerry Smith said he
did not ask for anything other than a firm bid. (R. 789).
Mr. Roy C. Smith said it would be necessary for him to
contact his home office before giving a definite answer.
Exhibit 28, is the telephone company memorandum showing Jerry Smith called defendant's telephone number,
Garfield 17799, San Francisco, on August 17, 1950. (R.
788-789). Roy C. Smith subsequently told Jerry Smith
he would meet with him in Salt Lake City, the latter
part of the month. (R. 791).
The next day, D. W. Connole called Roy C. Smith,
August 18, 1950. Roy C. Smith testified that Mr. Connole asked for a quotation on two dumb-waiters, which
quotation defendant furnished by telegram dated August
22, 1950, Exhibit 19, on an installed basis and also on
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an F. 0. B. basis. (R. 885). Roy C. Smith denied that
there was any other discussion. The plaintiff offered
no evidence of any "\Yritten request for dumb-waiter
quotations. Mrs. Alice Connole, mother of Mr. Connole,
and secretary of l{imball Elevator Company, testified
that she listened in on the telephone conversation. On
cross-examination Mrs. Connole admitted that her son
had called Roy C. Smith for a quotation on dumb-waiters,
and it may have been in the telephone conversation of
.August 18, 1950. (R. 942).
Mr. Connole testified as to the conversation with
Roy C. Smith: "I told him that the Hotel Utah would
like to have a proposal on the over-all job to verify our
bid and justification of the amount quoted in our proposal and asked him if he could prepare the same and
he said he would . . . he said he 'vould have to get in
touch with the Pacific people." (R. 374). On crossexamination, when pressed for an answer as to what was
said by Roy C. Smith, he admitted that he testified on
deposition: "I don't remember just what he said." (R.
578). He again admitted that he did not remember what
Roy C. Smith said. (R. 579). No one could imply a
promise from Roy C. Smith, when l\Ir. Connole did not
remember what he said. Roy C. Smith promised nothing.
~

l\Irs. Connole testified that she listened in on the
conversation which her son had with Roy C. Smith over
the telephone on August 18, 1950: ''That was when he
asked for a bid, another estimate. . . . He called them
and told them that the hotel company 'vanted a support90
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ing bid ; that Otis was not going to bid, and the Westinghouse had too much on the coast, they would not come
into the Salt Lake territory with the elevator business .
. . . He said he would look it up and let us know." She
could not remember if there was anything else discussed.
(R. 940). The last remark quoted apparently had reference to dumb-"\vaiter prices. Inasmuch as Jerry Smith
had asked for a bid, and did not use the term supporting
bid, if Mr. Connole intended to convey some idea that
the hotel wanted something other than a firm bid or a
bona fide proposal which the hotel could act on, then Mr.
Connole "\vas practicing deceit for the third time.
Mr. Connole admitted that Jerry Smith did not ask
for a supporting bid, but stated that he wanted a bid
from defendant. (R. 577). Mr. Connole admitted that
on deposition he testified: ''He asked me if they would
give him a bid. I told him I would call Elevator Supplies
and ask them to give a supporting bid." (R. 577). On
deposition when asked "\Vhether Jerry Smith used the
words "supporting bid", Mr. Connole said:" I explained
to Mr. Jerry Smith that it would have to be a supporting
bid, because it was identically the same manufacturers
and the same people doing the work .... I told him that
the bid would be by identically the same people; and I
could not see what justification there would be for having
two people bid on identically the same equipment.'' (R.
575). The falsity of the representations of Mr. Connole
is demonstrated by comparing Exhibits "I" and "J",
which proves they are not identical.
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The version of the conversation, stripped of conclusions, presented by the plaintiff, fails to show that Utah
Hotel Company wanted any kind of a figure from defendant except a firm bid. By resort to misrepresentations plaintiff tried to talk Utah Hotel Company out of
getting a bid from defendant.
Mr. Allen E. Mecham, general counsel for Associated
General Contractors, a witness for plaintiff whose testimony was stipulated to, stated: "As far as I have any
knowledge, the term 'supporting bid' is not used in the
construction industry.'' On cross-examination he said
the term might be used as a ''collusive bid'' or it might
be ttsed to mean a bona fide bid. He further stated that
in ''the construction industry there is free competitive
bidding.'' (R. 657). Both Jerry Smith and Roy C. Smith
denied that such a term or expression was used in any
conversation, and Roy C. Smith said he never heard of
such expression prior to this lawsuit. (R. 786, 884-885).
The testimony of the plaintiff fails to show in any
particular that Roy C. Smith promised that defendant
would not give Utah Hotel Company a bona fide firm
bid. When Mr. Connole was asked whether R. C. Smith
ever told him (Mr. Connole) that defendant ''would not
present a firm bid to the Hotel Utah'' on the over-all
job, Mr. Connole ans,vered, "No." (R. 589). Nor was
there any testimony that there could have been any possible consideration, even if Roy C. Smith had promised
not to submit a firm bid to Utah Hotel Company. The
fact is, that there was no such promise. Both plaintiff
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and defendant knew Utah Hotel Company wanted a firm
bid from defendant, and if there had been any agreement
to refrain from submitting a firm bid such an agreement
(even if there had been consideration) would have been
collusive and fraudulent as against the Utah Hotel Company. Inasmuch as a bid is an offer, any bid submitted
by the defendant to the hotel company of necessity would
have had to be one which could be accepted or it would
not be a bid. Mr. Connole denied that he was trying to
keep Utah Hotel Company from getting a bid from defendant (R. 579) :

'' Q. Were you trying to keep the Hotel Utah
from getting a bid on the over-all job from the
Elevator Supplies Company~
"A. I was never aware that Elevator Supplies would bid the job. I "rasn 't trying to keep
them from it."
By letter dated August 28, 1950, Exhibit 20, plaintiff
submitted a proposal to Utah Hotel Company for the
sale of two electric dumb-waiters on a. non-installed basis.
(R. 249). Such bid was unsatisfactory to the management of Hotel Utah as the hotel was only interested in
bids on an installed basis. (R. 249). Furthermore, the
bid was incomplete, and it contained no specifications
whatsoever. (R. 793).
Mr. Roy C. Smith of defendant corporation came to
Salt Lake City with Mr. Charles Maynard Henker of
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company, August 29,
1950. (R. 695-696). Prior to coming, Roy C. Smith had
asked Mr. Henker if Pacific would submit a bid to de93
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fendant on a portion of the Hotel Utah elevator modernization on an installed basis. That would amount to a
great deal more than Pacific had previously bid to Kimball. (R. 673). Mr. Henker said that it would be all right
"if it is all right with l{imball Elevator Company", as
Pacific had submitted a bid previously to Kimball. (R.
673-674). Kimball was then the representative of Pacific
Elevator and Equipment Company in Utah. (R. 688).
Mr. Henker said he would not make a bid to defendant
without clearance from l{imball. (R. 674). He also told
Mr. Roy C. Smith that he thought it would be absolutely
necessary to make a complete survey of the job at the
job site. (R. 716). There had been business dealings
between defendant and Pacific for many years, always
on a basis of a request for a bid, submission of a quotation or firm bid, and a purchase order. That had been
true both ways. (R. 725). Contracts between them had
always been in writing. (R. 727).
There was a conference on August 30, 1950, between
Max C. Carpenter, manager of Hotel Utah, Jerry Smith,
building superintendent, and Roy C. Smith of defendant
corporation. Mr. Carpenter testified that he had asked
Jerry Smith to call Roy C. Smith for a bid from defendant on the over-all job. On this occasion Mr. Carpenter asked Roy C. Smith to submit a bid to the Hotel
Utah on the modernization of the three passenger elevators. Defendant did not solicit the business. (R. 242).
Mr. Carpenter at that time also asked Roy C. Smith to
submit a bid on two electric dumb waiter elevators. (R.
244). Mr. Carpenter also said he told Roy C. Smith that
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he 'vanted a bid on the over-all job on the passenger
elevator modernization, and that he expected Roy C.
Smith to present a straight-forward bid to the hotelone that could be accepted by the hotel. ( R. 248). There
was no discussion of the Kimball bid. Roy C. Smith
did not say or do anything to discourage Mr. Carpenter
from dealing with Kimball. (R. 248). Mr. Carpenter had
Roy C. Smith go over the elevator openings and make
a thorough inspection and examination, and Mr. Carpenter told him the things he wanted done. (R. 250).
Mr. Henker testified that after he and Roy C. Smith
arrived in Salt Lake City, they talked to some of the
hotel people, ''Then we made a very thorough survey
of the equipment down to the last detail, preparatory
to making up a firm bid to Elevator Supplies Company.''
(R. 676). Mr. Jerry Smith told ~fr. Henker that the
management had invited Elevator Supplies Company to
submit a bid on the over-all job; and Mr. Smith also
stated that the hotel wanted Elevator Supplies equipment used as far as possible. (R. 716-717). Before submitting any bid to defendant, Mr. Henker spent whatever time he thought was necessary to determine just
how much this job should cost for Pacific supplies and
equipment, plus installation charges. (R. 717). The
purpose of his visit to Salt Lake City was to determine
what to bid to defendant. (R. 718).
On August 30, 1950, there was a conversation between Roy C. Smith, Daniel W. Connole and Charles
Maynard Henker on the way to the Park Building at the
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University of Utah. Roy C. Smith(testified that he told
Mr. Connole that he wanted him to know that Hotel Utah
had asked defendant for a bid on the entire job and that
defendant was going to submit a bid; and that Mr.
Henker came here to make a survey of the job to quote
on an installed basis. While he could not hear the entire
conversation between Mr. Henker and Mr. Connole, both
of whom were in the front seat of Mr. Connole's car, Mr.
Henker asked Mr. Connole if it was all right to bid to
defendant, and Mr. Connole told Mr. Henker, yes, as
long as they were bidding list price. ( R. 886-887). Mr.
Connole said it was all right for Pacific to give defendant
a quotation. (R. 936-937).
Mr. Henker testified that he told Mr. Connole that
he had been requested by Elevator Supplies Company
to give a bid on the Hotel Utah job on an installed basis,
·and he wanted to be sure that Mr. _Connole had no obpections to· submitting a bid to Elevator Supplies Company.
Mr. Connole made some statement to the effect that he
knew that the hotel management had requested additional bids on the over-all job. (R. 718). Mr. Henker also
testified that the purpose of his visit to Salt Lake City
was to go over the job with the idea of bidding directly
to defendant; and that required a survey of the job to
get down to facts and figures which they had to have
in order to bid the job on that basis. (R. 671-672). He
further testified that he had already bid to Kimball and
he asked Mr. Smith and Mr. Connole whether they were
in agreement, as he wanted to confirm his company's
position in tendering this bid to defendant, and he wanted
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to clear himself of any wrongdoing as far as l(imball
Elevator Company was concerned. (R. 676-677). He said
they indicated they were in agreement, but that was all
that was said. (R. 677). In consequence of that discussion, under date of September 7, 1950, Pacific Elevator
and Equipment Company ''submitted a quotation or a
firm bid to the Elevator Supplies Company, Inc." (R.
717).
On direct examination Mr. Connole testified that
Mr. Henker said: ''While I have the two of you together,
you understand Mr. Smith is going to place a proposal
to the Utah Hotel. Am I to give him your figures~" Mr.
Connole told him ''Yes. '' He did not recall whether
anything else was said. (R. 37 4-375). On cross-examination Mr. Connole admitted that he told Mr. Henker it
was all right to submit a bid to Roy C. Smith, but he
did not know if that was the exact language. (R. 572).
He admitted that on deposition he testified: t' The Elevator Supplies Company requested the information from
Mr. Benker, and Mr. Henker refused to give it to them,
until he had my permission and that it was finally understood that I knew they were bidding it.'' (R. 572).

"Q. At the time that Mr. Henker spoke to
you he asked you whether it was agreeable for
him to furnish a quotation to the Elevator Supplies Company on the Hotel Utah job.
''A. The Elevator Supplies Company requested the information from Mr. Henker, and
Mr. Henker refused to give it to them, until he
had my permission and that it was finally understood that I knew they were bidding it.
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"Q. That is right, and he told you that Elevator Supplies Company was bidding on this job
and had asked Pacific EleYator and Equipment
Company to furnish them a quotation.
''A. That is correct.''
The testimony of Mr. Connole shows clearly that
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company had express
permission from Kimball to submit a bid to defendant,
and tnat it 'vas understood that defendant was bidding
on the job. Quoting further from the admissions of Mr.
Connole ( R. 573) :
'' Q. All he said to you was that the Eleva tor
Supplies Company 'requested us' to give them a
quotation on a certain part of this work~
''A. He told me that he could not give them
a quotation, because we were figuring the job and
representing them-unless it was with our permission.
'' Q. And you told him it was all right?

''A. I told him it was all right.''
The word ''quotation'' was used as a synonym for
"bid", as illustrated by the testimony of Mr. Henker.
(R. 717). There would not have been any occasion for
Pacific to get clearance from Kimball to merely submit
an "estimate of cost". Kimball was the territorial agent
of Pacific, and Pacific was unwilling to give defendant a
firm bid or quotation until ~fr. Connole consented. Mr.
Connole expressly told l\fr. Henker "it \Vas all right"
to give defendant a quotation. The admissions of Mr.
Connole, as plaintiff's manager, show that he consented

98
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

unequivocally to presentation of a firm bid by Pacific to
defendant. The only possible purpose of the detailed
"rork done by 1\{r. Henker in his survey, was "preparatory to making up a firm bid to Elevator Supplies Company." (R. 6'76). The testimony of Mr. Henker clearly
sho"\\rs too, that he relied on the consent of plaintiff to
present a bona fide bid to defendant, for Pacific gave a
bid to defendant about one week later, on September 7,
1950, Exhibit 18, and on October 4, 1950, Pacific accepted
a purchase order from defendant, Exhibit 2. (R. 717,
719-721)
0

In the conversation between Mr. Connole, Mr. Henker and Mr. Smith, on August 30, 1950, there was a
definite express discussion of the fact that Utah Hotel
Company had asked defendant to submit a bid, and that
defendant had requested a bid from Pacific on a portion
of the over-all job. Plaintiff did not make any pretense
in that discussion that there was any ''agreement''
whereby defendant would refrain from submitting a
firm bid to Utah Hotel Company. When the subject of
submission of a bid by defendant to its customer, Utah
Hotel Company, was expressly discussed, plaintiff could
have declined to give Pacific permission and defendant
\vould have been compelled to get a quotation from some
other elevator company. Plaintiff did not merely passively acquiesce in submission of a bid by Pacific to
defendant, but plaintiff expressly told Mr. Henker "it
was all right.'' Plaintiff thereby recognized the right
of defendant to present a firm bid to Utah Hotel Company, and plaintiff also recognized the right of the hotel
99
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company to obtain a firm bid from defendant. The admissions of plaintiff completely shattered plaintiff's
claim of an ''implied agreement not to compete with
plaintiff". It was improper to submit the case to the
jury when plaintiff's own evidence proved there was no
such ''agreement''. The trial court had no authority to
permit the jury to speculate that Mr. Connole did not
mean what he said when he told Mr. Henker it was all
right to submit a bid to the defendant, when the sole
purpose of such a bid was to enable defendant to submit
a bona fide bid to Utah Hotel Company.
Mr. Connole, as manager of Kimball Elevator Company, was confronted with a specific inquiry by Mr.
Henker. In response, Mr. Connole used unequivocal
words of consent which induced Pacific to submit a firm
bid to defendant. After Pacific submitted such bid,
plaintiff could not be heard to say that Mr. Connole did
not mean what he said. Even if Mr. Connole had not
expressly consented but plaintiff had merely passively
acquiesced in the submission of a firm bid by Pacific to
defendant, plaintiff could not be permitted to complain
either to Pacific or to defendant after both Pacific and
defendant had acted thereon. As stated in McSweaney
v. Equitable Trust Co., 127 N. J. L. 299, 22 A. 2d 282,
285, 139 A. L. R. 653 :
"The rule is well recognized that where a
party, 'vith full knowledge or with sufficient
notice or means of knowledge of his rights and
of all the material facts, remains inactive for a
considerable time or abstains from impeaching
a contract or transaction, or freely does what
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amounts to a recognition thereof as existing, or
acts in a manner inconsistent with its repudiation
and so as to effect or interfere with the relation
and situation of the parties, so that the other
party is induced to suppose that it is recognized,
this amounts to acquiescence and the transaction,
although originally impeachable becomes unimpeachable. ' '
Plaintiff has never tried to impeach the conduct of
Pacific in giving defendant a firm bid. The significant
fact is, that plaintiff did not remain inactive when defendant disclosed that it had asked Pacific for a bid;
but plaintiff expressly told Pacific that it was all right
to give defendant a bid. Obviously, if plaintiff had
merely registered disapproval, Pacific would have refrained from giving defendant a bid, as Pacific did not
want to offend its agent, Kimball Elevator Company.
Plaintiff did not just refrain from making an objection.
P1aintiff gave Pacific the ''green light'', by expressly
consenting to submission of a bid by Pacific to defendant.
In Stewart v. Finkelston.e, 208 Mass. 28, 36, 92 N. E.
37, 39, 28 L. R. A. (n.s.) 634, 18 Am. St. Rep. 370, it was
said that ''if there has been actual or passive acquiescence in the performance of the act complained of, then
equity will ordinarily refuse her aid for the establishment of an admitted right. * * * It would be contrary
to equity and good conscience to enforce such rights
when a defendant has been led to suppose there was no
objection to his operations.'' Obviously, plaintiff, as
territorial representative of Pacific, could not have
maintained an action against Pacific for submitting a
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firm bid to defendant, since plaintiff expressly consented
thereto. The action against defendant is not in good
faith. Plaintiff has not tried to impeach the conduct of
Pacific, but complains against defendant on a fictitious
claim after expressly telling Pacific it was all right to
submit a bid to defendant, knowing that such bid would
assist defendant in preparation and submission of a firm
bid to the hotel company on the over-all job.
In Uccello v. Gold'N Foods, 325 Mass. 319, 90 N. E.
2d 530, 535, 16 A. L. R. 2d 458, it is said: ''Acquiescence
is conduct from which may be inferred assent with a
consequent estoppel or quasi-estoppel." Numerous cases
are cited. However, in the instant case, there was no
need to infer assent of plaint~ff, for plaintiff expressly
consented. Mr. Connole said that Mr. Henker refused
to give defendant a bid "until he had my permission and
that it was nnally understood that I knew they were
bidding it.'' Mr. Connole told Mr. Henker it was all right
for Pacific_ to give defendant a quotation. There is no
room for explanation or interpretation. Plaintiff, by
express language, unequivocally consented to submission
of a bid by Pacific to defendant, on which consent Pacific
relied in presenting a firm bid to defendant. Without
qualification, plaintiff recognized the right and propriety
of defendant in submitting a firm bid to Utah Hotel
Company, which had been a customer of defendant for
over two years.
Under date of September 7, 1950, Pacific Elevator
and Equipment Company submitted a firm bid to de102
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fendant, Exhibit 18. (R. 717). Said bid covered the power
control and certain other equipment not then being
manufactured by defendant. The bid was on an installed
basis. (R. 717).
Eight days later, by letter from Pacific to plaintiff
dated September 15, 1950, Exhibit "F ", Pacific increased
its original bid of July 13, 1950, from $3050 per car to
$3715 per car (R. 714), an increase of nearly 22%. The
revised quotation was due to a rising market. In that
letter increasing the price of the quoted equipment,
Pacific stated: '' lVlr. Henker made an extensive survey
of the present installation and we wish to add the following items of repair work which you would have to
figure locally:'' ( 8 items specified, including new hoist
cables, governor cables, etc.) ''Our revised labor estimate including all of these items would be 139 crew days
for the entire job, exclusive of Elevator Supplies."
Pacific called attention to those additional items so that
if Kimball had an opportunity to revise its bid, it could
take those items into consideration. (R. 714-715). A
quotation from Pacific is good for only 30 days. There
was a price increase of 30% in electrical equipment in
1950. (R. 734-735). When counsel for plaintiff asked
whether Pacific intended that Kimball should be able
to rely on the new quotation, Mr. Henker answered, "Of
course. Why not~" (R. 735). It was not improper for
Pacific to submit a bid to defendant and also submit a
bid to plaintiff, or to anyone else, when acceptance could
come from only one of them.
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On September 11, 1950, defendant submitted two
bids to Utah Hotel Company. Exhibit "J" was on the
over-all passenger elevator modernization project, and
Exhibit 4 was on the two electric dumb-waiter elevators,
on an installed basis. Mr. Carpenter, manager of Utah
Hotel, testified that Exhibit '' J'' was the only bid which
the hotel ever received for doing the modernization the
way the hotel wanted it done. (R. 264).
On September 11, 1950, ·defendant withdrew the
original quotations to plaintiff, and in the light of information obtained from the hotel, defendant submitted
two new bids to plaintiff, Exhibit LLL. One was a new
proposal on the passenger elevators, increasing the price
from $30,126 quoted as of June 14, 1950, (Exhibit KKK),
to $32,020. A new proposal was made on the dumbwaiters to meet new specifications of Hotel Utah. In
the covering letter dated September 8, 1950, defendant
stated that it thereby withdrew its original proposal on
the passenger elevators, and it was thereby submitting
a new proposal 'vith price increase, stating "we have
also omitted the provision in one car for operation without an attendant, as we have been definitely informed
by the building that this feature is not desired." Defendant also advised plaintiff that an identical quotation
on the dumb-waiters had been made to Hotel Utah "as
per their request.'' Of course, the bid to Utah Hotel
Company on the passenger elevator modernization was
not an identical quotation to the one given to plaintiff,
for the one given to plaintiff covered only a portion of
the proposed job while the one given to the hotel covered
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the entire modernization project. In that letter, defendant advised plaintiff that the prices quoted were
list, subject to a discount of 10%. Suggestion was also
made that Mr. Connole call Mr. Smith to ''discuss any
other questions which may be pertinent to this negotia-

tion.''
Defendant and Pacific each made it possible for
plaintiff to make a new bid to Utah Hotel Company
which would remedy the omissions and uncertainties
which made the bid dated August 16, 1950, an abortive
and unsatisfactory bid. Plaintiff was not foreclosed of
opportunity to present a proper bid as far as the actions
of defendant and Pacific were concerned. In fact, both
defendant and Pacific called plaintiff's attention to information obtained from Hotel Utah, to which plaintiff
would have to give heed in order to submit a bid satisfactory in form. The failure of plaintiff to present a
complete and definite proposal on August 16, 1950, was
entirely the fault of plaintiff. Defendant did not prevent
plaintiff from making a satisfactory proposal to the
hotel company, either on August 16, 1950, or at any time.
Plaintiff disregarded both the new proposal from defendant dated September 11, 1950, and the new proposal
from Pacific dated September 15, 1950, and never
attempted to present a new bid to Utah Hotel Company.
(R. 542).
The pretended excuse for failure of plaintiff to
submit a new or revised bid was the hearsay testimony
of Mr. Connole (permitted over objections), that he told
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Jerry Smith that Kimball "\vas anticipating a "slight
increase in cost of electrical parts''; that Jerry Smith
said that the hotel had not decided definitely whether it
"\vould re-use the lanterns and push-buttons; that there
'vas some discussion about price increase, but that he
never told Jerry Smith he was raising the bid 26% ; and
that he told Jerry Smith if he would let plaintiff know
what the hotel "ranted deleted, "I would give him a new
bid, and he never let me kno,v." (R. 534, 54~). :\1r. Connole admitted that although plaintiff received new quotations from both defendant and Pacific, plaintiff did
nothing to present a new bid to Utah Hotel Company.
(R. 542).
Jerry Smith denied that anything was said about
re-use of lanterns and push buttons after plaintiff submitted its bid. He testified that sometime following submission of the Kimball bid, Mr. Connole told him the bid
was no longer in effect due to price increase, and that
he wrote 26% on the face of the bid as the figure by
which Mr. Connole had said the bid would be increased.
(R. 794-796, 816-817). When. Jerry Smith made such
notation. on the Kimball bid, the hotel management instructed him to disregard that bid and that company,
and not commttnicate further with it. (R. 822).
Although there is no competent proof that plaintiff
was misled by anything Jerry Smith supposedly said to
Mr. Connole, Mr. Connole admitted that Jerry Smith
never told plaintiff not to revise its bid. Plaintiff could
not have proffered any excuse of that character anyway,
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after September 11, 1950, when defendant presented its
new proposal to plaintiff covering what the hotel 'vanted.
Plaintiff not only ignored the information it obtained from defendant, but also the information it had
received from Pacific which clearly showed that plaintiff had omitted 23 essential items from its bid of
August 16, 1950. By letter dated July 13, 1950, Pacific
advised plaintiff that there were 15 repair items which
plaintiff wouTd have to figure. Plaintiff omitted all 15
from its bid. On September 15, 1950, Pacific notified
plaintiff that Pacific had found 8 additional items to be
included. Plaintiff continued to do nothing to remedy
the fatal omissions and uncertainties of its bid of August
16, 1950. Plaintiff simply would not include all of the
items the hotel rightfully insisted on having in the
modernization. Plaintiff foreclosed itself of opportunity
to have Hotel Utah consider it as a prospective contractor, by its own mismanagement and indisposition to
offer Hotel Utah what it wanted, as well as by plaintiff's
previous dealings.
The Utah Hotel Company did not make an award
of the two contracts to defendant until 16 days after
defendant presented the two new bids to the plaintiff.
The contracts were awarded September 27, 1950.
The plaintiff did not at any time say to anyone at
Hotel Utah that defendant had no right to present a
firm bid. Nor did plaintiff make any such representation
to defendant. The plaintiff recognized the right of de107
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fendant to deal with Utah Hotel Company which had
· been a satisfied customer of defendant for over two
years. In fact, when Mr. Connole was asked if he tried
to keep Hotel Utah from getting a bid from Elevator
Supplies Company on the over-all job, he said, ''I wasn't
trying to keep them from it.'' (R. 579). He further
testified that he did not tell anyone at the hotel prior
to tne award of the contracts, not to award a contract
to defendant. He added gratuitously, "I never knew
they would consider it. ' ' ( R. 596) . Mr. Connole also
admitted that Roy C. Smith never said at any time that
he would not submit a firm bid to Utah Hotel Company.
(R. 589). Nor did Mr. Connole know of any bid which
defendant ever submitted to anyone which was not a
firm bid. It was further admitted by Mr. Connole that
Roy C. Smith never told Mr. Connole that defendant
would give plaintiff a "cut out of the job" if the hotel
company ·awarded the contract to defendant. Mr. Connole stated that there was no promise of a cut, and there
were no promises. (R. 589-590).
Appellant will point out later, that the attempt of
plaintiff to exact a ''commission'' from defendant as
the successful bidder, was wrongful, for plaintiff knew
that defendant did not pay any commissions, and plaintiff also knew that plaintiff was not instrumental in
having Utah Hotel Company award the contracts to defendant. Furthermore, the attempt of plaintiff to induce
Hotel Utah to cancel the elevator modernization contract
with defendant, and to issue a new contract to plaintiff,
"ras a 'vrongful act designed to deprive defendant of its
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

contract rights in the effort of plaintiff to get something
for nothing.
The trial court should have granted the motion for
directed verdict, of no cause of action, for plaintiff demonstrated that it had no right of action.

PoiNT

5.

PLAINTIFF WAS THE ONLY WRONGDOER,
(A) BY PRACTICE OF DECEIT IN AN EFFORT
TO PREVENT COMPETITION, AND (B) BY ATTEMPTING TO EXACT A SPURIOUS '' COMMISSION'' FROM DEFENDANT AS SUCCESSFUL BIDDER, AND BY WRONGFULLY ATTEMPTING TO
DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF ITS CONTRACT.
The claim of plaintiff that it had "excellent business
relations" with Utah Hotel Company back-fired. Its
own witness, Max C. Carpenter, manager of Hotel Utah,
testified that at the time in question the relations between the hotel and plaintiff were unsatisfactory to some
degree because Kimball had installed a small service
elevator which did not operate satisfactorily, and it
ultimately had to be removed. (R. 246-247). Instead of
making corrections, plaintiff furnished excuses and arguments. Jerry Smith, building superintendent of Hotel
Utah, testified that prior to 1948, the hotel had purchased
various repair parts from Kimball Elevator Company,
but the service was not always satisfactory, so that in
1948 the hotel began to purchase directly from defendant
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to expedite a repair program. (R. 770-771). Mr Carpenter
also testified that the hotel had business dealings with
defendant since 1948. (R. 243-244). Utah Hotel Company
in 1950 was a customer of defendant.
In 1950 no contract whatsoever existed between
plaintiff and Utah Hotel Company. Plaintiff did nothing
to regain the hotel's confidence. The only proposal submitted by plaintiff to the hotel was dated August 16,
1950, and it was unsatisfactory and unacceptable to the
hotel management. (R. 246). Mr. Carpenter could not
tell from reading the bid, what work would actually be
done. The bid was incomplete and ''too vague.'' (R. 246247). Mr. Carpenter never submitted the Kimball bid
to the executive committee, and he never asked Kimball
if it cared to make another bid. (R. 264). Defendant
did not say or do anything to discourage the hotel company from dealing with plaintiff, and the Kimball bid
was never discussed with defendant. (R. 237).
Defendant did not even solicit the business from the
hotel, but Utah Hotel Company requested a bid on the
over-all job from defendant. (R. 241-242). Defendant
presented the only bid which was acceptable to the hotel
company. (R. 264). When the hotel management was
informed that plaintiff was going to increase the price
of its bid, Jerry Smith, building superintendent, was
. instructed to disregard the Kimball bid and not to communicate further with Kimball Elevator Company. (R.
822).
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Plaintiff did not sue in tort on some theory that it
"'. as maliciously prevented from entering into contract
with Utah Hotel Company, for there could have been
no possible factual basis of recovery on any such theory,
or any other legal theory. The tort rule is stated in
Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555:
''Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and
advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill
and credit. He ha.s no right to be protected against
competition, but he has a right to be free from
malicious and wanton interference, disturbance,
or annoyance. If disturbance or loss comes as a
result of competition or the exercise of like rights
by others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless
some superior right by contract, or otherwise, is
interfered with. But if it comes from the merely
wanton or malicious acts of others, without the
justification of competition, or the service of any
interest or lawful purpose, it then stands upon a
different footing.'' (Emphasis added.)
The statement in Skene v. Carayanis, 103 Conn. 708,
131 A. 497, 498, illustrates the law:
''The instant case does not fall fully within
the principle which holds liable him who, knowingly and without adequate justification, causes
another to breach his contract. R and W Hat
Shop, Inc., v. Sculley, 98 Conn. 1, 119 A. 55, 29
A. L. R. 551. The law does not, however, restrict
its protection to rights resting upon completed
contracts, but it also forbids unjustifiable inter-ference with any man's right to pursue his lawful
business or occupation, and to secure to himself
the earnings of his industry. Full, fair, and free
competition is necessary to the economic life of
a community, but under its guise, no man can, by
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unlawful means, prevent another from obtaining
the fruits of his labor. 'The weapons used by the
trader who relies upon this right for justification
must be those furnished by the laws of trade, or,
at least, must not be inconsistent with their free
operation. No man can justify interference with
another man's business through fraud or misrepresentation, nor by intimidation, obstruction, or
molestation.' Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255,
261, 69 N. E. 1085, 1088, 64 L. R. A. 260, 102 Am.
St. Rep. 341; Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227
N.Y. 1, 11, 124 N. E. 97, 6 A. L. R. 901; Virtue v.
Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17, 31,
142 N. W. 930, 1136, L. R. A. 1915 B, 1179, 1195. ''
Plaintiff proved no misrepresentations by defendant,
nor any fraud, molestation or interference. T~e only
party guilty of any such conduct was the pla;intiff.
(A) Plai.ntijj practiced deceit in the effort to pre-

vent competition.

At the time plaintiff requested defendant to ":figure
out'' the necessary elevator supplies for modernization
of the passenger elevators, in May 1950, plaintiff knew
that Utah Hotel Company had been a customer of defendant for over two years. Before submitting any bid,
defendant asked Mr. Connole what the bidding procedure would be. (R. 883). Mr. Connole admitted that he
told Roy C. Smith that Kimball Elevator Company was
going to do the job at Hotel Utah, and that he understood that there would be no other bidder on this job.
(R. 523-524). The representations were false, and uttered
without excuse, in an effort to prevent competition with
plaintiff.
112
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It is undisputed that Utah Hotel Company informed
plaintiff that it wanted a bid from defendant on the total
job. Mr. Connole falsely represented to Utah Hotel
Company that it would do no good; that such bid from
defendant 'vould be identical with plaintiff's bid. (R.
786-787, 818). Mr. Connole admitted saying, "I told him
that the bid would be by identically the same people; and
I could not see what justification there would be for
having t"~o people bid on identically the same equipment." (R. 575). The representation that the bid from
defendant would be identical was false, as demonstrated
by Exhibits "I" and "J". The plaintiff sought to
discourag·e the hotel from procuring a bid from defendant.
Although neither defendant nor Utah Hotel Company entered into agreement with plaintiff by virtue of
sucli false representations, had either one done so, the
agreement would have been subject to rescission. As
pointed out by this Honorable Court in Ogden Valley
Tt·out & Resort Co. v. Lewis, 41 Utah 183, 125 P. 687, it
is not necessary in an action for rescission to prove that
the party "'"ho made the false representations kne"r them
to be false; but merely that they were false and induced
the making of the contract. "Why should he who makes
false representations be permitted to profit by them,
whether he knew they were false or not~ Upon the other
hand, why should the party who is deceived be bound by
a contract based upon false representations, simply because he cannot prove that the other party to the contract
knew the statements when made were false~'' Plaintiff
113
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sued because it was frustrated in its unlawful scheme
to perpetrate a frauq. by the practice of dece~t both on
defendant and on Hotel Utah, and plaintiff seeks to be
put in a more advantageous position than if it had been
successful in its 'vrongful designs in the first instance.
The claim of ''implied agreement'' is fictitious on
its face in the light of the deception practiced by plaintiff, and the deception was of such a material nature that
if an agreement could have been induced successfully
by plaintiff, either with defendant or with Utah Hotel
Company, there would have been a complete bar by
virtue of the right to rescind.
(B) Plaintiff was . a wrongdoer by attempting to
exact a spurious "commission" and by attempting to
interfere with the contra.ct awarded to defendant.

l\1r. Connole expressly admitted that defendant did
not promise the plaintiff a ''cut out of the job.'' (R. 589590). He also admitted that there were no promises.
(R. 590). Mr. Connole also knew very well that defendant had never paid commissions. Defendant sold
to elevator companies at a discount of 10% from list
price. That did not constitute a commission, as an
offeree could not realize such discount or any other
benefit if it failed to make the purchase. Mr. Connole
knew that Utah Hotel Company had awarded the contracts to defendant on the basis of acceptable bids.
Neither he nor his company induced Utah Hotel Company to award the contracts to defendant. When he
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said, ''I expected my regular commission on the job''
(R. 590), he knew there was no commission due or owing,
and that he had never been paid a commission, nor had
JCimball Elevator Company. It was a plain attempt of
an unsuccessful bidder (if Kimball could be considered
a bidder when it declined to submit a. new bid), to exact
a fee from the successful bidder without consideration.
It was an unconscionable effort to get something for
nothing, commonly called a ''shake-down''.
When defendant flatly refused to submit to such
exaction, plaintiff asked Utah Hotel Company for a
''commission'' which was likewise refused. Plaintiff
was told that Hotel Utah had put the job out on bids,
and that Kimball had not been the successful bidder.
(R. 238, 240, 250). Plaintiff then wrongfully attempted
to induce Utah Hotel Company to change the contract
from defendant to ICimball, on the assurance that it
'vould not cost any more. Mr. Carpenter refused to do
anything to change the contract with defendant in any
way, shape or form. (R. 239-240). The entire conduct
of plaintiff was reprehensible, in defiance of the rights
of defendant.
In answer to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff made the unwarranted contention that
acceptance of a contract by defendant from Utah Hotel
Company on the passenger modernization project, constituted a "piratical taking of the Hotel Utah contract".
(R. 82). Such false contention was echoed throughout
the proceedings. Defendant did nothing to prevent plain-
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tiff from submitting a satisfactory bid to U ta.h Hotel
Company. Plaintiff presented an abortive bid, and when
plaintiff was furnished the necessary information by
defendant and by Pacific from which plaintiff could
have remedied the fatal omissions and uncertainties of
its unsatisfactory bid, plaintiff neglected to do anything
about it. When the contracts were awarded to defendant
because the defendant was the only bidder which offered
to do the jobs as the hotel 'vanted them done, the plaintiff first wrongfully tried to exact a spurious '' commission". When that contemptible scheme failed, plaintiff
tried to work on Hotel Utah.
The testimony of Mr. Connole as to "·hat he said to
Ivlax C. Carpenter demonstrates that he again resorted
to deceit in an effort to deprive defendant of its contract:
''I asked him if it "\vould be possible to transfer the contract that was issued to Elevator Supplies Company
over into the name of Kimball Elevator Company, that
it 'vas one and the same people doing the work, that it
was identical quotations, and it would make no difference
in price on the job." ( R. 391). The testimony was incompetent as part of an attempt of plaintiff to impeach
its ov/n witness, Mr. Carpenter, but Mr. Connole's own
version shows deceit: (1) The statement that "it was
one and the same people doing the work", was false, as
the bid submitted by the defendant contemplated performance by defendant and· by Pacific, and l(imball had
no part in performance. ( 2) The assertion that ''it was
identical quotations'', "\Vas false, for the Kimball bid
omitted 23 essential items "\Vhich were all included in
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the defendant's bid. Had plaintiff been successful in its
wrongful attempts to deprive the defendant of the contract, it would have been a case of "piracy of contract",
and actionable as a tort.
The only wrongdoer was the plaintiff, first by the
practice of deceit upon defendant and upon Utah Hotel
Company, then as unsuccessful bidder by the unconscionable attempt to exact a. spurious ''commission'', and
finally by the attempt to deprive defendant of the contract a'va.rded by Utah Hotel Company. It was apparent
at every step of the proceedings that plaintiff was
attempting to use the judicial machinery to accomplish
its unlawful scheme to get something for nothing. The
lower court should have dismissed the action with prejudice, since it was obvious that the action was in bad faith
in an effort to perpetrate a fraud.

PoiNT

6.

THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE
THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE OBTAINED
THE MODERNIZATION CONTRACT, AND NO
COMPETENT PROOF OF ANY DAMAGES.
Obviously, plaintiff could not claim damages for not
being awarded the Hotel Utah elevator modernization
contract, when plaintiff failed to prove that it would
actually have been awarded the contract, except for some
wrongful act of defendant. There was no claim made
by plaintiff that defendant committed any tort. De-
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fendant did not mislead the plaintiff, nor in any ~~ay
induce the plaintiff to submit an improper bid to Utah
Hotel Company. Nor was the defendant in any way
responsible for the unsuccessful past business dealings
between plaintiff and Utah Hotel Company which reduced the confidence of the hotel company in plaintiff to
practically zero. There was no competent evidence that
the hotel company would have awarded the contract to
plaintiff even if defendant had refused to give the hotel
a bid.
Plaintiff was an unacceptable bidder as far as Utah
Hotel Company was concerned, not only by reason of
the indisposition of plaintiff to submit a bid proposing
the type of performance which the hotel wanted, but
also because plaintiff had not given the hotel satisfactory
performance in the past. Plaintiff had ''two strikes
against it'' before it submitted its incomplete bid on
August 16, 1950, Exhibit "I". Mr. Carpenter, manager
of the hotel, testified that at that time, the relationship
of Utah Hotel Company "\vith Kimball Elevator Company was unsatisfactory to some degree, because Kimball had installed a small service elevator which did not
operate satisfactorily. (R. 246-247). Said elevator did
not work efficiently, and it had to be removed in 1949.
(R. 258). Its speed was too slow, the cab ''"as too heavy,
and it operated unsatisfactorily even after Kimball
changed the gear ratio. (R. 799, 805). Furthermore,
Kimball had given unsatisfactory service to the hotel on
repair parts, so that beginning with 1948 the hotel com118
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pany began to purchase the repair parts from defendant.
When plaintiff submitted its bid on August 16, 1950,
which omitted 23 essential items, and which was indefinite and otherwise incomplete, if that was not "strike
three against the plaintiff" it was at least "foul ball."
Plaintiff acknowledged to the hotel that the bid covered
only a portion of the project. Plaintiff manifested no
disposition to present a bid which would be acceptable
to the hotel management. When plaintiff notified the
hotel of price increase, there can be no question about
the fact that the hotel called ''strike three''. At that
time the management instructed Jerry Smith to disregard the Kimball bid and the Kimball Elevator Company, and not communica.te further with it. ( R. 822).
The hotel did not have to offer any reason for its decision
not to do business with plaintiff; but plaintiff had given
unsatisfactory performance in the past, and instead of
doing something to restore confidence, plaintiff made
such an objectionable proposal that the hotel company
was unwilling to risk doing business with it. Mr. Carpenter even declined to submit the Kimball bid to the
executive committee. (R. 264). He did not see fit to ask
the Kimball Elevator Company if it cared to make another bid. The hotel "\vas not very anxious to do business,
or even to invite Kimball to come back and submit
another bid, since Kimball had not submitted a satisfactory bid in the first instance. (R. 263-264).
It would be utterly impossible for reasonable minds
to reach the conclusion from the evidence, that Hotel
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Utah would have awarded any contract to any firm which
took the attitude that Kimball manifested. There was
no basis for submitting the case to the jury, and submission was a mere invitation to engage in speculation
in violation of the rights of def endan t.
Nor did plaintiff show that it could have made any
profit, if it were assumed for purposes of argument that
such a contract had been awarded to plaintiff. There
was no competent evidence whatsoever, that plaintiff
could have made either $8,555 awarded by the jury or
any other amount in excess of costs of performance. Mr.
Connole originally testified that the job was bid low
(R. 416):
''We took the price of the Elevator Supplies
equipment, the portion of the work they were to
do on an installed basis and took the price of the
Pacific Elevator & Equipment Company-we took
their estimates of their time or labor, our overhead and arrived at the price of $59,600.

"Q. (By Mr. Brennan) Did you consider any
other element than cost in making this price~
"A. Yes we bid the job lower than normal
because we wanted it as an advertising feature.''
Such testimony indicates that plaintiff did not figure
on any profit. Later, in an attempt to build up a claim
of ''damages'', plaintiff offered in evidence Exhibit
SSS, which was an ''estimate sheet'' prepared by plaintiff after the suit was started, to show a ''profit'' of
$12,899.08. Said incompetent instrument was received in
evidence over objections of defendant, notwithstanding
120
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~',

,~

said paper shows on its face tha.t at the time it was
prepared, plaintiff omitted a number of known items of
cost. ( R. 607-612) .
Plaintiff omitted the net increases which plaintiff
would have had to pay defendant under the new bid of
September 11, 1950, in the amount of $1,884.60 and the
net increase in the new bid of Pacific dated September
15, 1950, amounting to $1,995.00. The 34 additional crew
days mentioned by Pacific for installation of its equipment and other items, were also omitted from the labor
computations. Plaintiff used "labor figures" of August
1950, notwithstanding the costs in 1951 had increased
when the job would have been performed. Even at
plaintiff's lo'v labor estimate· of $3.98 per crew hour
(times 8 for 34 days), would amount to an additional
$1,082.56 alone, plus 10% for insurance would add
$108.26. The total of these specific items alone which
plaintiff conveniently excluded from the ''estimate sheet''
specially prepared for trial, aggregate $5,070.42. Those
items alone reduce plaintiff's "estimated profit" down
to $7,828.66 or a figure below the $8,555 awarded by the
jury, before various other omitted items are taken into
ronsidera tion.
Mr. Connole admitted that there were additional
items mentioned in the letter from Pacific to plaintiff
dated September 15, 1950. He said the new drive sheaves
would cost about $425 each. Two of them would cost
$850. He said two new hoist cables would each cost from
$150 to $175, and he was not trying to overstate those
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costs. Three of them them at $175 would add another
$525. The governor cables 'vould cost $150 eaeh or $450.
(R. 386-388). These few additional items would amount
to $1,825 to reduce the ''estimated profit'' do,vn to
$6,003.66. There were numerous other items of expense,
some of which he did not attempt to price, but merely
stated they were "included" in the original figure. If
all of the omitted i terns had been candidly disclosed,
they would not only have completely \Yiped out the
balance of the ''estimated profit'', but show a loss of
thousands of dollars.
Mr. Connole originally testified that he figured overhead in computing the figure of $59,600; but all overhead
costs except 10% for payroll insurance, are omitted from
the "estimate". Later, he testified, "You can't operate
on 10% in any business.'' (R. 530). There can be no
doubt that such an admission was not an overstatement.
He further testified that the 10% discount allowed to
elevator companies on purchases made by them, only
''covers part of the cost of operation.'' He admitted
that he figured nothing for overhead in his computation;
that he "never" figures it in the job. "You will find
it under the pro fit colu1nn." ( R. 530). Thus, a new technique has been devised for showing a ''profit'', by including overhead items in the "profit column." Even
if only 10% were used as the basic figure for overhead
costs, and the 10% were not figured on the sum which
plaintiff would have had to pay defendant if plaintiff
had been awarded the contract, ($28,818 after deducting
the 10% discount from list price), there would have been
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at least $30,782 of plaintiff's bid to which overhead
would apply, or $3,078.20 to reduce the "estimated
profit'' to $2,925.46.
There \Vas no figure set up for contingencies. It was
undisputed, as testified by Mr. Roy C. Smith, that in
the light of actual experience of doing the job, there
should have been from 8% to 10% allowed for contingencies. ( R. 914). If only 8% of $30,782 were figured, there
would be an additional cost of $2,462.56 to reduce the
''estimated profit'' to $462.90, and the $462.90 would
not begin to cover the other undisclosed costs, which
were conveniently omitted from the specially prepared
''estimate sheet'' written up sometime after this suit
\Vas initiated.
Plaintiff omitted the cost of a supervisor. Mr. Connole testified that Pacific was to send a man for supervision, and that the figure from Pacific did not include
the cost of supervision. (R. 549). Mr. Henker testified
that if l{imball had been awarded the job, Kimball had
arranged to hire a supervisor from the coast. ( R. 741743). Plaintiff did not see fit to disclose how many
thousand dollars such supervision with board allowance
'\vould have cost. The trial court sustained objections
to questions designed to show what the costs actually
\vere on the job. Plaintiff did not show what they were,
so the jury could not make a finding from a lack of
proof. As stated by counsel for plaintiff: "He knows
Mr. Henker refused to show the cost sheets. Mr. Reimann
asked him.'' (R. 898). The best evidence of whether a
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profit could be made on a job is what the job actually
cost, when done efficiently. Plaintiff also omitted the
cost of screening between the elevators, which would
have resulted in substantial expense in view of the
height of the building. Plaintiff failed to account for
the increased labor costs in the year 1951 over the year
1950, which would have added considerable expense. Instead of even a ''profit'' of $462.90, there would have
been a loss of thousands of dollars.
There was no competent evidence of any possible
''profit'', either in the amount of $8,555 or any other
sum. The court invited the jury to speculate. An examination of the verdict, which shows that some figures
were written and then crossed out, demonstrates how
utterly confused the jury had become. (R. 193-194).
Reasonable minds could not have concluded that plaintiff could have made any profit whatsoever. Proof of
profit cannot be made by willfully omitting costs or by
failing to disclose the full amount of the costs.
As stated in Durfee v. Durfee & Carvning, Inc., 323
Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 2d 522, 532 : ''To recover, the profits
in question must be capable of determination as a
practical matter upon evidence that proves them by a
f.air degree of certainty and accuracy; they cannot be
recovered when remote, speculative, hypothetical and
not within the realm of reasonable certainty.'' Exhibit
SSS was an incompetent misleading statement devised
by plaintiff after the suit was started. Damage cannot
be established for loss of profits, by the art of showing
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a fictitious profit through a deliberate omission of
essential items of cost or by failure to disclose the actual
amount of the costs.
The trial court also erroneously allowed the jury to
award ''damages'' for loss of advertising value. The
purported ''loss'' was ·allegedly occasioned by being
''deprived'' of having its nameplates,'' Kimball Elevator
Co.'' in the thresholds of the three elevator cabs. The
$8,530 awarded by the jury was without warrant under
the facts or under the law. Defendant did not prevent
plaintiff from making a deal with Utah Hotel Company
to get plaintiff's nameplates in the cabs. The Utah Hotel
Company did not allow defendant nor anyone else to
have any nameplates in the cabs. Kimball was not the
manufacturer of any of the equipment, but defendant
was the manufacturer of some of the important parts
of the equipment in the modernization, and there would
have been some reason for defendant to have its own
nameplates there if the hotel had permitted nameplates.
The old thresholds with the nameplates had to be removed along with the old cabs. The hotel management
selected thresholds for the new cabs, which were blank.
The hotel refused to allow any name in the cab except
the name of the cab manufacturer, ''Tyler'', in small
letters on the capacity plates in the cabs. (R. 249, 259260, 834-"835).
There is not the slightest competent evidence that
Utah Hotel Company would have allowed Kimball, which
manufactured none of the major equipment, to have put
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its nameplates in the elevator cabs, even if by some
miracle Kimball could have regained the confidence of
the hotel management and submitted an acceptable proposal, and have been awarded the contract. The bid
which plaintiff submitted, Exhibit ''I'', does not mention the subject. Mr. Connole admitted that the subject
of nameplates had never been discussed by plaintiff with
the hotel management. (R. 586-587, 650). There was no
competent evidence from which the jury could ''find''
that the hotel would have tolerated plaintiff's nameplates.
In submitting the case to the jury, the court utterly
disregarded the absolute right of Utah Hotel Company
as owner of the property to refuse anyone permission to
advertise. Defendant did not make that decision, and
defendant did not prevent plaintiff from making some
kind of a deal with the hotel company to have plaintiff's
nameplates in the cabs. It was a violation of a fundamental rule of liability to invite the jury to recover
damages against the defendant for the decision of Utah
Hotel Company, when defendant was not responsible
for that decision. Inasmuch as defendant, as manufacturer of some of the important equipment which went
into the modernization, could not get permission from
the hotel to install its nameplates, no person of ordinary
intelligence could arrive at any conclusion rationally
that plaintiff could have obtained permission when plaintiff was not a manufacturer of any of the equipment.
The Utah Hotel Company, notwithstanding the refusal of the trial court to so instruct, had the absolute
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right as the owner of the property, to refuse to permit
installation of nameplates. There is no evidence that
plaintiff would have been accorded some special privilege. There is a definite reason why the hotel would not
have allowed Kimball to install its nameplates. The
nameplate is supposed to be the manufacturer's nameplate, and Kimball could not possibly qualify. Emerson
S. Smith, called by plaintiff as an ''advertising expert''
who admitted that he was not qualified in the elevator
field (R. 566), admitted that the purpose of the nameplate is to identify the manufacturer. (R. 557). Mr. Connole testified that it is a practice of the manufacturer to
install its nameplate on the machine or on the cabs of
the elevator. (R. 649). He admitted that Kimball had
to obtain permission in the cases where it did install its
nameplates.
The award of damages was predicated on the loss
of advertising value of having a manufacturer's nameplate in the elevator cabs. (R. 560-561, 563). The testimony as to ''damages'' for not having Kimball's nameplates in the cabs was incompetent, for Kimball's nameplates could not possibly be manufacturer's nameplates.
One who has a contract to install manufactured equipment, is not the manufacturer. Mr. Emerson S. Smith
'vas not qualified to give an opinion. He gave an opinion ·
as to manufacturer's nameplates, which was irrelevant.
He had been in the elevator cabs on many oc.casions, but
he never paid any attention to whether there were any
nameplates in the thresholds of the cabs. (R. 558). Until
he made the inspection for the purpose of testifying, he
127

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was not aware of the absence of nameplates. Although
he saw a name on the capacity-plate, he had no recollection as to the particular name. (R. 560). Yet, he tried
to say that the general public who are. not advertising
conscious and not "experts", would observe what he
failed to observe. The court erred in refusing to strike
such ridiculous testimony of a man who admitted he
was not qualified in the elevator field.

Kimball Elevator Company was not the manufacturer of any of the equipment constituting th~ elevators.
The hoisting machines were manufactured by Ideal Electric Company. The power control relays are General
Electric, assembled by Pacific Elevator and Equipment
Company. The oil buffers were made by Pacific. The
signal controls and door operators and accessories, were
manufactured by Elevator Supplies Company, Inc., the
defendant. The cabs were manufactured by Tyler Cab
Company. The car safeties were manufactured by Kimball Brothers, of Council Bluffs, Iowa. Utah Hotel Company would not allow any nameplates of defendant or of
anyone else in the thresholds of the elevator cabs, because
five manufacturers were involved. (R. 833-834).
To have placed ''Kimball Elevator Co.'' nameplates
in the cabs, would have falsely advertised plaintiff as
the manufacturer of that which it did not and does not
manufacture. Such nameplates would constitute an unlawful mislabeling. Plaintiff could not lawfully advertise
in any manner without permission of the owner; and
Utah Hotel Company refused consent to those who asked,
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and plaintiff did not even presume to ask for a permission which would be refused. A person who is not the
manufacturer, cannot rightfully claim to be damaged by
not having a manufacturer's nameplate on something
which he has never manufactured. It would have been
unla;wful, as an unfair trade practice, forK imball to have
placed its nameplates in the elevator cabs. It was prejudicial error for the court to advise the jury that damages
could be recovered against defendant, when the owner
did not permit such advertising, and when plaintiff would
have been guilty of false advertising· by using such
false labels.
Section 13-2-11, U. C. A. 1953, declares that "Unfair
methods of competition or trade are declared unlawful.''
The state statute is substantially the same as the federal
statute. This case involves equipment sold and shipped
in interstate commerce, so that the federal statute would
be applicable, 15 U. S. C. A. Sees. 41-45. False and misleading labels constitute unfair methods of competition
which are declared unlawful. In Federal T·rade Commis·sion v. Army & Navy Trading Co., 88 F. 2d 776, it was
held that false and misleading representations as to the
origin of a commodity or as to its nature or quality
constitute an unfair method of competition. In Ditz
Distributors Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F.
2d 676, the court declared that the mere fact that an
expert would not be deceived is immaterial, and that
the important criterion in determining whether a product
is falsely mislabeled or advertised is the net impression
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"'"hich the advertisement 1s likely to make upon the
general public.
If Kimball could have had its nameplates in the
elevators, it would have falsely advertised that it was
the manufacturer of the equipment which it does not
manufacture. Inasmuch as such conduct would be unlawful, plaintiff cannot claim to be damaged by being
"prevented" from doing that which it had no legal right
to do. Obviously, no c.laim could be asserted against
defendant in any event, for the hotel company as owner
did not allow any nameplates in the cabs.
The plaintiff could not have obtained an award of
the contract. It could not have made a profit, and it
could not have had any right to put its nameplates in
the elevator cabs. There could be no basis for any
"damages". The claims of plaintiff were .unfounded
Plaintiff was not entitled to recover any sum or amount.
The court erred in refusing to enter judgment in accordance with the motion of defendant for a directed verdict
of ''no cause of action.''
PoiNT

7.

THERE WAS NO PROOF OF LEGAL CONSIDERATION.
Plaintiff proved that it devised a scheme to get
something for nothing. Plaintiff did not merely fail to
prove legal consideration, but actually produced evidence
that there was no consideration. When plaintiff learned
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that defendant was awarded the contracts, plaintiff tried
to get a "cut out of the job", by demanding a "commission". Plaintiff admitted that defendant had not
promised plaintiff a "cut out of the job", nor made any
other promises in the event defendant was awarded the
contracts. r~rhere can be no question about the fact that
plaintiff tried to shake down the successful bidder. Plaintiff admittedly did not stop there, but tried to induce
Utah Hotel Company to cancel its contract with defendant on the elevator modernization and to award the
contract to plaintiff. In such attempt, the plaintiff again
resorted to false representations.
The law has never countenanced schemes to get
something for nothing, either by outright false representations, or by agreements induced without consideration. It is elementary that an agreement is invalid if
not supported by a legal and valuable consideration.
The trial judge did not require the plaintiff to
specify what consideration, if any, plaintiff claimed for
the purported ''agreement not to compete with plaintiff." The so-called "issue" recited in the pre-trial
order, failed to state a cause of action, for want of consideration, as discussed under Point 2 (A), as well as
for the reason that such an "agreement" would have
been illegal and void under the Sherman Act, whether
express or implied.
No evidence was produced by plaintiff which even
slightly resembles consideration as that term has been
defined in the cases and in text-books. The numerous
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requests for bids could not constitute either offers or
consideration. As pointed out in 1 Williston. on Contracts, Sec. 31, page 74, an advertisement for bids "is
not itself an offer, but the bid or tender is an offer which
creates no rights until accepted." Nor could the unaccepted offers from defendant in response to requests for
bids, imply a promise not to compete, for without acceptance there could be no contract.
Neither a promise to refrain from competition, nor
consideration, could be implied from a group of unaccepted offers and other negotiations which terminated
prior to May 11, 1950. Disregarding (for purposes of
illustration) the fact that plaintiff obtained the bid dated
June 14, 1950, from defendant by falsely representing to
defendant that Hotel Utah was going to award the job
to plaintiff, that bid was merely an offer which never
resulted in any contract because it was never accepted.
Furthermore, defendant withdrew said offer by letter
dated September 8, 1950. No contract, express or implied, could possibly have resulted from such unaccepted
withdrawn offer.
In the light of specifications required by Utah Hotel
Company, defendant submitted two ne'v bids to plaintiff
dated September 11, 1950. One was on the elevator
modernization, and one 'vas on the dumb-waiters. Plaintiff did not g~ve any consideration for those two new
offers. In fact, plaintiff did not even request defendant
to submit either of those two bids. Those new bids were
not presented to plaintiff until after defendant had
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already submitted its two bids to Utah Hotel Company.
It would have been impossible for defendant in presenting the new bids to plaintiff, to have ''impliedly promised'' plaintiff that it would not give any good faith bids
to Utah Hotel Company when defendant had already
given such bids to the hotel company. Plaintiff did not
and could not show any possible consideration for its
claim of an ''implied agreement'' for defendant to refrain from doing business with its own customer, Utah
Hotel Company. The authorities cited under Point 2 (A)
are applicable here.
The court could not make a contract for the parties.
Neither could the court law!ully dispense with proof of
a legal consideration. There was not only a want of
proof of any consideration, but affirmative evidence that
there was no consideration. Consequently there was no
proof of a contract. The court erred prejudicially in
failing to grant the motion of defendant for a directed
verdict of no cause of action. Due process of law prohibits entering a judgment on a purported contract when
there is no evidence that the alleged contract ever existed.
The law in America requires consideration for agreements. The attempt to recover on a pretended ''implied
agreement'' for which there could be no conceivable
consideration, is a scheme to get something for nothing
which is not countenanced under the law. The courts
cannot be permitted to be used as instruments to foster
schemes to get something for nothing.
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PorNT 8.

THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT
OF BASIC RIGHTS, BY INJECTING FICTITIOUS
ISSUES INTO THE CASE; BY PREJUDICIAL
COMMENTS ON EVIDENCE; BY RECEIVING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE; BY EXCLUDING COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT; AND BY
REJECTING A NUMBER OF DEFENSES.
From the inception of the trial, the court permitted
plaintiff to present incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial evidence· over repeated objections of defendant.
Some of the objectionable evidence consisted of testimony of purported negotiations on other projects which
had terminated, transactions not even involving defendant, and requests for bids on other projects and
numerous unaccepted offers. Mr. Connole was allowed
to comment on such unsuccessful negotiations which had
faded into oblivion, as "contracts" and as "business
association''. Objections of defendant were overruled
persistently. (R. 268, 269, 271, 276, 279, 283). Finally,
the court allowed defendant a continuing objection to
all evidence not relating to the Hotel Utah modernization projects. (R. 283).
Defendant objected to most of the exhibits offered
by plaintiff, inasmuch as they had nothing whatsoever
to do with the Hotel Utah projects. l\1ost of them consisted of negotiations on other projects which had terminated, written offers "\vhich had expired, and corres-
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pondence having no bearing on plaintiff's claims. Defendant did not object to Exhibits A, F, I, J, L, 2-G,
2-P, 2-S, 3-D, 3-F to 3-L, 3-N, 3-0, 3-Q, 3-X, 3-Z, 4-A,
4-C to 4-I. The remainder of the exhibits offered by
plaintiff were challenged as incompetent, irrelevant and
immaterial, and they could not serve any purpose other
than to mislead and confuse the jury. The court even
allowed Mr. Connole to comment on the instruments. (R.
295-296). Defendant objected in vain to testimony as
to negotiations. (R. 297). Defendant also objected to
evidence of transactions to which defendant was not a
party. (R. 299). The court opened the gates to a flood
of hearsay.
The court repeatedly injected into the case fictitious
issues. Mr. Connole admitted that the jobs on which
plaintiff and Murphy Elevator Company had obtained
bids from defendant, never materialized. (R. 500). When
defendant sought to bring out admissions that those
negotiations did not result in any purchase order nor
any other contract with defendant, and that the exhibits
which defendant had objected to were unaccepted offers
which never became contracts, the trial judge cut off
cross-examination with the declaration:
''It doesn't make any difference. The complaint is, the contract breached was not a contract
to install, but a preliminary contract of the negotiations." (R. 503).
The court opened the door to the wildest speculation that defendant could be liable on some theory of
''breach of preliminary contract of negotiations.''
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Negotiations for a contract never executed are not
competent evidence. Negotiations do not constitute a
contract at all. The assertion of the court was utterly
contrary to the law, and falsely inferred that defendant
was liable without a valid contract involving the essentials of mutual assent, consideration, and legal subjectmatter. The statement of the court was a prejudicial
comment on the incompetent evidence, which amounted
to saying that negotiations which had terminated and
unaccepted written offers which had expired, might constitute a ''preliminary contract of negotiations.''
The trial court also permitted plaintiff to introduce
evidenc.e that defendant was a subcontractor for plaintiff on a limited portion of the Park Building job in
1950, then repeatedly made unwarranted comments about
the "relationship of contractor and subcontractor",
which were highly prejudicial. There was no connection.
whatsoever between the Park Building job and the Hotel
Utah projects. The relationship of contractor and subcontractor did not extend beyond the Park Building job.
No such relationship came into existence with respect to
Hotel Utah projects, for the simple reason that there
was no ac.ceptance of any proposal made by defendant
and hence no contract. The court injected another false
issue into the case in limiting cross-examination by
counsel for defendant (R. 506):
''I am going to limit you, the same as I said
at noon, to the issue of whether the defendant
was a subcontractor for the plaintiff.''
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The so-called ''issue'' was patently false, for with
respect to the Hotel Utah projects, it was impossible for
defendant to be a subcontractor for plaintiff when defendant's proposals to plaintiff were never accepted, and
there was no contract between the plaintiff and defendant. The court also made a highly prejudicial misstatement concerning the incompetent evidence which plaintiff
had introduced, by saying that ''Most of the evidence
was, they were the original contractor and subcontractor." (R. 506). Inasmuch as the bids had not been accepted, and had expired, no such purported contractual
relationship ever came into existence. The jury was
advised by the court, that there was a contractual relationship when none in fact had come into being.
Section 38-1-2, U. C. A. 1953, defines ''Contractors
and Subcontractors'' :
''Whoever shall do work or furnish materials
by contract, express or implied, with the owner,
as in this chapter provided, shall be deemed an
original contractor, and all other persons doing
work or furnishing materials shall be deemed
subcontractors.'' (Italics added.)
The defendant certainly had a right to show that
the bids were not accepted, that no contract came into
existence, and that defendant had not become a subcontractor in the numerous cases referred to by plaintiff
as "contracts". The evidence did not even show that
the plaintiff had always bid as a proposed original contractor ; and inasmuch as some of the bids were to general
contractors, plaintiff would have been a subcontractor in
137
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those cases if its bids had been accepted. In a number
of the cases, plaintiff acted as agent for Murphy Elevator
Company, and plaintiff was not even the bidder.
The court also erroneously sustained objections to
questions designed to show that defendant never refused
to submit bona fide bids to any persons requesting bids.
The purported ground for such adverse ruling was another invalid "issue" that it was plaintiff's theory that
defendant had never made any contract as an original
contractor in Utah prior to submission of two bids by
defendant to Utah Hotel Company in 1950. (R. 844-845).
Such ''issue'' echoed the spirit of regimentation which
characterized the feudalistic age. Such claim was not
even embodied in the pre-trial order. (R. 62-63). It was
asserted by plain tiff as a smoke-screen to obscure the
fact that there was no contract of any kind between
plaintiff and defendant with respect to Hotel Utah. The
claim would have been immaterial if it had been true,
but plaintiff's own evidence proved that such contention
was false. In 1948, 1949 and the early part of 1950 the
defendant was an original con.tractor with Utah Hotel
Company, the owner of Hotel Utah, for defendant sold
materials to the hotel company for the repair of the
passenger elevators, Exhibit 3. (R. 243-244, 770-771).
It was stipulated at the trial, "that prior to September 11, 1950, the defendant corporation, Elevator
Supplies Company, had not in Utah, Idaho or Montana,
ever bid as a prospective original contractor, as to any
elevator supplies or equipment, except on ... the sale
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of elevator parts and equipment, as manufactured by
the said Elevator Supplies Company, in case of sale of
parts a uniform discount of 10% off list or quotations,
was always allowed to all elevator contractors, but no
discount was allowed to other purchasers. With regard
to quotations on signal control, synchron control, collective and duplex collective control, it is further stipulated that the defendant, Elevator Supplies Company
did not quote exclusively to the plaintiff, Kimball Elevator Company, but that all quotations on such equipment
by the defendant, Elevator Supplies Company, were
made exclusively to original elevator contractors.'' (R.
858).
The fact that prior to September 11, 1950, defendant
had not bid as a prospective original contractor except
on materials which it manufactured, did not imply a
promise to plaintiff nor to any other elevator company
nor to anyone else that defendant would not in the
future include in its bids any materials manufactured
by others. Likewise, the fact that prior to September
11, 1950, defendant had given bids on signal control,
synchron control, and other types of controls only to
elevator contractors, did not and could not imply a
promise to anyone that in the future defendant would
refrain from quoting to owners of buildings or persons
other than elevator contractors.
Plaintiff's evidence shows that defendant was an
original contractor with Utah Hotel Company in 1948,
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1949 and the early part of 1950; but even if that had
not been the case, and even if in 1949 and in the early
part of 1950 the defendant had restricted its operations
to that of a subcontractor in Utah, such a policy would
not have prevented defendant from altering that policy
later on in 1950 if it sa":r fit to bid as a proposed original
contractor. Defendant certainly did not have to get
permission from plaintiff nor any other corporation.
The right to contract is guaranteed by the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 1: "All men have the
inherent and inalienable right . . . to acquire, possess
and protect property." Such constitutional right cannot
be whittled down by implication, or otherwise. Not even
the Legislature can impose restrictions upon such right,
except to specify the form in which contracts shall be
executed in order to be valid. In the case of Golding v.
Schubach Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P. 2d 871, this
Honorable Court held that Article I, Section 1, Constitution of Utah, is infringed when one is deprived of his
liberty to contract with others respecting the use to
which he may subject his property or employ his talents.
If the Legislature cannot deprive an individual of such
right, neither can plaintiff nor any other corporation
arrogate to itself the po,ver to dictate to defendant how
defendant ·shall contract or with whom it shall contract,
or how defendant shall otherwise run its business. The
idea that an "implied contract" can be forced onto a
person ·without his consent is contrary to the Bill of
Rights.
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The court allowed Mr. Connole to assume the attitude of a dictator, by permitting him to make a prejudicial impudent remark by way of conclusion (R. 949):

''Q. Did you at any time, authorize Roy Smith
to make a firm bid to the Hotel Utah?
"1\IR. REIMANN: Just a moment. I object
to that, as calling for a conclusion, which is incompetent, immaterial and irrelevant. He has no
authority to speak for defendant.
''MR. BRENNAN: I said, did he authorize'
''THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
"A. I did not. "
In the first place, the plaintiff had no legal right to
dictate to defendant. Plaintiff had no legal authority to
license defendant to bid as a prospective original contractor nor to prevent defendant from exercising the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The power to
license resides in the State, not in some corporation, nor
in Daniel W. Connole. Section 58-6-3, U. C. A. 1953,
states that "the term contractor, ... shall include subcontract~r.'' Section 58-6-4 provides for issuance of ''a
license authorizing the applicant to engage in the practice and business of contracting.'' Application is made
to the State, not to an individual or a corporation. The
statute does not regiment a qualified person to the role
of subcontractor, even if he never previously operated
as an original contractor. A licensee may start the year
as a subcontractor and change his methods of business
anytime during the year to operate as a general contractor. It is strictly his own business. Many contrac141
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tors, by reason of lack of sufficient capital are financially
unable to operate as original or ''prime'' contractors.
In the second place, it was pTejudicial error for the
trial court to permit Mr. Connole by way of an incompetent impudent conclusion, to interpret his express words
of consent to Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company
to mean that there was not to be a ''firm bid. ' ' If the
bid were not a firm bid it would necessarily be a collusive
or "phoney bid." Mr. Connole admitted that he told
Mr. Henker that it was all right for Pacific to submit a
bid to defendant. Having used unequivocal language of
consent in response to an inquiry of Mr. Henker, Mr.
Connole could not later be allowed to interpret his remarks to state that he did not mean what he said. Even
if Mr. Connole had not expressly consented, but had
merely passively acquiesced in the conduct of Pacific in
submission of a firm bid to defendant, plaintiff could
not later complain either to Pacific or to defendant.
However, the evidence required a finding that plaintiff
expressly consented to a bid by Pacific to defendant.
Plaintiff's own witness, Allen E. Mecham, general
·counsel for the Associated General Contractors, said that
''in the construction industry there is free competitive
bidding", and he was not aware of any collusive bidding.
(R. 667). When Mr. Henker of Pacific Elevator and
Equipment Company, was asked by counsel for plaintiff
if there is a trade practice in the elevator industry not
to bid directly to a customer, he testified that he had
''seen it both ways, three ways against the middle ...
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Well, in some of these places they will bid to suppliers,
and bid to a customer, and with different figures, and
everything else." (R. 774-775). How they bid is a matter
of company policy. lVIr. Henker was careful to make it
clear that Pacific did not agree to refrain from selling
to any person.
The trial judge made a prejudicial comment by misstating the evidence in sustaining objections of plaintiff
to interrogation of a defense witness (R. 844) :
''THE COURT: . . . He admits you had a
right to make proposals to other original bidders,
and that is embraced in your question, that is the
question at issue. He does not claim that. The
objection that it is immaterial is sustained. In
explanation of the court's ruling on this point,
the jury may see it this way: The Pacific Elevator
Company might be invited to bid on two original
proposals. One might be by the plaintiff and one
might be by the defendant, which they were in
this case. Now whether they can ethically bid to
both is not a problem in this lawsuit, because the
only question here raised is whether the defendant could make an original bid to the hotel Utah
after having made a sub-bid-a bid for a sub·contract with the pla.intiff. There could be a question, but it is not in this case because the defendant did not get involved in any offer with
any other proposed original contractor." (Italics
added).
In substance the court said that there was an issue
as to whether the defendant had a right to exercise the
privileges guaranteed by the Constitution. The comment
"whether they can ethically bid to both", inferred that
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there might be something unethical about the conduct
of defendant. The answer to such comment is, that it is
always ethical to have free competitive bidding, and not
only unethical but criminal to violate the federal and
state statutes which prohibit agreements in restraint
of competition.
Even if plaintiff did repeatedly assert at the trial
that defendant could not become an original contractor
(R. 654), there was no occasion for- the court to keep
repeating such false contention. Defendant had a constitutional right to contract directly with Utah Hotel
Company in 1950. Defendant had done so in 1948 and
1949. The hotel company not only had a right to purchase directly from defendant on catalog, but the hotel
had a right to request defendant to submit a bid on an
installed basis. Defendant did not have to obtain the
consent of plaintiff or of any other corporation in order
to include in the bid of defendant, materials manufactured by others who were willing to sell to defendant.
It was a terrific shock to hear the trial judge infer that
defendant could not exercise its constitutional right to
contract, unless defendant obtained permission of plaintiff.
Inasmuch as it was conceded that defendant had a
right to present a bid to some proposed original contractor other than plaintiff, the claims of plaintiff were
obviously fictitious. How could there be an implied agreement to refrain from competing directly with plaintiff,
when it is admitted that there was no implied agreement
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or any other agreement to refrain from competing with
plaintiff by submission of a bid to a competitor of plaintiff who would then bid to the owner~
The repeated statement that there was an ''issue''
as to whether defendant could bid to Hotel Utah after
having submitted a bid on a portion of the work to
plaintiff, 'vas also prejudicial and unwarranted in the
light of the facts. The original bid obtained by plaintiff
from defendant through misrepresentation, was withdrawn by defendant by letter dated September 8, 1950.
No one can intelligently challenge the right of defendant
to withdraw that bid, inasmuch as it had never been
accepted. The situation then was as if no bid had been
presented to plaintiff, so that even the assertion that
defendant presented a bid to Utah Hotel Company after
submitting a bid to plaintiff is misleading as well as
irrelevant. On September 11, 1950, defendant first presented bids to Utah Hotel Company, then submitted two
new bids to plaintiff. The situation at that time was if
defendant had first submitted bids to Utah Hotel Company. The argument of ''implied agreement not to
compete with plaintiff", becomes even more ridiculous;
for at that time there were already two bids submitted
to Utah Hotel Company, defendant's customer, and no
rational person could say that defendant "impliedly
promised'' to refrain from doing the very thing which
plaintiff knew defendant had already done.
The court persistently ignored the fundamental
reason, independent of the constitutional right to con145
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tract, 'vhy there can be no legal objection to giving a
bid to several different persons. .1\ bid is merely an
offer. A request for a bid is not an offer. Until the offer
is accepted, there is no contract. In 1 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 31, page 74, it is stated:
''Often tenders or bids are advertised for ...
by private corporations. The rules governing
such bidding are analogous to the rules governing
auction sales. That is, an ordinary advertisement
for bids or tenders is not itself an offer, but the
bid or tender is an offer which creates no rights
until accepted.''
In Section 32, at page 77, the rule is stated that it is
possible to make offers to any one ''or to every one.''
If an offer can be made to an unlimited number of
people, it can a1so be made to specified individuals, and
different proposals can be made. Neither cases nor texts
can be found which even hint that it is actionable to
submit offers to a proposed general contractor and also
to the owner. On the other hand, an attempt to prevent
the owner from obtaining competitive bids is a fraud
on the owner, and a violation of law.
If plaintiff on September 16, 1950, had submitted a
new bid to Utah Hotel Company in the light of information received from Pacific and from defendant, and
if such bid had been in acceptable form and content to

satisfy Utah Hotel Company, and if plaintiff had been
able to regain the confidence of the hotel company which
plaintiff had lost, and if Utah Hotel Company had accepted plaintiff's bids instead of the bids of defendant,
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Utah Hotel Company would not have accepted the bids
of defendant. In that situation, defendant would not
have accepted the bid from Pacific. Plaintiff might have
accepted the bids from both Pacific and from defendant.
It was no more possible for both plaintiff and defendant
to accept the bids from Pacific, than it was for Utah Hotel
Company to accept the over-all bids from both defendant
and plaintiff (assuming that plaintiff had submitted a
new bid which was free from the objections which caused
rejection of the original bid of August 16, 1950). The
hotel company having accepted the bids of defendant,
defendant accepted the bid from Pacific (which was a
vastly different bid from the one presented by Pacific
to plaintiff). The plaintiff not being awarded the contract would not in any event accept the bid submitted
by defendant. There could be no possibility of breach
of contract by submission of bids to both a proposed
original contractor and to the owner, for there can be
no contract until or unless there is acceptance of an
offer. Only one of the offers submitted by defendant
could possibly be accepted on one project.
The trial court erred in restricting cross-examination. Such cross-examination was obviously designed to
demonstrate the falsity of the claims and conclusions
asserted by plaintiff over objections of defendant.
The court erroneously refused to allow defendant
to show actual costs of the job, even after the court had
permitted Mr. Connole to give estimates of what he
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thought the cost should have been. (R. 897-899). The
court then made the un,varranted comment (R. 899):
"The only question there is 'vhat bid could
have been obtained to determine whether the
plaintiff had a loss as a result of not getting a
contract.''
The statement of the court inferred that plaintiff
was entitled to recover because plaintiff did not obtain
a contract. By such prejudicial comment, the court
erroneously denied defendant the right to show actual
costs of doing the job. Actual costs would be competent
in any event, as an appropriate criterion for determining
whether plaintiff could possibly have made any profit if
it had been awarded the job. The idea that plaintiff
could rely on "estimates" of costs which excluded many
of the items of expense, is patently absurd. Also, the
assertion of the court that it 'vould be necessary to show
bids from someone other than defendant, (which would
be utterly impossible), ignores the basic rule that profit
is the margin of return over and above costs.
The court erred in allowing Mr. Connole to comment
on, interpret, and contradict the written instruments.
He was even permitted to call the bid dated August 16,
1950, Exhibit ''I'', a ''contract'' although the instrument
was entirely unsatisfactory to Utah Hotel Company and
was rejected. (R. 385-388). His testimony was also
objectionable because he tried to vary the instrument
by parole, by saying that various items not mentioned
in the proposal ''were figured in our original contract.''
(R. 385-386).
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Mr. Connole '\vas allowed to contradict some of the
testimony of Mr. Carpenter, who had been called to
testify by plaintiff. (R. 390-393). Such testimony of Mr.
Connole was clearly hearsay. He was permitted by the
court to make prejudicial hearsay remarks as to what
he allegedly said to Mr. Carpenter, such as "my commission for handling was all in the original contract'',
knowing very well there was no contract. (R. 392). The
court also erred prejudicially in allowing Mr. Connole
to testify as to purported conversations with Mr. Carpenter and with l\1:r. Jerry Smith, of Hotel Utah. (R.
369-373).

The court arbitrarily ruled out a number of defenses.
One was the defense of illegality of the purported contract alleged in the amended complaint, and the defense
of illegality to the pretended ''agreement not to compete''
recited in the pre-trial order. (R. 63).
The court ruled out the defense of lack of authority
of any officer or agent of defendant to enter into any
agreement to refrain from competition. (R. 25, 58-59).
The trial judge sustained an objection to questions
on cross-examination which would demonstrate that Mr.
Connole acted in bad faith in demanding a "commission"
on September 27, 1950. Defendant asked whether plaintiff had received any money, check or bank draft. (R.
605). Plaintiff well-knew that the only basis of dealing
had been purchasing from defendant at a discount, on
the same basis as other elevator companies.
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By repeatedly restraining cross-examination which
demonstrated that the claims of plaintiff constituted
subterfuge, the defendant was deprived of further admissions from plaintiff.
If the trial court had ruled correctly, instead of the
way it did rule on objections of defendant, the case would
have been dismissed with prejudice.
PorNT 9.

THE COURT MISDIRECTED THE JURY
PREJUDICIALLY BOTH AS TO THE LAW AND
AS TO THE EVIDENCE, AND THE COURT ALSO
WITHHELD FROM THE JURY VARIOUS THEORIES OF DEFENSE BY REFUSING TO GIVE APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS.
The trial court should have directed a verdict
against the plaintiff. The claims of plaintiff are contrary
to law. Plaintiff failed to prove any agreement or any
breach of contract.
In submitting the case to the jury, the court substantially deprived defendant of its defenses, by contradicting the evidence, by disregarding the express stipulations of the parties, and by ignoring the admissions
of plaintiff. The court also refused to present to the
jury by appropriate instruction, the defenses established
by the evidence. Defendant duly excepted to the erroneous instructions given, and also excepted to the refusal
of the trial judge to give 28 separate instructions which
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had been timely requested by defendant. (R. 111-131,
157-189, 966-971).
Defendant excepted to the last four lines of Instruction No. 1 inasmuch as there was no evidence of any
implied contract, nor any circumstantial evidence that
the parties intended to make a contract such as claimed
by plaintiff. Defendant excepted to Instruction No. 2
for the same reason. (R. 112-113). Instruction No. 2-a,
was vicious, for there was not only a lack of competent
evidence of any agreement between the parties to prevent
defendant from submitting a bid to Utah Hotel Company,
but the instruction was in defiance of the federal and
state statutes which make any such purported agreements
illegal (R. 114) :
'' ... If you shall believe from all the evidence
in this cause as to the actions, conduct and manner
of doing business between the parties that both
the plaintiff and defendant understood and agreed
that the defendant company could not contract
directly with a customer to whom plaintiff had
already submitted a bid for sale or use of defendant's equipment, such agreement, if any,
although not in writing would be binding between
the parties.''
The instruction disregards the admissions and stipul~tions which show that defendant quoted plaintiff on
the same basis as other elevator companies. The instruction is contrary to law for the reason previously indicated, that unaccepted offers cannot impliedly create a
contract; and even in the few instances where contracts
were actually made, they were specific, express and in
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writing, and left no room for any implications. Also,
the execution and performance of a specific contract in
the past, does not constitute any implied agreement to
enter into a similar contract in the future, nor to limit
activities in the future. The instruction also permitted
the jury to construe written instruments, which is not
a function of the jury. The trial court had no authority
to delegate such function to the jury. The trial judge
could not have lawfully construed a group of expired
unaccepted offers and negotiations which had terminated,
a.s an implied contract not to compete. The instruction
was in defiance of the Bill of Rights.
Instruction No. 5 contains the same vices as No. 2 a,
and more. (R. 120). Among the objectional features of
said instruction were the following:
''The plaintiff says that an understanding had
developed from the nature of their business, their
locations, their past dealings with each other, and
all of the facts up to the submission of the defendant's bid to the plaintiff.
''The plaintiff says that the implied understanding was that they were acting as follows:
When the plaintiff had asked the defendant for a
bid, and after the defendant had responded with
a bid, that the defendant would not compete with
the plaintiff in any way for the original contract.''
The instruction fails to show a valid agreement for
want of consideration, and the statement of the claim is
void on its face. Furthermore, the court ignored the
fact that the original bid of June 14, 1950, obtained by
false representations by plaintiff, was withdrawn Sep152
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tember 8, 1950. The court failed and refused to state
the defenses of defendant, but merely stated, "The
defendant says there "\Yas no such understanding.'' The
statement is false, for defendant denied that there was
any agree1nent 'vhatsoever, and the court inferred that
there "Tas some other kind of ''understanding''. Tht
mere assertion that ''Defendant also says that the defendant was free to bid for an original contract'', was
not a fair nor an adequate statement of the defendant's
position, for defendant claimed that plaintiff's conduct
was not in good faith in that the plaintiff was guilty of
misrepresentation.
Instruction No. 5-a disregarded the admissions of
plaintiff, the undisputed evidence and the stipulations
of counsel, and authorized the jury to disregard those
matters (R. 121):
''Plaintiff has introduced evidence to show
that the plaintiff did not invite other companies
to compete with the defendant on certain products,
and that the plaintiff used said certain products
of the defendant exclusively.''
Such statement was utterly contrary to plaintiff's
own evidence, which showed that plaintiff never did use
defendant's products exclusively, and particularly never
at any time purchased any dumb-waiters, relay controls
of any of the modern types, and that plaintiff took orders
on such items from companies other than defendant,
as previously pointed out in argument of Point 3.
Counsel for plaintiff stipulated that defendant did not
deal exclusively with plaintiff, and also that plaintiff
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purchased from others the type of equipment which
defendant manufactures, 'vhich completely precluded any
such instruction. The plaintiff's evidence did not at any
time sho'v that the dealings 'vere exclusive, and the
charge to the jury of exclusive dealings was absolutely
contrary to the evidence. The. court had no right to
contradict the admissions of plaintiff and the stipulations of counsel which clearly sho,ved that there were
no exclusive dealings.
The court further attempted to delegate to the jury
the privilege of construing the written negotiations as
amounting to an implied contract, when the court would
have been compelled by the fundamental rules of law
to charge that those instruments did not imply any such
agreement as contended by plaintiff. The instruction
stated, ''You may consider the conduct of the parties
'vhatever you find it to have been~ in determining whether
or not there was an implied agreement to the effect that
the defendant would not compete against the plaintiff."
(R. 121). The court told the jury it could find anything,
as it refused to give the jury instructions in accordance
'vith the stipulation of the parties or the admissions of
plaintiff. The court attempted to license the jury to
construe written neg·otia tions and unaccepted offers
which had expired as an implied agreement not to com~
pete. Neither the court nor the jury had any such right.
The court's instruction No. 5-b that such an agree~
ment would have been legal and valid and not against
public policy, was contrary to the express provisions of
the Sherman Act, and also other federal and state legis~
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lation discussed under Points 1 and 2. The first line of
No. 5-c was objectionable for the same reason.
Instruction No. 6 was wholly unwarranted, and
prejudicial for the reason that there "\Vas neither evidence of a ''general implied agreement not to compete
with plaintiff'', nor ''an implied agreement not to compete for the Hotel Utah job". That instruction was particularly vicious in opening two avenues of conjecture,
without competent evidence (R. 124) :
''If you find from the dealings of the parties
generally, and independent of the negotiations for
the Hotel Utah job, that an implied agreement
not to compete existed between the plaintiff and
the defendant, then you should find in favor of
the plaintiff unless plaintiff waived that agreement.''
It would be impossible to make out a·n implied agreement generally when the matter was never discussed,
and in 20 years defendant had been awarded only seven
contracts, each by way of written acceptance of written
bid; and the evidence showed that defendant did not deal
with plaintiff on any different basis than any other
elevator company. TheTe was no proof of any consideration, nor any other essential elements of a contract. The
court also opened an alternate avenue for the wildest
sort of conjecture (R. 124) :
"If you find that there was no implied general
agreement, but that there was an implied agreement not to compete for the Hotel Utah job, then
you should find for the plaintiff unless it was
waived by the plaintiff or unless the plaintiff in-
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duced the implied agreement by a misrepresentation as explained hereafter. ''
The evidence required a finding that plaintiff recognized the right of defendant to make a bid to Utah Hotel
Company and the right of Utah Hotel Company to obtain
a firm bid from defendant, for the plaintiff tried to talk
Utah Hotel Company out of getting a bid from defendant and plaintiff made no claim that defendant was
precluded from giving a bid, and plaintiff expressly
told Mr. Henker that it was all right for Pacific Elevator
and Equipment Company to submit a bid to defendant,
which would destroy the claim that there was in existence
at that time any "implied agreement not to compete."
Furthermore, the original bid of defendant to plaintiff,
which was obtained by false representations was withdrawn on September 8, 1950, there having been no acceptance. The bid submitted thereafter was junior to the
bid submitted by defendant to Hotel Utah. The jury
was told that it could find from the evidence an agreement which never existed, and that if it "found" such
an ''agreement'' the plaintiff was entitled to recover,
falsely inferring that defendant violated some contractual right of plaintiff when no such contractual right
had ever existed or could have existed under the law.
By the second paragraph of Instruction No. 7 the
court charged ( R. 127) :
"The defendant has the burden to prove that
the· plaintiff acquiesced in the defendant's giving
a competitive bid to the Hotel Utah, and that the
plaintiff induced the defendant to agree not to
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compete by a misrepresentation, if such an
ment existed.''

~gree

A party never ha.s a burden to prove anything which
his adversary has already proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In this case the plaintiff admitted making the
false representations. The plaintiff also admitted telling
Mr. Henker that it was all right for Pacific to give defendant a bid; so that defendant had no burden whatsoever to prove the very things which the plaintiff confessed. The court had no right to invite the jury to
speculate as to whether Mr. Connole meant what he said
when he told Pacific that it was all right to submit a bid
to defendant, knowing that defendant wa.s going to use
the bid from Pacific to arrive at a proper bid to submit
to Utah Hotel Company. The court might just as well
have told the jury that plaintiff admitted those things,
but the jury could disregard the admissions of the plaintiff on the theory that defendant had the burden of
proving them, and what the plaintiff unequivocally admitted or stipulated to be the facts would not count.
Instruction No. 11 related to the award of damages.
There was no evidence that plaintiff could have obtained
an award of the contract. The court charged inter alia
(R. 128) :

"If you find for the plaintiff then you a.re to
award plaintiff the damages that resulted from
the defendant's breach of contract. In such an
event the plaintiff would be entitled to the profit
that plaintiff would have made on the contract
with the Hotel Utah, and that amount cannot
exceed $12,899.08."
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There was no contract and no possible ''breach of
contract.'' There was no proof of any damages. As
pointed out under Point 6, there was no competent evidence that plaintiff could have made a cent of profit.
Mr. Connole first testified that he figured the job "low''
by computing only the items which would be the actual
costs. When he sprang Exhibit SSS which had been
concocted after this suit started, it was apparent that to
arrive at the figure of $12,899.08 he had willfully omitted
at least $15,000 of actual costs.
The court further instructed (R. 128):
''The verdict may also include the loss of
advertising that would have gone to the plaintiff,
if any, had the plaintiff had the original contract.
Such loss would include the observations that
passengers might be able to make of the sign that
plaintiff could have and would have lawfully maintained on the elevator cabs.
''The amount that plaintiff would be entitled
to for the use of signs in the elevator cabs, and
for not being able to point out the Hotel Utah as
one of its installations, cannot exceed the amount
of $1,000 per year, discounted for payment in adcance ... ''
The last quoted portions of Instruction No. 11 are
objectionable by inferring, contrary to the evidence, that
plaintiff would have been able to put its signs in the
elevator cabs lawfully. The evidence is undisputed that
Utah Hotel Company as owner of the property did not
and would not consent to any nameplates in the
thresholds of the cabs. If plaintiff, by some miracle, had
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been able to obtain an award of the contract, and had
put its nameplates in the cabs to falsely advertise itself
as the manufacturer, Utah Hotel Company could and
would have ripped them out of the cabs. There is no
evidence that the nameplates would have remained in
the cabs for even 24 hours, even if the plaintiff could
have installed them without Utah Hotel Company knowing about it.
There never was any permission to advertise, and
plaintiff could not have been damaged. It would have
been unlawful as an unfair trade practice for plaintiff
to have advertised itself as the manufacturer of that
which it did not and does not manufacture. A person
cannot be heard to say he was damaged by being prevented from doing an unlawful act, or even prevented
from doing that which he had not obtained the right to
do. The evidence of damage related to loss of privilege
of placing the manufacturer's nameplates in the cabs.
The plaintiff could not possibly qualify as a manufacturer. The instruction further assumes that defendant
would be liable for the decision made by Hotel Utah.
The court violated fundamental rules by refusing to
give instructions on the theories of defendant as to the
defenses asserted. Out of requests for instructions numbered 1 to 37 inclusive, the court refused to give any
of that list except 1, 6, 15, 16, 20, 21, 35, 36 and 37 in
\vhole or in part. This Honorable Court held in Webb v.
Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P. 2d 114, that a party is entitled
to have his theory submitted to the jury by appropriate
159
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instructions, when there is evidence to sustain it. The
trial court erred in its refusal to give each of the requested instructions, inasmuch as correct statements of
law are embodied in such requested instructions, and
there was more than ample evidence to warrant such
instructions.
By request No. 2, the court was requested to charge
that in order to have a contract implied by conduct, all
of the elements of a valid contract must exist, including
a meeting of the minds to do that which is lawful, and
also consideration. (R. 157). The defendant was Inexorably right in request No. 4 (R. 159):
"The fact that the parties have entered into
a particular contract or agreement in the past, by
express written terms, does not imply that the
parties will continue to make contracts of such
character in the future. In other words, where
there is a written agreement between the parties
on a particular date whereby one party contracts
to do a particular job for the other party, that
fact does not imply that a similar transaction will
be entered into thereafter. Such written contract
and the performance under it is not to be construed as conduct which implies some other agreement, in the absence of language in such instrument which indicates that the parties contemplate
performance in addition to that which is expressly
stated in the written agreement."
See Donovan v. McGurrin, 69 Utah 1, 251 P. 1067, 17
C. J. S., Contracts, Implied Terms, pages 779-780, and
Johnson v. Iglehart Bros., 95 F. 2d 4. Likewise, it was
prejudicial error to fail to give request No. 5:
160
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''You are instructed that it is the duty of the
court to construe the written instruments. In this
case, none of the written instruments nor the performance required under any of said written instruments, show any intention on the part of the
defendant to agree to refrain from submitting a
bid to any other person. Furthermore, you are
instructed that in a number of instances, the defendant submitted written bids on the same job
or project to plaintiff and to one or more other
companies.
"Neither the request of plaintiff to defendant,
dated May 11, 1950, to submit a bid on a portion
of the modernization of the passenger elevators
at Hotel Utah, nor the proposal by defendant
dated June 14, 1950, to the plaintiff, nor the
written proposal made to plaintiff by defendant
dated September 11, 1950, can be construed in
any manner as an agreement on the part of defendant to refrain from submitting to management of Utah Hotel Company a bid on the entire
modernization project.''
The court had a duty to construe the written instruments, and it had no authority to delegate that function
to the jury. The request of defendant was proper, for
there could be no other construction of the written
instruments.
Defendant was entitled to have submitted request
No.7: "The fact that defendant had submitted to plaintiff a proposal covering a portion of the modernization
project, did not make it wrongful for defendant to submit
to Utah Hotel Company upon invitation of Utah Hotel
Company a proposal covering the entire modernization
161
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project.'' The hotel had been a customer for over two
years, and the hotel had a right to receive a firm bid
from defendant, and a right not to receive a misleading
or collusive bid. Likewise, defendant was entitled to
have request No. 8 granted (R. 163), particularly in view
of the prejudicial comments of the court on the evidence:
"You are instructed that the mere fact that
defendant had not previously bid as a prime contractor in the State of Utah, did not require
defendant to obtain the consent of the plaintiff
or any other elevator company, in order to submit a bid to Utah Hotel Company as a proposed
prime contractor. The term ''prime contractor''
means one who undertakes to perform the entire
construction project, as distinguished from a
''subcontractor'' who merely performs a portion
of such project.''
By the court's ·refusal to give such instruction, the
court inferred again that defendant had no right to exercise its consttiutional right to enter into contract.
By request No. 9 the defendant asked the court to
charge the jury that every contract in restraint of trade
or commerce is illegal if such contract prevents competition and tends toward monopoly. The court gave an
instruction directly contrary to law. The substance of
defendant's request was included in the motion for a
directed verdict. Request No. 10 was, ''An agreement
or promise not to bid for the award of a contract, having
as its primary object the stifling of competition, is
illegal.'' That request was taken from the Restatement
of Law, Contracts, Sec. 517. There could be no dispute
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about the fact that plaintiff sought to prevent competition. Defendant was entitled to directed verdict, and it
was error for the court to refuse to follow the law.
By request No. 11 the court "\vas asked to charge
that if the plaintiff procured a quotation from defendant
on the false representation that plaintiff would be the
only bidder on the job, the jury should find against the
plaintiff. A person cannot enforce a fraudulent claim.
By request No. 12, defendant appropriately asked
that the jury be instructed that if plaintiff failed to
submit any further bid within a reasonable time, plaintiff "\vas not acting in good faith with the Utah Hotel
Company, and plaintiff cannot complain about acceptance
of the request of Utah Hotel Company to defendant to
submit a bid on the over-all modernization project. (R.
167). There can be no dispute about the insufficiency
and unsatisfactory nature of plaintiff's bid to Utah Hotel
Company. By request No. 13, defendant asked that the
jury be instructed that defendant is not responsible for
the failure of plaintiff to submit a bid to Utah Hotel
Company which would be satisfactory to the hotel company. (R. 168). There was no reason for refusing such
request.
By request No. 14: "You are instructed that it was
the right of the Utah Hotel Company to ask the defendant or any other person to submit bids on the over-all
construction project.'' Such request was proper in law
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ana in fact. rrhe court ignored the Bill of Rights both
from the standpoint of defendant as well as Utah Hotel
Company's position. By request No. 17: ''The owner
of a building is entitled to require the things done it
desires done in the remodeling or construction conducted
on the owner's premises, and the owner has a right to
specify what is to be done and to reject any proposal
which does not meet the owner's wishes.'' Said instruction was properly proposed in view of the contention of
defendant that plaintiff failed to obtain the award of
the contract because it would not do the things that the
hotel wanted, in the past or at that time. The cour was
arbitrary in refusing each of the requests. The court
ignored the defenses which plaintiff had proved.
By request No. 18, the defendant asked the court to
instruct the jury as follows (R. 173):
"In this case the plaintiff claims it was damaged by the removal of name-plates from the
elevator thresholds. You are instructed that the
purpose of such name-plates is to advertise. The
owner of a building has the absolute right to
determine 'vhether or not any name-plates or any
other device shall be made a part of the equipment installed, and the owner has the right to
either prohibit the placing of any advertising
device on his premises or to remove the same
at any time.
''The plaintiff cannot recover damages for .the
loss of advertising through removal of the nameplates if such name-plates were removed by reason
of the fact that the Utah Hotel Company did not
want any such name-pia tes. ''
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The instruction was correct, and it reflects the theory
of defendant that Utah Hotel Company had the old nameplates removed, and it did not allow any name-plates in
the new cabs. Defendant could not possibly be liable in
damages for the acts of the Utah Hotel Company or its
decisions not to have name-plates.
The defendant was entitled to have the court give
its request No. 19 inasmuch as plaintiff was not a manufacturer, and the placing of name-plates denoting a
manufacturer, when Kimball Elevator Company did not
manufacture such equipment, would be an unfair tradepractice by false advertising:
"You are instructed that it is an unfair trade
practice to place a false or misleading label on
any manufactured article or equipment. In this
connection you are charged that where a person
merely installs equipment manufactured by some
other person, the placing of a name-plate or other
device upon such equipment in such a manner that
it denotes the name of the manufacturer, and not
the installer of such equipment, such labeling
which falsely denotes the name of a manufacturer
is an unfair trade practice.
"You are further instructed that a person who
is guilty of an unfair trade practice has no cause
of action for the removal of any such device nor
for preventing him from continuing such false or
misleading labeling.''
The court in denying such request, deprived defendant of a substantial defense. The denial amounted
to saying that one who is prevented from falsely advertising, has a cause of action against the person who had

165

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

no part in preventing it; for in this case the decision to
have blank thresholds was made solely by Utah Hotel
Company, as the owner. The court disregarded the rights
of the owner, and inferred that Kimball Elevator Company had some special property rights on the premises
of Hotel Utah. The refusal of the court to give reque~t
No. 22, was also prejudicial ( R. 177) :
''The Utah Hotel Company is not a party to
this action. There is evidence in this case that
the old elevator cabs were removed, and new
elevator cabs were installed as a part of the
modernization project. There is no evidence that
the name-plates of the plaintiff which were in
the old elevator cabs were installed as safety
devices, and the evidence is that they were advertising devices. There is evidence that the old
name-plates could not have been used in the new
elevator cabs in any event, and that the management of Utah Hotel Company refused to allow
any name-plates on the thresholds of the new cabs.
''You are instructed that the Utah Hotel Company was under no legal duty to allow any nameplate or any other advertising device on the
threshold of any elevator. You are further instructed that the defendant had no legal right to
put a name-plate in such elevator cabs without
the consent of the Utah Hotel Company. You are
therefore instructed that the defendant is not in
any manner liable for the alleged loss of advertising to the plaintiff by reason of the decisions
of the Utah Hotel Company.''
Obviously, an owner of property has a right to
decide whether a person who wants to advertise shall
have his advertising on the premises. The idea that
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plaintiff could put its advertising on Hotel Utah premises
"~hether the hotel liked it or not, is un-American. Plaintiff's o'vn witness, Max C. Carpenter stated that the
hotel would not allow any such name-plates, and there
is no evidence that the hotel was willing to allow any of
plaintiff's name-plates to be installed, particularly in
view of the fact that plaintiff was not a manufacturer
of any of the essential equipment. By request No. 23,
which the defendant "ras entitled to have the court give
to the jury, it is stated that plain tiff is not enti tied to
recover for either the removal of the old name-plates
nor for not putting new plates in the new cabs, for the
reason that there is no evidence that there was any agreement between the hotel and plaintiff for plaintiff to have
such name-plates in the new cabs, nor any evidence that
plaintiff paid the hotel money or any other thing of
value for name-plates in the new cabs. The instruction
requested is strictly in accordance with the record. Plaintiff did not acquire any right to have name-plates in the
new cabs, and the claim of loss, was utterly fictitious.
By request No. 24, the defendant asked the jury to
be instructed (R. 179) :
''An agreement between parties whereby one
party is to submit an additional bid to the owner
with the purpose of inducing the owner to believe that there is competitive bidding and that
the bid already submitted is a reasonable price
for the proposed job, is a collusive agreement and
there can be no recovery for any alleged breach
of such an agreement. ' '
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Such an instruction was warranted by the statements of Mr .. Connole that he wanted defendant to give
the hotel a bid which would ''justify our price''. He
knew that the hotel 'vanted an honest firm bid. While
defendant denied that there was such a conversation as
claimed by plaintiff, the fact is that the testimony of
plaintiff would show that plaintiff sought the presentation of a collusive bid, and no recovery could be had on
an agreement of such a character, even if there had been
any consideration. There was no consideration and the
pretended ''agreement'' would have been void anyway.
Request No. 25 should have been given because it is
quoted from Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 1468, which states
that an agreement designed for the suppression of competition is a matter of restraint of trade, and if the bidding relates to a proposed contract with a private individual it is a fraud upon such person and such agreement
is unenforceable for it is against public policy to permit
a fraud upon an individual or a corporation which seeks
competitive bids. The evidence clearly shows that plaintiff was seeking to suppress competition, by deceit and
by trying to discourage the hotel from getting a bid
from defendant.
Request No. 26 should have been given and it was
prejudicial error to refuse it, for the hotel company had
a constitutional right to get a bid from defendant, and
plaintiff had no right to impede or restrict the bid in
any manner (R. 181):
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''You are instructed that the Utah Hotel Company as the owner of the property where the
modernization of the elevators was contemplated,
had the absolute right to request the defendant
to submit a firm bid to the Utah Hotel Company
and that the plaintiff company had no right to
restrict or to place any limitation on the bid to
be submitted by the defendant corporation to the
Utah Hotel Company."
The foregoing proposed instruction is so fundamental that a denial of it amounts to a refusal to recognize the Bill of Rights. Likewise, request No. 27 is
inexorably right as a statement of law (R. 182):
"An implied contract is one which the law
infers from the facts and circumstances of a case,
but it will not be inferred in any case where an
express contract would for any reason be invalid.''
The ''implied contract'' theory was designed to circumvent the federal and state statutes which interdict
agreements to refrain from selling to a person or class
of persons. Request No. 29 is also a correct statement
of the law, which defendant was entitled to have the
court give to the jury (R. 184) :
''You are instructed that if you find from the
evidence that Utah Hotel Company requested the
defendant corporation to submit a bid in writing
on the over-all job, and not a mere estimate, that
there could not be any lawfully implied agreement
between the plaintiff and defendant for the defendant to refrain from submitting a firm bid to
Utah Hotel Company; and that any attempt on
the part of the plaintiff to prevent the Utah Hotel
Company from getting a good faith bid would
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have been fraudulent and in derrogation of the
rights of Utah Hotel Company, and your verdict
must be against the plaintiff and in favor of the
defendant, no cause of action.''
Such an instruction would have been generous to
plaintiff, since the court erred in not directing a verdict
in favor of defendant. Plaintiff did not have any right
to interfere "rith the property rights of Utah Hotel Company, by having any agreement with defendant to refrain
from submitting a firm bid to the hotel. No such agreement was ever thought of until the pre-trial conference,
and there was no proof of it at the trial.
Request No. 28 was inexorably right, for the court
had no authority to turn over a group of miscellaneous
irrelevant instruments to the jury to construe. It is the
duty of the judge to construe written instruments, and
that function cannot be delegated to the jury. (R. 183).
' 'You are instructed that the preliminary
negotiations which lead up to the submission of
a bid, do not constitute either an express or implied contract. Where the terms of a request for
bid are clear and the terms of a bid submitted in
response to such request are likewise clear, there
is not to be read into either the request or into
the bid something which is contrary to or at
variance with what is expressly stated. You are
further instructed that parties are presumed to
say what they intend to say when they make an
express written statement which is clear and
definite. ''
This request was warranted in view of the court's
statement that the complaint 'vas that there was a breach
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of a ''preliminary contract of negotiations.'' Furthermore, since the instruments were clear and definite, there
was no occasion to imply some agreement whereby defendant would be subservient to plaintiff.
By request No. 32, defendant asked that the jury
be instructed to disregard all comments of any witness
referring to plaintiff as agent of defendant for the
reason there was no evidence of such a relationship. By
request No. 33, the defendant rightfully asked the court
to instruct the jury sufficiently on consideration as a
necessary element of a valid contract, and to caution
the jury that the various instruments introduced in
evidence could not constitute consideration for an "implied agreement" (R. 188):
"You are instructed that there must be consideration for a contract. That is, a person who
claims a contract must show that there is legal
consideration to support the promise or the agreement. You are instructed that the fact that the
parties may have had prior dealings does not
constitute consideration. In this case there were
prior bids made by defendant to plaintiff, some
of which were accepted and some of which were
never accepted. In this connection, where the bid
is to sell specified property for a definite price
and that price is paid, that transaction is completed, and the fact that a definite contract so
resulted is not consideration for some future
transaction.
"You are therefore instructed that mere negotiations in the past in which plaintiff sought to
obtain a bargain from defendant, or negotiations
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"Thich resulted in actual sales, do not constitute
consideration for any future agreement.''
The court allowed plaintiff to confuse the jury with
a mass of incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial evidence. To make matters worse, the court delegated to
the jury the function of construing written instruments,
to permit the jury to find an ''implied agreement not to
compete with plaintiff'' from negotiations which had
terminated and from numerous unaccepted offers which
had expired. The court licensed the jury to ''find' ' consideration when none could possibly exist.
The court also erred in failing to give request No.
34, for if plaintiff actually used some term which has
no common meaning, plaintiff had the duty to make
itself understood. The court was 'vrong in ruling that
defendant had the burden of finding out what plaintiff
meant. In any event no meeting of the minds could be
presumed.
Having committed prejudicial error by submitting
the case to the jury when there was no evidence of any
agreement, the court committed further error by prejudicial instructions which invited the jury to fasten
liability on defendant when none existed. The court
also ignored the stipulations of the parties and the admissions of plaintiff. Not only did the court fail to give
fair instructions, but the court practically blotted out
most of the defenses, although plaintiff itself proved
most of them. The court refused to present the defendant's theories of defense.
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There were adequate reasons for motion for a new
trial. The court made rulings contrary to law, admitted
incompetent evidence and excluded proper evidence, and
then misdirected the jury and failed to give adequate
or proper instructions. The affidavit of counsel for defendant (R. 197-200), shows not only misconduct of Mr.
Connole during the trial, but that Exhibits 22, 23, 24,
26, 27 and 28 were missing when the case was submitted
to the jury. Inability of counsel to find those exhibits
was called to the attention of the clerk. Exhibits 26, 27
and 28 were found after the jury returned its verdict,
March 19, 1953. Exhibits 22, 23 and 24 are still missing.
Those particular exhibits "\Vere produced at the trial by
plaintiff upon demand of defendant. They were copies
of letters from plaintiff to Murphy Elevator Company
dated January 31, February 23, and April 22, 1948. Those
letters refute statements of Mr. Connole that Kimball
did not charge Murphy Elevator Company a commission.
Exhibit 23 shows that plaintiff did not know how to
figure the freight elevator modernization jobs at Hotel
Utah in 1948.
The defendant was and is entitled to have granted
its motion for judgment in accordance with the motion
for directed verdict. The court did not even grant the
motion for new trial, although the case shrieks with
prejudicial error.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff pleaded a collusive illegal agreement. Plaintiff neither pleaded nor proved any consideration. None
of the written instruments even suggest any idea that
defendant as seller or prospective seller, should refrain
from selling to anyone or refrain from entering into
contract with anyone. The court refused to give heed
to the federal and state statutes which declare illegal
and criminal, the very type of agreement asserted in
this case. The court had no authority to grant plaintiff
immunity from the law, nor did the court have any right
to make a contract, nor to deny defendant the defenses
it asserted, including the defense of illegality.
The evidence demonstrated that plaintiff devised a
scheme to get something for nothing, first by making a
fictitious demand for a "commission" from defendant
as successful bidder. For all practical purposes, plaintiff
had ceased to be a bidder or a c~ndidate for the award
of the modernization contract, by submission of an unsatisfactory bid and then by failing and neglecting to
submit a new bid which would conform to specifications
required by Utah Hotel Company. The original quotation
dated June 14, 1950, obtained by plaintiff from defendant
by false representations, was never accepted, and it was
witharawn by letter dated September 8, 1950, delivered
September 11 or 12, 1950. A new bid from defendant
to plaintiff dated September 11, 1950, was submitted by
defendant to plaintiff after the defendant had submitted
bids to Utah Hotel Company in response to requests of

174

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Hotel Company. The bid of defendant to Utah
IIotel Company on the modernization of the passenger
elevators was based in part on a bid given to defendant
by Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company. Pacific,
(plaintiff's principal), did not submit such bid to defendant until plaintiff was fully informed nor until plaintiff told Pacific it was all right to give defendant a.
quotation. The claim that there was an ''implied agreement not to compete with plaintiff'' by the submission
of an offer to plaintiff by defendant, is fictitious and
sham; for there was no discussion about refraining from
competition, and plaintiff was informed not only by Utah
Hotel Company, but by the defendant and by Pacific,
that the hotel company asked defendant to submit a bid
on the over-all job. There was no legal nor factual basis
for any pretended "implication". The claim that by
submitting a bid to plaintiff on September 12, 1950,
defendant "impliedly promised" not to submit a good
faith bid to the hotel company, when plaintiff knew defendant had already submitted a bid to Utah Hotel Company, is utterly devoid of candor. Utah Hotel Company
had been the customer of defendant at that time for
about 30 months.
The plaintiff proved neither meeting of minds, con~
sideration, nor legal subject-matter for an agreement.
Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of no cause
of action. Instead of throwing the plaintiff out of court
for trying to perpetrate an unconscionable scheme to get
something for nothing, the trial judge threw the law of
contracts out of court. It became obvious that plaintiff
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could not show any contract, but only unaccepted offers
and negotiations which had terminated, which could not
possibly give birth to a contract. The court then announced that ''the contract breached was not a contract
to install, but a preliminary contract of negotiations."
Such a ''theory'' is utterly in defiance of all rules of
contract, for negotiations do not constitute a contract.
The court disregarded the constitutional rights of
both defendant and Utah Hotel Company. The trial
judge ignored the evidence which shows that plaintiff
was not prevented from doing business with Utah Hotel
Company by a wrongful act of defendant, for defendant
was not guilty of any wrongful act. Only the plaintiff
was guilty of wrongdoing. Utah Hotel Company had a
legal right to refuse to do business with plaintiff, without
reason at all, but it established two good reasons why
it could not risk doing business with plaintiff: (1) Plaintiff had given unsatisfactory performance in the past
without making corrections; and (2) plaintiff utterly
failed to offer to do the job the way the hotel wanted it
done or to include all of the items which had to be included. There was no evidence that plaintiff could pos~
si~ly have been awarded either of the two contracts.
Plaintiff did not even prove that it could have made
any profit, even if by some miracle it could have be.en
awarded the contract, for plaintiff resorted to incompe;.
tent evidence of an estimate which omitted a number of
essential items of cost which would have shown that the
cost exceeded the contract price. Plaintiff was allowed
recovery for the failure to have its name-plates on the
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thresholds of the elevator cabs, when such name-plates
would have been illegal and would have constituted an
unfair trade practice since plaintiff would not have been
the manufacturer. Furthermore, plaintiff could not show
that it could have even obtained permission of Utah Hotel
Company, and the evidence is that the hotel would not
allow such name-plates. Plaintiff "struck out" on every
claim it presented. It proved that it resorted to the
judicial machinery in an effort to turn its ''own delicts
into a triumph'' in a scheme to get something for nothing.
Defendant and appellant respectfully submits that
the judgment should be reversed and the cause should
be remanded to the district co~rt, with directions to
enter a judgment against the plaintiff of no cause of
action, for the reason that the evidence shows that plaintiff has no valid claim and no right of recovery against
defendant. Appellant prays for any and all other appropriate relief, including new trial if for any reason this
Honorable Court should deny appellant judgment against
respondent of no cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL E. REIMANN, and
HOWARD J. CANTUS,
.Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.
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